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Preface
This thesis is the result of a PhD project at the Department of Production
and Quality Engineering, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
(NTNU). The work was carried out from October 2005 till November 2008.
The PhD project has been carried out in close collaboration with my main
supervisor, Professor Marvin Rausand at Department of Production and Quality
Engineering (NTNU), and his contributions are reflected in several articles. The
co-supervisor has been Professor Tor Onshus at Department of Engineering Cy-
bernetics (NTNU). He has contributed with his broad industrial network within
the oil and gas industry.
The PhD project has been a unique opportunity for making contributions to a
field in which I take great interest, namely reliability of safety instrumented sys-
tems. Previously, I have worked with safety instrumented systems from a more
practical viewpoint. This knowledge has been used as basis for the development
of new concepts and methods which I hope will lead to safer and more reliable
design and operation of such systems.
Trondheim,
February 2009 Mary Ann Lundteigen
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Summary
This PhD thesis proposes new methods and gives new insight to safety and re-
liability assessments of safety instrumented systems (SISs). These systems play
an important role in many industry sectors and are used to detect the onset of
hazardous events and mitigate their consequences to humans, the environment,
and material assets.
This PhD thesis focuses on SIS applications in the oil and gas industry. Here,
the SIS must respond to hazardous events such as gas leakages, fires, and over-
pressurization. Because there are personnel onboard the oil and gas installations,
the operations take place in a vulnerable marine environment, and substantial
values are associated with the offshore facilities, the reliability of SIS is of great
concern to the public, the authorities, and the plant owners.
The objective of this PhD project has been to identify some of the key factors
that influence the SIS reliability, clarify their effects on reliability, and suggest
means to improve the treatment of these factors in safety and reliability assess-
ments in design and operation.
The PhD project builds on concepts, methods, and definitions in two key
standards for SIS design, construction, and operation: IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.
IEC 61508 is a generic standard, and applies to more than one industry sector
and to SIS manufacturers who develop new products for safety applications. IEC
61511 is a process sector standard and applies to SISs that are based on well
proven or certified components.
The main contributions from this PhD project are:
• A product development model that integrates reliability, availability, main-
tainability, and safety (RAMS) requirements with product development.
• An approach for how to demonstrate compliance to IEC 61508.
• An approach for how to carry out reliability analysis of complex SIS.
• A clarification of the concepts of architectural constraints and safe failure
fraction (SFF), and a discussion of why the SFF may not be suited as a design
parameter.
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• A clarification and classification of the concept of spurious activations and
spurious activation rate.
• An approach for how to determine the test coverage of partial stroke testing
of shutdown valves.
• An approach for how to defend against common cause failures (CCFs) in the
operational phase.
• An approach for how to use field data to monitor and act upon the SIS relia-
bility performance.
It has been important to share the contributions and ideas for further work
with other researchers. The contributions have been presented in ten articles,
where five have been published in international journals, two have been submit-
ted for publication, and three have been presented at conferences and in confer-
ence proceedings.
The contributions are also directed to the industry and the actors that are in-
volved in SIS design, construction, and operation. Even if the oil and gas industry
is the main focus area of the PhD project, the results may be relevant for other
industry sectors as well.
SIS manufacturers and SIS designers face a large number of requirements
from authorities, oil companies, international standards, and so on. At the same
time, they are requested to use the safety life cycle model in IEC 61508 as basis
for their product development. This PhD thesis links the safety life cycle model
in IEC 61508 to a more general product development model, where IEC 61508
requirements are discussed in light of other RAMS requirements.
SIS manufacturers who develop products for more than one industry sector
must often adhere to IEC 61508 as well as sector specific standards. Some of
the sector specific standards build directly on IEC 61508, while others have been
developed prior to IEC 61508 and may use different concepts and approaches.
This PhD thesis describes an approach for qualification of a software develop-
ment platform in light of these challenges.
SIS designers have to balance the SIS reliability with the practicality of per-
forming functional tests. Functional tests are important means to reveal SIS fail-
ures, but the tests often require process shutdowns. Partial stroke testing is a
valve test that does not require full valve closure, but the test efficiency is highly
influenced by the test coverage. This PhD thesis suggests a way to determine the
test coverage, taking into account application specific considerations and generic
data for valve failures.
Traditionally, the oil and gas industry has aimed at keeping the SIS as sim-
ple as possible, and here, reliability block diagrams have been well suited for
reliability analysis. However, technology development challenges the principle
of simplicity, and then fault tree analysis may be better suited to achieve com-
plete reliability models and for involving design engineers in the model con-
struction and verification. Many software tools for fault tree analysis make non-
conservative estimates for the reliability of periodically tested SISs, which may
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not be acceptable when the estimates are used as basis for selecting hardware
architecture. This PhD thesis proposes a conservative calculation approach for
fault tree analysis that builds on calculation methods that the oil and gas industry
are familiar with.
The architectural constraints are used in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 to restrict
the freedom in selecting hardware architecture and to avoid that architecture is
determined based on reliability calculations alone. The architectural constraints,
and in particular the SFF, have been questioned by many researchers, SIS de-
signers, manufacturers, and end users. The insight that is provided in this PhD
thesis to the desired and undesired properties of the SFF and the architectural
constraints may therefore be of interest to several parties. In addition, IEC 61508
and IEC 61511 committees may find the clarification and discussion useful as
they are now in the process of evaluating whether or not to keep these concepts
in future revisions of the standards.
Spurious activations of SIS may lead to production losses, loss of confidence
to the SIS, and more undesired events due to the increased number of shutdowns
and start-ups. IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 do not give explicit constraints for
the spurious activation rate, but oil companies must still consider this issue be-
cause of operational and safety considerations. To account for spurious activa-
tions when selecting SIS design requires insight to why spurious activations oc-
cur and how the spurious trip rate may be estimated. This PhD thesis introduces
three new definitions related to spurious activation; spurious operation, spurious
trip, and spurious shutdown, as a means to clarify the underlying causes of spu-
rious activations and how they are to be included when calculating the spurious
trip rate.
Oil companies have to align their operation and maintenance according to
requirements in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. Two areas where the IEC standards
may require some adjustments to the way of operating and maintaining a SIS
are the handling of CCFs and the follow-up of SIS safety integrity performance.
This PhD thesis suggests an approach on how to defend against CCFs that may
be implemented with current practises for planning, execution, and follow-up
of functional testing and inspection activities. The PhD thesis also presents an
approach for how field data may be used to monitor the safety integrity and for
making adjustments to the test intervals.
There are several areas of further research. One area is related to implementa-
tion of new approaches and concepts from this PhD project into existing industry
practises. Another area is to develop and improve existing concepts and methods
for reliability and safety assessments to account for new technologies and new
ways of operating oil and gas facilities.

About this thesis
The PhD thesis is written for scientists, safety professionals, managers, and other
personnel with knowledge or interest in safety and reliability assessments. Some
knowledge about the offshore oil and gas industry is beneficial. It is also an
advantage to understand the concepts and main principles of the IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511 standards.
The thesis has three parts; Part I Main report, Part II Articles, and Part III
Supplementary information. A list of acronyms and abbreviations and a glossary
are provided at the end of the thesis.
Part I starts with a brief introduction to safety instrumented systems (SIS)
and why they are important in many industry applications, and continues with
a presentation of research challenges, objectives, and main results. The main
research principles and the approach are also presented.
Part II comprises the ten articles that have been developed as part of the PhD
project. Here, five articles are published in international journals, two articles
have been submitted for publication, and three articles have been presented in
conferences and conference proceedings.
Part III gives supplementary information on SIS and SIS related standards
and guidelines. Readers who are not familiar with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511,
may find it beneficial to read Part III in addition to the introductory sections in
Part I.
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Part I
Main report

1Introduction
1.1 Background
Our safety is increasingly taken care of by safety instrumented systems (SISs),
where electrical, electronic, and/or programmable electronic (E/E/PE) devices
interact with mechanical, pneumatic, and hydraulic systems. Such systems are,
for example, frequently used in cars. When you press the brake pedal while driv-
ing, your pedal force may not necessarily be added directly to the car brakes.
Instead, a PE device may convert the pedal force to an electrical signal which is
then used to activate the brake blocks.
During heavy braking, you may experience that the pedal pulses even if you
apply a constant force. In this case, your car has an anti-lock braking system that
prevents the wheels from locking by repeatedly releasing and applying braking
force. This system helps you as a driver to maintain control over the car. If you
still loose control and drive into the ditch, the electronic based air bag system
will release and reduce the extent of damages.
SISs have a much wider application area than the car example. They are of
vital importance at process plants to detect the onset of hazardous events, for
example a release of some hazardous material, and for mitigating their conse-
quences to humans, the environment, and material assets.
SISs are also found in many transportation systems. One example is railway
signalling systems, where SISs are used to set light signals and operate switches.
If the train enters a rail section without permission, for example a train passing
a red light (‘stop’) signal, there may be an additional SIS, the automatic train
protection system, that forces the train to start immediate retardation. SISs are
also an integral part of aircraft and air traffic control systems, to ensure safe
operation of aircrafts in air as well as on ground.
So, when you drive to work or travel by plane to a distant location, you rely on
the SIS to respond to hazardous events. And you may ask: How reliable are these
systems and how can we make sure that they provide the necessary protection?
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This PhD thesis addresses these questions and suggests methods and concepts
to be used by researchers, reliability analysts, design engineers, and end users for
their joint effort in building and operating safe SIS.
The main focus is SIS applications in the oil and gas industry, and particularly
in light of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, two standards that are widely accepted for
SIS design and operation. Even so, many of the basic principles and research
results apply to other industry sectors as well.
1.1.1 Safety instrumented systems
The main purpose of a SIS is to bring the plant or an equipment to a safe state
if an hazardous event occurs. Hazardous events may be gas leakages or too high
or too low pressures, temperatures, and liquid levels. If the SIS fails to perform
the intended functions, the event may develop into an accident, for example an
explosion.
Logic solver
Final elementsInput elements
Fig. 1.1. Simplified illustration of a SIS
A SIS may be split into three main subsystems as illustrated in Fig. 1.1; input
elements, logic solvers, and final elements. These three subsystems are used to
perform safety instrumented functions (SIFs).
A more detailed presentation of SIS and SIS related concepts is given in Part
III, Chapter 4.
1.1.2 Safety and reliability assessments
Safety and reliability assessments play an important role in SIS design, con-
struction, and operation. Such assessments are used to select and qualify a SIS
for a particular application with the given functional and reliability requirements.
When the SIS is put into operation, data may be collected to update the safety
and reliability assessments and verify that the SIS continues to meet the specified
requirements.
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Safety and reliability assessments comprise activities such as reliability mod-
eling and calculations, design reviews, testing, and failure analysis.
The purpose of a design review is to examine the documentation of hardware
and software and evaluate if all the stated requirements are catered for. Failure
analysis is often performed as part of the design review, to ensure that all failure
causes and effects are identified and handled in the SIS design. One frequently
used method is the failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) [108]. In the op-
eration phase, failure analysis may be used to determine corrective actions and
ways to prevent similar failures in the future.
Reliability modeling may be performed by the use of reliability block dia-
grams, Markov state transition diagrams, fault tree analysis, petri-net, or binary
decision diagrams [108, 81, 48, 38, 112, 18]. Quantitative results may be ob-
tained by approximation formulas [108, 24, 114], or by exact formulas [18, 112].
Many calculation methods that are used with periodically tested SIS are based
on approximations [48, 100, 114].
Testing may be performed once the SIS hardware and software have been
constructed or purchased. Testing of hardware and the integrated software and
hardware may start with individual components and end with the SIF loops.
Software testing may follow the V model. The V model combines a top-down
software design approach with a bottom up testing strategy [38, 116]. In the
operational phase, testing is a key activities to reveal hidden SIS failures and to
verify that any modification to the SIS hardware or software leads to the intended
result.
The stated requirements are given in regulations and standards. National and
international regulatory authorities provide overall requirements for SIS design,
implementation, and operation. For the detailed implementation of these require-
ments, the regulations often refer to international standards like IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511. IEC 61508 was introduced in 1998, while IEC 61511 was published
in 2003, as the process sector implementation of the IEC 61508. In this PhD
thesis, these two standards are often referred to as “the IEC standards”.
Other sectors and application areas have also developed their own standards
based on IEC 61508, or modified existing standards to reflect the IEC 61508 re-
quirements, for example IEC 62061 [41] for machinery control systems, IEC
62425 [45] for railway signalling systems, IEC 61513 [40] for nuclear power
plants, and IEC 60601[36] for medical equipment.
A more detailed presentation of IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and other related
standards is given in Part III, Chapter 5.
1.1.3 IEC 61508 and IEC 61511
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 outline requirements, principles, and methods for
safety and reliability assessments, and indicate at what point in time such as-
sessments should be performed.
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The main purpose of the IEC standards is to define a unified approach to safe
and reliable SIS design, implementation, and operation. Even if some of the prin-
ciples, concepts, and methods have been used in previous standards, IEC 61508
and IEC 61511 represent a further development, taking into account the chal-
lenges and opportunities of using E/E/PE technology. The standards do not only
address technical aspects, but also work processes, procedures, and tools neces-
sary to specify, develop, operate, and maintain SIS hardware and software.
IEC 61508 organizes its requirements according to a safety life cycle. The
safety life cycle comprises 16 phases and is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. IEC 61511
uses a similar life cycle model. A more detailed discussion of the safety life
cycle phases is given in Part III, chapter 5.3.
Two concepts are used to describe the desired safety and reliability perfor-
mance; the functional safety requirements, stating what the SIS is required to
do, and the safety integrity requirements, stating how well the SIS is required
to perform. IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 distinguish between four safety integrity
levels (SIL), ranging from SIL 1 to SIL 4 where SIL 1 is the least and SIL 4 is
the most reliable level. For each SIF, the SIL is selected so that the necessary risk
reduction is achieved.
A SIL requirement gives restrictions and guidance on the selection of hard-
ware, software, and associated tools, procedures, and work processes. If a SIS
implements several SIFs that have different SIL requirements, the strictest SIL
requirement applies to any shared components like for example a logic solver.
Safety integrity is split into three parts: Hardware safety integrity, software
safety integrity, and systematic safety integrity. To meet a SIL requirement, it is
necessary to demonstrate that all parts achieve the specified SIL. If, for example,
it is confirmed that a SIF meets SIL 2 in terms of hardware safety integrity, we
can not claim compliance to this SIL unless the systematic and software safety
integrity also meet SIL 2.
Verification of adequate hardware safety integrity is a two step process. First,
it is required to calculate the reliability of the SIFs and compare the results with
the SIL requirement, and second it is required to determine the architectural con-
straints.
IEC 61508 uses probability of a dangerous failure per hour (PFH) for a SIS
that operates continuously and probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a SIS
that operates on demand. A reliability target range is specified for each SIL.
The PFD target range for a SIL 2 safety function is, for example, between 1 ·
10−3 and 1 · 10−2. This means that a SIL 2 safety function must perform its
intended functions in (at least) 99 out of 100 demands. The IEC standards suggest
using the beta factor model for including common cause failures (CCFs) in the
calculations, and IEC 61508, ISA TR 84.00.02 [48], and the PDS method [114]
give some practical examples on how the model can be applied for different
hardware configurations.
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1 Concept
2 Overall scopedefinition
3 Hazard and riskanalysis
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6 Overall
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maintenance
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12 Overall installationand commissioning
13 Overall safetyvalidation
14 Overall operation,maintenance and repair
16 Decommissioningor disposal
15 Overall modificationand retrofit
Back to appropriate
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Fig. 1.2. Safety life cycle (from [38])
The architectural constraints are used to determine the minimum hardware
fault tolerance, taking into account some key properties such as the component
complexity and the safe failure fraction (SFF). The SFF is the proportion of
“safe” failures among all failures. A “safe” failure is either a failure that is safe
by design, or a dangerous failure that is immediately detected and corrected. The
IEC standards define a safe failure as a failure that does not have the potential
to put the SIS in a hazardous or fail-to-function state. A dangerous failure is a
failure that can prevent the SIS from performing a specific SIF, but when de-
tected soon after its occurrence, for example by online diagnostics, the failure is
considered to be “safe” since the operators are notified and given the opportunity
to implement compensating measures and necessary repairs. In some cases, the
SIS may automatically respond to a dangerous detected failure as if it were a true
demand, for example, causing shutdown of a process section or the whole plant.
To ensure compliance with software and safety integrity requirements, the
standards promote verification and validation in various stages of the SIS life cy-
cle, including design reviews, commissioning, testing, and audits. The key audit
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activity is functional safety assessment (FSA). This is an extended review were
compliance to all requirements of the IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 is investigated.
The introduction of the IEC standards has lead to a more unified approach to
SIS design, construction, and operation. However, the standards also give new
challenges to the industry, as they have to adapt their current practises to new
concepts, principles, and requirements. The concepts, principles, and require-
ments are not always fully understood, which in some cases lead to unintended
use.
The implications of IEC 61508, and related standards as IEC 61511, are ex-
tensively discussed in the literature [5, 11, 128, 12, 109, 110, 24, 116, 125, 121,
13]. Still, SIS manufacturers, SIS designers, and end users seem to request more
guidance on how to adapt to the IEC requirements.
1.2 Research challenges and questions
Based on a thorough literature review1 and discussion with SIS manufacturers
and end users, some overall challenges include:
• Some of the key concepts that have been introduced with IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511 are not well defined and fully understood.
• As a result, many concepts are applied differently leading to different, and
not always comparable results.
• There seems to be insufficient attempts to analyze key factors that influence
reliability, and provide guidance on their constraints and recommended use.
• SIS manufacturers, system integrators, and end users still seem to lack guid-
ance on how to adjust their current work processes, tools, and procedures to
IEC 61508 and related standards.
More specifically, the following specific challenges related to safety and re-
liability assessments have been identified.
1.2.1 RAMS requirements from the SIS producer’s perspective
SIS manufacturers must often adhere to IEC 61508 when designing and con-
structing new SIS devices. IEC 61511 does, for example, direct SIS manufactur-
ers back to IEC 61508 for design and qualification of new SIS devices. For SIS
manufacturers, it may therefore be advantageous to align their product develop-
ment process with the framework in IEC 61508, but IEC 61508 does not provide
all necessary requirements for SIS development. Manufacturers also face other
1 with basis in Part II and Part III.
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safety, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) requirements from cus-
tomers and authority regulations and directives.
Many authors address product development models and product development
challenges [103, 10, 78, 61, 15, 25, 26, 80]. Product development is viewed from
different angles; The producer (e.g., manufacturer, system integrator) perspec-
tive, consumer (e.g., end user) perspective, or a combination of the two perspec-
tives. Unfortunately, none of the models indicate how RAMS requirements can
be catered for in the context of IEC 61508. Relevant research questions to ad-
dress are therefore:
• What are the RAMS requirements from a SIS producer’s perspective?
• How can a product development model reflect RAMS requirements in light
of the requirements in IEC 61508?
1.2.2 Adoption of IEC 61508 requirements
Industry specific standards are used to integrate the IEC 61508 requirements with
sector specific considerations, design principles, and terms. For SIS manufactur-
ers who develop equipment or systems for more than one industry sector, it is
important to have methods and tools that comply with IEC 61508 as well as
with the sector specific standards. However, many SIS manufacturers find this
task overwhelming, and seek guidance on how to demonstrate that their prod-
ucts meet the relevant requirements. A relevant research question to address are
therefore:
• What approach may be taken for qualifying a product according to the
IEC 61508 and relevant sector specific requirements?
1.2.3 Reliability analysis of complex SIS
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2, there are several approaches for calculating the
SIS reliability. Obtaining a point value of the reliability, for example for the av-
erage PFD, is not the only purpose of such an analysis. The analysis should help
designers understand the functionality of the SIS and give advice to how the SIS
design can be improved. Such improvements may be related to physical design
changes, changes to the voting logic, improved diagnostic test routines, protec-
tion against common cause failures (CCF), and so on. An important objective of
reliability analysis is therefore to provide a decision basis which is possible to
comprehend by design engineers who are usually not trained in reliability engi-
neering.
The reliability analysis approaches have different strengths and weaknesses.
Many SISs include complex interactions of pneumatic, hydraulic, electrical, and
programmable electrical components, and in this case it is necessary to select
a method that can capture the complexity and at the same time contribute with
10 1 Introduction
more insight to how the SIS works among SIS designers, operators, and main-
tenance personnel. These strengths and weaknesses are best demonstrated by
case studies. Case studies are therefore often requested and welcomed to share
experience and increase the awareness to their practical use. Relevant research
questions to address are therefore:
• What kind of reliability modeling and calculation approaches are suitable
for complex SISs, taking into account the need to provide information that
may be possible to comprehend by SIS designers, operators, and maintenance
personnel?
• What kind of practical considerations can be made to the handling of CCFs?
1.2.4 The ambiguity of the architectural constraints
In the design phase, the PFD is calculated based on generic data (e.g., generic
failure rates). This initial PFD estimate, which is sometimes referred to as the
predicted performance [80], may be uncertain due to a number of reasons. Fol-
lowing the recommended approach in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, the contribu-
tion from software failures and systematic failures are often excluded. In addi-
tion, the effects of operational and environmental conditions on the SIS hard-
ware may not be fully known and catered for in the input data. Assumptions
and simplifications that are made for the reliability modeling and analysis may
also influence to what extent the predicted PFD gives a realistic indication of the
performance.
Based on these arguments, IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 have included a set of
additional requirements to achieve a sufficiently robust hardware architecture.
These requirements are referred to as architectural constraints, and their inten-
tion is to have one (or more) additional channels that can activate the SIF in
case of a fault within the SIS. The architectural constraints prevent SIS design-
ers and system integrators from selecting architecture based on PFD calculations
alone, and the requirements may therefore be seen as restrictions in the freedom
to choose hardware architecture.
The architectural constraints are sometimes interpreted as a mistrust to the
quantitative reliability analysis. Reliability experts frequently debate whether or
not the architectural constraints are necessary. It is particularly the suitability of
the safe failure fraction (SFF) that has been questioned [66, 47, 111].
A thorough analysis of the architectural constraints and the SFF, and their
intended and non-intended effects on reliability seems to be missing. A relevant
research question to address is therefore:
• How do the architectural constraints affect reliability, and in particular, the
SFF?
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1.2.5 The concept of spurious activations
The main focus of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 is to ensure that the SIS is able
to perform on demand. Limited focus is given to spurious activations and their
causes and effects. IEC61508 has no requirements related to spurious activa-
tions. IEC 61511 requires that a maximum spurious trip rate is specified, but the
standard does not provide any definition of a spurious trip or guidance on how
the rate should be estimated and catered for when selecting SIS design.
To estimate the spurious trip rate, the oil and gas industry often uses the for-
mulas presented in [122, 48, 114, 116]. When comparing these formulas, it is
evident that there is no unique interpretation of the spurious trip concept. While
the PDS2 method [114] defines a spurious trip as a spurious activation of a sin-
gle SIS element or of a SIF, ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 [8] refers to a spurious trip as
a non-intended process shutdown. As a result, the concept of spurious trip is
rather confusing and it is difficult to compare the spurious trip rate in different
applications. Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• What is meant by spurious activation?
• How may spurious activation be classified?
• What factors should be considered when calculating the spurious activation
rate?
1.2.6 Defense against CCFs in the operational phase
End users need to have work practises, procedures, tools, and personnel compe-
tence to maintain the desired SIS performance. Safety and reliability assessments
often indicate that the most important contributor to SIS failure is CCFs. CCFs
may affect several redundant components, and thereby violate the intended tol-
erance against hardware failures.
The events, acts, and conditions that lead to CCFs may be introduced in de-
sign as well as in the operational phase. For design and construction, checklists
have been developed to ensure that measures are taken to reveal and avoid intro-
ducing CCFs. Similar tools seem to be missing for SIS follow-up in the opera-
tional phase.
Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• How are CCFs introduced in the operational phase?
• How can CCFs be identified, analyzed and prevented during SIS operation
and maintenance?
2 PDS is the Norwegian abbreviation of “reliability of computer-based safety systems”.
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1.2.7 The reliability effects of introducing partial stroke testing
Partial stroke testing (PST) is sometimes introduced to improve reliability of
shutdown valves. The reliability gain may be used to improve safety and/or to
reduce costs [68]. The magnitude of reliability improvement is influenced by the
PST coverage factor, which expresses to what extent failures can be revealed
during PST compared to functional tests.
While several authors have discussed how to take credit for PST in reliability
calculations [6, 4, 64, 76, 120], little guidance has been given on how to deter-
mine the PST coverage factor. Lundteigen and Rausand [68] show that past data
indicate quite different PST coverage, and ISA TR 84.00.03 and Goble [23] sug-
gest using FMEA to determine the PST coverage. Relevant research questions to
address are therefore:
• What factors influence the PST coverage?
• What PST coverage may be claimed for shutdown valves based on historical
data?
• What methods can be used to determine the PST coverage factor, taking into
account application specific conditions and technology?
1.2.8 SIS performance monitoring in the operational phase
Monitoring reliability performance of safety functions was a legal requirement
in Norway even before the introduction of the IEC standards. Unfortunately, the
current performance indicators and targets are not fully suited for follow-up of
SIL requirements.
The industry also seems to lack a common approach to how field data can
be utilized for maintenance management, for example for making decisions on
how frequent the functional tests should be executed based on the field experi-
ence. Two approaches are included in OLF-070 [100]. Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches have not been widely adopted by the Norwegian oil and gas industry,
and changes to the test intervals are today mainly based on qualitative consider-
ations. Relevant research questions to address are therefore:
• How can field data be used to monitor the safety integrity during operations?
• How can field data be used to make decisions regarding the functional test
intervals?
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1.3 Research objectives
The main objective of the PhD project has been to identify some of the key
factors that influence the SIS reliability, clarify their effects on reliability, and
suggest means to improve the treatment of these factors in safety and reliability
assessments in design and operation.
Based on the main objective and the research questions, the more specific objec-
tives have been to:
1. Propose a RAMS management approach that relates IEC 61508 require-
ments to other RAMS requirements.
2. Demonstrate how SIS manufacturers can achieve compliance to the IEC 61508
requirements as well as sector specific requirements, by using a software de-
velopment platform as a case study.
3. Contribute with new perspectives and approaches for reliability analysis of
complex SIS.
4. Clarify how the requirements for architectural constraints may affect relia-
bility, taking both intended and unintended effects into account.
5. Provide definitions for spurious activation, and suggest which factors to ad-
dress when calculating the spurious activation rate.
6. Propose a framework for calculating the PST coverage, that takes design
features as well as plant specific features into account.
7. Propose a CCF defense approach that can improve the awareness, under-
standing, and control of CCFs during execution and follow-up of functional
tests and inspections.
8. Propose a practical approach for using field data for monitoring safety in-
tegrity performance and for making decisions on how to adjust the functional
test intervals.
The numbering does not indicate a prioritization of the objectives. The pur-
pose of the numbering is for reference only.
1.4 Delimitations
The main focus is SIS applications in the oil and gas industry and within the
context of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, and most practical examples, terms, and
concepts are selected from this industry sector. It is assumed that the SIS is op-
erating on demand, rather than continuously or in the high demand mode. This
assumption applies to most SIS on oil and gas installations.
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The selected research areas are based on own interests (what I would like
to learn more about), on IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 (what I should know some-
thing about), on discussions with other reliability experts, for example in the
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 committee, on the stated research questions, on re-
search challenges identified in SINTEF projects, and, finally, on practical chal-
lenges experienced through participation in the analysis of SIS failures reported
for the Kristin installation that is operated by StatoilHydro. This means that there
may be other relevant factors that influence the SIS reliability, for example han-
dling of uncertainty, that are not covered in this PhD project.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The thesis comprises three main parts; Part I Main report, Part II Articles, and
Part III Supplementary information.
Part I gives a brief presentation of the research area, the research approach,
and the main results. Part I also gives ideas for areas of further research. The
main report builds on ten research articles, and the reader is directed back to
these articles for additional details on the main results.
Part II includes the ten research articles that have been published during the
PhD project, in international journals or in conference proceedings.
Part III provides supplementary information on SIS and SIS related stan-
dards, and gives readers an opportunity for more insight to these areas.
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1.5.1 Journal articles
Reference
Article 1: [87]
Nordland, Odd and Lundteigen, Mary Ann. Safety qualification of
a software development environment. International Journal of Per-
formability Engineering (IJPE), Volume 3, p. 75-89, 2007
Article 2: [67]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. Common cause fail-
ures in safety instrumented systems on oil and gas installations: Im-
plementing defense measures through function testing. Journal of
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 20, p. 218-229,
2007
Article 3: [70]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. Spurious activation
of safety instrumented systems in the oil and gas industry: Basic
concepts and formulas. Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
Volume 93, p. 1208-1217, 2008
Article 4: [69]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. Partial stroke testing
of process shutdown valves: How to determine the test coverage.
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 21, p.
579-588, 2008
Article 5: [71]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. Architectural con-
straints in IEC 61508: Do they have the intended effect? Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, Volume 94, p.520-525, 2009
Article 6: [65]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. Reliability assessment
of safety instrumented systems in the oil and gas industry: A prac-
tical approach and a case study. Submitted to Journal of Reliability,
Quality and Safety Engineering
Article 7: [72]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann, Rausand, Marvin, and Utne, Ingrid. Devel-
opment of safety instrumented systems – RAMS engineering and
management from a producer perspective. Submitted to Reliability
Engineering and System Safety
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1.5.2 Conference articles
Reference
Article 8: [68]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. The effect of partial
stroke testing on the reliability of safety valves. In Risk, Reliability
and Societal Risk, Volume 3. Taylor & Francis 2007, p. 2479-2486
Article 9: [28]
Hauge, Stein and Lundteigen, Mary Ann. A new approach for
follow-up of safety instrumented systems in the oil and gas indus-
try. In Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis: Theory, Methods and
Applications, Volume 3. CRC Press. 2008, p. 2921-2928
Article 10: [66]
Lundteigen, Mary Ann and Rausand, Marvin. Assessment of hard-
ware safety integrity requirements. In I: Reliability of Safety-Critical
Systems: Proceedings of the 30th ESReDA Seminar. European Com-
mission, Joint Research Centre p. 185-198
2Research principles and approach
The main reasons for starting a PhD project have been to:
• Acquire a state of the art knowledge within my areas of interest; SIS and
safety and reliability analysis.
• Be able to understand and use methods for safety and reliability assessments,
and learn more about their strengths and limitations.
• Develop research skills, ranging from the design and execution of research
projects, to the writing of scientific articles and presentation of research re-
sults.
• Contribute with new concepts and methods that may be recognized by other
researchers within the same research area.
• Develop international and national networks with reliability and SIS experts.
The overall approach for meeting these objectives are outlined in the follow-
ing sections.
My scientific background is natural science with specialization in cybernet-
ics. Cybernetics concern automatic control, and many applications build on tech-
nologies that are frequently used for SIS.
Most of my work experience is related to the oil and gas industry, with par-
ticular focus on instrumentation and maintenance. I have obtained field experi-
ence from having worked on offshore oil and gas installations. It was during this
period my interest in SIS emerged, an interest that has been further developed
through research activities and now finally, in a PhD project. I hope that future
research will benefit from the skills that I have developed during the PhD project.
2.1 Research principles
What is research?
Research may be defined as a detailed study of a subject, especially in order to
discover (new) information or reach a (new) understanding (Cambridge Dictio-
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naries Online). The study should be systematic, and the subject may, for example,
be literature, theory, materials, or a system. The primary objectives of research
are to acquire and exploit new knowledge.
Many research (or scientific) methods within social as well as natural sci-
ence require the use of experiments. An experiment is a test under controlled
conditions that is made to demonstrate a known truth, examine the validity of a
hypothesis, or determine the suitability of something previously untried. A differ-
ence between my work and classical (natural science) research, is that I develop
new methods and concepts based on reasoning rather than by performing exper-
iments. I define reasoning as the process where formal logic arguments, existing
methods, and knowledge are used as building blocks to derive new relationships
or insight.
We may distinguish between three types of research based on the intended
use OECD [98]: (i) Basic research is experimental or theoretical work under-
taken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phe-
nomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view,
(ii) applied research is original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new
knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or
objective, and (iii) oriented basic research is research carried out with the ex-
pectation that it will produce a broad base of knowledge likely to form the back-
ground to the solution of recognized or expected current or future problems or
possibilities. While the main purpose of (i) and (iii) is to acquire new knowledge,
the main purpose of (ii) is to solve a particular problem.
The research performed as part of my PhD project may be classified as ori-
ented basic research because the focus is on the development of new concepts
and methods that may fulfil current need, and which may form a basis for further
research that may meet the needs of the future.
When is a research method sustainable?
Any new method should not be accepted before it has been proved valid for its in-
tended purpose. Without experiments, we may investigate the method’s validity
by investigating the validity of the reasoning. If some of the initial assumptions
are incorrect or the formal logic used to support the new method is wrong or
incorrectly used, we may conclude that the method is not valid at all or just valid
within a more narrow application area than originally planned. It is also possible
to perform case studies where the method is tested for an example application.
In this case, we may validate the results by qualitative or expert judgments, or
preferably, compare the results with outcomes from other recognized and com-
parable methods.
In my research, I have tried to use both validation approaches. I have justified
the arguments and assumptions used in method development. By peer review, the
arguments, the assumptions, and also the formal logic have been verified. I have
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also included case studies, or given examples, that illustrate how the method may
be applied. The methods presented in article 6 (on reliability analysis of complex
SIS) and article 9 (on SIS performance monitoring) have been used in industry
projects.
Method validity is not the only quality measure of research methods. Accord-
ing to the Norwegian Research Council [94], research quality is related to three
aspects:
• Originality; to what extent the research is novel and has innovative use of
theory and methods.
• Solidity; to what extent the statements and conclusions in the research are
well supported.
• Relevance; to what extent the research is linked to professional development
or is practical and useful to society.
I have published articles in journals and conferences with referee as a means
to verify that my research approaches fulfil the requirements to originality, so-
lidity, and relevance. By presenting some of the results in relevant fora, like the
PDS forum1 and the IEC 61511 technical committee, I have also obtained addi-
tional confirmation of the research relevance. However, additional case studies
should be performed to obtain more insight on how the results may be applied
and integrated into the SIS life cycle phases.
The main type of research in this thesis is development of concepts and meth-
ods meant for practical applications in the oil and gas industry. The purpose has
been to develop new theoretical models, frameworks, and methods based on ex-
isting methods within functional analysis, causal analysis, and reliability model-
ing.
I do not think research should be performed as an individual project. I think
the research quality improves from the interaction between researchers, and be-
tween researchers and the industry. New ideas form the basis for new knowledge,
and may often occur unexpectedly when a problem or a system is viewed from
different angles and perspectives. Even though a PhD project is a rather individ-
ual activity, I have tried to discuss ideas and results with different actors.
First to mention is the fruitful discussions with my main supervisor, who has
challenged me on the quality of reasoning and the application of theory. Second,
I have participated in several related activities, which are further explained in
Section 2.2. Through these activities, I have been able to raise my understanding
of SIS and SIS related standards and identify new research areas.
To be successful in research, it is essential to cope with criticism. A necessary
basis for handling criticism is always to aim for high quality research that is
worthwhile defending.
1 PDS is the acronym for “pålitelighet og tilgjengelighet av datamaskinbaserte sikringssyste-
mer” (Norwegian for “Reliability and availability of computer based safety systems”). The
PDS forum is a forum for Norwegian vendors and users of control and safety systems.
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I think that the way a researcher copes with criticism may be a measure of the
researchers integrity or confidence in own research. Being exposed to criticism,
for example in a response from a reviewer on a new journal article, should start a
two step process. First, it is important to analyze the criticism carefully; Does it
represent a new perspective to my research, and which I have not been aware of
or considered sufficiently? Does it pinpoint a gap or a weakness in my research,
for example the assumptions? In this case, the criticism represents valuable input
to my research, and potentially, a starting point of a new collaboration among
researchers. If the criticism turns out to be invalid or pointless, even after having
explored the pearls of wisdom that may be buried in it, I think it is still worth
a well founded reply. The second step should therefore always be to give well
founded replies regardless of validness of the criticism. By this approach, I think
that my integrity as a researcher increases, in my own eyes as well as others.
2.2 Research approach
High quality research requires a documented and logical design of the research
project. A research project is a sequence of activities or work packages that build
onto each other. It starts with the definition of research basis and research ques-
tions and ends up with the research results. A research project should provide
answers to the initially stated questions, provide new methods, highlight their
application areas, and suggest new perspectives and ideas for further work.
A research project should include the following main steps (derived from
[62]):
1. Identification of research context and perspectives
2. Discussion of relevant research problems (“gaps”), and the associated re-
search questions
3. Identification of main assumptions
4. Description of theoretical basis
5. Description of new methods and models
6. Discussion of methods/model application areas and constraints
My PhD project has been divided into the three main activities: (1) Devel-
opment of the PhD project plan, (2) development of research articles, and (3)
development of the PhD main report (thesis). In addition, I have participated in
a number of related activities which have supported my research.
The research activities and how they relate to the research results are illus-
trated in Fig. 2.1. The project plan development started with a literature review
and an initial identification of research gaps. The activity then continued with
a discussion of research topics, research questions, and research approach. The
research questions that have been addressed in this PhD project have been partly
selected from the literature review and partly from topics where I would like to
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further work
Overall approach
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conclusions
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state of the art
Updated description 
of state of the art
Participation in follow-up SIS at Kristin
Holding lectures within research topics
Fig. 2.1. Research execution plan
increase my competence. The PhD project plan resulted in an initial state of the
art description, formulation of research questions, and a research execution plan.
The research articles have been developed following the same research steps.
The new methods and models and their theoretical basis are also presented there.
Most of the articles are written together with my main supervisor, Professor Mar-
vin Rausand as we have mutual interest in the research field.
Two articles have been written with researchers from SINTEF, Odd Nordland
and Stein Hauge. The article with Odd Nordland documents some of the results
from an industry project where SINTEF performed reliability analysis of a new
railway signaling system. The article with Stein Hauge has been based on a re-
search project that is funded by the Norwegian Research Council and the PDS
forum (referred to as the PDS-BIP project).
The PhD main report (thesis) describes the research basis, research questions,
and research approach, and outlines the main results from the research articles.
The development of the PhD thesis has been an iterative process as new results,
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ideas and insight have been obtained from the research articles and other related
activities, like:
• Participation in follow-up of SIS at Kristin: Kristin in a condensate field out-
side Norway and which is operated by StatoilHydro at Stjørdal. The Kristin
offshore installation is built according to the OLF-070 [100], and the follow-
up must be aligned with the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 requirements. Here,
I have been able to participate in the analysis of SIS failures that have been
reported for the installation.
• Participation in projects:
– PDS-BIP project: This project comprises several research activities. I
have contributed to two research reports: The first report describes the
current status and challenges related to implementation of the IEC 61508
and IEC 61511 requirements for new installations on the Norwegian con-
tinental shelf. The second report describes a guideline for follow-up of
safety integrity for SIS in the operational phase.
– Industry project on investigating draw-work brake problems: The project
was led by Professor Michael Golan at the department of Petroleum En-
gineering and Applied Geophysics (NTNU), and I have contributed with
qualitative reliability analysis of control and safety functions that were
implemented for the brakes.
– Industry project on reliability analysis of workover systems: I have per-
formed qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis of well isolation
for workover systems.
• Participation in conferences and seminars: I have participated and presented
results in the ESREL conference two times. In addition, I have held presenta-
tions in the PDS forum and at some industry related conferences. I have also
been invited and participated in company internal seminars on IEC 61508
and IEC 61511.
• IEC 61511 technical committee work: I am participating in the IEC 61511
technical committee on behalf of the PDS forum. The technical committee is
responsible for maintaining the IEC 61511. Through this work, I am able to
better understand intention behind the requirements and to meet and discuss
key issues of SIS design, construction, and operation with SIS experts from
many different countries. A revision of the IEC 61511 has now been initiated,
and here I may be able to influence the future content of the standard.
I have prepared and held lectures on all topics that are covered in my arti-
cles and some related areas. Holding lectures have been a way to improve my
understanding of fundamental issues within reliability as well as on the methods
that are frequently used for safety and reliability assessments. In addition, the
presented material is subject to a quality check by the participating students.
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Quality assurance
An essential part of the quality assurance has been carried out through publi-
cation in international journals and conferences with referee. In addition, the
relevance and solidity have been confirmed by sharing research ideas and results
at international conferences and in relevant forums like the PDS forum and the
technical committee for the IEC 61511 standard.

3Main results and further work
3.1 Main results
The ten research articles represent and describe the main results of this PhD
project. The relationships between the articles and the research objectives are
illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Eight research objectives were stated in Section 1.3. The
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate to what extent these objectives have been
met.
In Table 3.1, I have indicated how different target groups may use the results
from this PhD project. The rationale behind this table is further elaborated in
Section 3.2.
Table 3.1. Subjects of interest for different target groups
Target groups Subjects of interest Article ref.
Academics (other researchers): Spurious activation 3
Architectural constraints 5,10
Industry - end users: Defenses against CCFs 2
Use of field data 9
Industry - SIS designers, Compliance to IEC standards 1
manufacturers: Product development - RAMS 7
Partial stroke testing 4,8
Architectural constraints 5,10
Analysis of complex SIS 6
Authorities Defenses against CCFs 2
Education: Concept clarification All
3.1.1 Contributions to objective 1
The first objective addresses the need for SIS manufacturers, SIS designers, and
system integrators to have a holistic view on RAMS requirements, and not on
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Fig. 3.1. Relationships between research objectives and research articles
IEC 61508 and related standards alone. The research questions associated with
the objective are discussed in Section 1.2.1 and article 7 [72]. The main contri-
butions from this PhD project are:
• Identification of RAMS requirements for a SIS producer.
• Development of a product development model that integrates these require-
ments, and demonstrates its application for a SIS.
I consider the contributions as a first step towards meeting objective 1. To
fully meet the objective, the framework should provide more in-depth guidance
on each of the RAMS aspects. Currently, the framework is more detailed on is-
sues related to IEC 61508 compared to product safety, availability, maintenance,
and maintainability. A particular area of interest is to balance safety integrity and
(production) availability.
3.1.2 Contributions to objective 2
The second objective addresses the need for more guidance on how to demon-
strate compliance to the IEC 61508 and sector specific standards. The research
questions associated with the objective are discussed in Section 1.2.2 and article
1 [87]. The main contributions from this PhD project are:
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• A clarification of how EN 50126, EN 50128, and EN 50129 for railway sig-
naling systems relate to the IEC 61508 requirements for a software develop-
ment platform.
• A practical approach for how to demonstrate compliance to IEC 61508 and
sector specific requirements.
Article 1 is the only publication in this PhD project that is directed towards
another industry sector than the oil and gas industry. The article builds on a
SINTEF project where I was the project leader and where the reliability of a
railway signaling system was investigated. The article has been included because
the results are applicable for the oil and gas industry: Some overall principles for
handling sector specific and generic standards are discussed and the software
development platform may be used in many industry sectors, including the oil
and gas industry.
Many industry specific standards for SIS software and hardware design were
developed prior to the release of IEC 61508. Some of the standards have later
been updated to reflect IEC 61508, but there are often inconsistencies due to
the sector specific considerations. As IEC 61508 acceptance increases among
national authorities, the regulations often make reference to the IEC 61508 as
well as the sector specific standards. For SIS manufacturers and SIS designers, it
is necessary to demonstrate compliance to both categories of standards.
My view is that the contributions from this PhD project are important to ease
the adoption of the IEC standards. Case studies are useful to demonstrate the pro-
cess of compliance. A limitation may be that verification of application software
is not addressed. A software development platform can provide programmers
with suitable tools for software development, but is not able to verify if the tools
are used correctly and if the software specification is adequate and correctly in-
terpreted through the software code. IEC 61508 and EN 50128 propose several
methods that are suitable for revealing software failures and weaknesses, but the
standards may provide too much freedom in the selection of methods.
3.1.3 Contributions to objective 3
The third objective addresses the need to improve current methods for reliability
analysis of complex SIS, taking into account that the methods should still be
possible to comprehend by design engineers and that the methods should cater
for the main properties of periodically tested systems. The research questions
associated with the objective are discussed in Section 1.2.3 and article 6 [65].
The main contributions from this PhD project are:
• A detailed description of a complex SIS, represented by a case study of a
workover system for well interventions.
• An approach for how to model CCFs and to make conservative approxima-
tions for the PFD with fault tree analysis.
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• A recommendation on the use of minimal cut sets as basis for communicating
findings from reliability analyses to decision makers and practitioners.
In my view, the contributions support the stated objectives. I realize that the
arguments for using fault tree analysis are mainly based on the identified limita-
tions of reliability block diagrams. The main reasons for taking this approach are
that (i) both fault trees and reliability block diagrams are widely accepted in the
oil and gas industry, and (ii) fault trees are (like reliability block diagrams) easy
to comprehend by SIS designers and practitioners and it is therefore easier for
the reliability analysts to use their expertise for verifying the reliability models.
One immediate question that the reader may ask is why a new approach for
fault tree analysis is necessary when several software tools are available that
supports such analyses.
The first response to this question is that most software tools for fault tree
analysis use non-conservative approximations for periodically tested compo-
nents. This may not be acceptable when the PFD estimates are used as basis
for selecting hardware architecture. Many reliability analysts may ask how im-
portant the conservative versus the non-conservative estimation is, in particular if
the same tool is used to analyze and compare different hardware configurations.
I partly agree with this argument, but in practise, the results are being compared
even if different calculation approaches are used. Many decision makers do not
have sufficient insight to judge how the calculation approach influences the PFD
estimate. I therefore think that we, as researchers, as a minimum should aim
for calculation approaches that make conservative rather than non-conservative
approximations.
A second response to this question is related to how the CCFs are treated.
Most fault tree analysis tools require explicit modeling of CCFs in the fault trees,
and this is not always a suitable approach for reliability analysis of complex SIS.
As demonstrated by a case study, there may be dependencies between compo-
nents that are modeled at different locations in the fault tree. For the reliability
analyst, it is not easy to decide how to model CCFs and where to incorporate
them as basic events. In addition, the size of the fault tree may be overwhelming
and the possibility for making errors during modeling or model revisions may
increase.
A third response to the question is related to the use of already well known
formulas in the oil and gas industry. Many reliability analysts are familiar with
reliability block diagrams and related approximation formulas in IEC 61508 and
the PDS method. The advantage of the proposed approach is that these well
known formulas are applied for the minimal cut sets. The system is considered
as a series of cut parallel structures in a reliability block diagram, where each
minimal cut set is a 1-out-of-n. Here, 1-out-of-n means that at least one out of n
components must function for the configuration to perform its intended function.
One area that is not sufficiently addressed in the proposed approach is the
handling of k-out-of-n voted configurations with k ≥ 2. For a k-out-of-n con-
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figuration, the same components may be element of more than one minimal set.
For the calculations, the “repeated” components may be considered as associ-
ated components. Rausand and Høyland [108] has proved that the upper bound
approximation holds even with associated components. This means that the PFD
estimate will be conservative rather than non-conservative.
In the article, it is recommended to define these subsystems as single ele-
ments in the fault tree, and use approximation formulas provided in IEC 61508
or by the PDS method to calculate the contributions from independent failures
and CCFs. The mixing of explicit modeling of CCF (in fault trees) and implicit
modeling through the minimal cut sets add some unwanted, and perhaps unnec-
essary, complexity to the proposed approach. More research may be required to
develop alternatives for handling CCFs.
I have not investigated other modeling approaches, like Markov methods,
Petri net, and Monte Carlo simulations. Even if these methods are more difficult
to comprehend by practitioners, they may add new insight to the behavior of
complex SIS which is not catered for in fault trees and reliability block diagrams.
3.1.4 Contributions to objective 4
The forth objective concerns the need to clarify the reliability effects of the re-
quirements for architectural constraints in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, and ad-
dresses in particular the suitability of the SFF. The research questions associated
with the objective are discussed in Section 1.2.4 and articles 5 [66] and 10 [71].
The main contributions from this PhD project are:
• A clarification of why the SFF may credit unsafe SIS design solutions.
• Two case studies that demonstrate the reliability effects of using the SFF as a
design parameter.
• New insight to why more hardware fault tolerance does not always give the
intended reliability improvements.
Regarding article 5, the most recent of the two articles, I have got feedback
from members of the IEC 61511 technical committee that supports my view and
compliments the way the analysis has been performed. For this reason, I think
that the contributions meet the research objective. The discussion of architec-
tural constraints should continue and be used as motivation for development of
new methods and guidelines that reduce uncertainty in reliability modeling and
reliability calculations.
Article 5 and 10 argue that a high SFF is not always good for safety. There
are two ways to reduce the unintended effects of the SFF. First, to exclude the
non-critical failures from the SFF formula, an approach that has been suggested
by the PDS method [114]. Second, to find ways to penalize high safe and danger-
ous detected failure rates in the same way as high dangerous undetected failure
rates are penalized through the PFD calculations. This may be an area of further
research.
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3.1.5 Contributions to objective 5
The fifth objective concerns how to define and classify spurious activations. The
research questions associated with the objective are discussed in Section 1.2.5
and article 3 [70]. The research objective was formulated based on a question I
asked myself when I tried to compare how the spurious trip rates were calculated.
It seems that different approaches are used without giving much reflection to
under which assumptions they are valid. The main contributions from this PhD
project are:
• Definition and classification of spurious activation including spurious opera-
tion, spurious trip, and spurious shutdown.
• Clarification of the causes of spurious activation.
• Discussion of the differences between safe CCFs and traditional (dangerous)
CCFs.
• Generic approach for calculation of spurious trip rate.
• A comparison between the generic approach and two other approaches that
are frequently used to calculate the spurious trip rate, the PDS method and
the ISA approach.
I think that my contributions represent new perspectives to the discussion on
spurious activation. Traditionally, spurious activations in the oil and gas industry
have been seen as a non-safety issue, and that the main consequences of such
activations are production losses. For this reason, the spurious activations are not
given much attention in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.
In other industry sectors, the link between spurious activation and safety is
more evident and reflected in regulations and guidelines. A spurious trip of a
railway signaling system may lead to a situation where the train location status
is not fully known and where manual traffic management is required before a
restart of the system is made. For a car, a spurious release of an air bag system
or the brakes may lead to collision or the car driving off the road.
Traditionally, IEC 61508 and related standards have been applied for emer-
gency shutdown systems, process shutdown systems, fire and gas systems, and
HIPPS. With the increased recognition of the standards, many oil companies as-
sign SIL requirements to other safety critical systems such as well intervention
systems, drilling systems, navigation systems, and ballast systems. For these sys-
tems, it is often important to also focus on the rate of spurious activations as they
may lead to hazardous events. Whereas traditional SISs often have a well defined
safe state, this is not always the case for other safety critical systems. The safe
state of a ballast system may in some cases be to stop pumps and close valves,
while in other situations, for example if the ballast tanks take in water, it may
be important to run pumps and keep valves open to retain equilibrium of the
installation.
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One aspect that could have been investigated further, is how a spurious acti-
vation may improve the actual (field) reliability. Spurious activations may often
lead to partial or complete functional test of SIFs, but more guidance should be
provided on how much credit to take from such activations. It is important to em-
phasize that giving credit to spurious activations is an issue for the operational
phase, and should not be used as an argument for designing SISs that are prone
to this type of failures.
3.1.6 Contributions to objective 6
The sixth objective concerns the need to clarify the reliability gain from intro-
ducing partial stroke testing (PST). The research questions associated with the
objective are discussed in Section 1.2.7 and articles 4 [68] and 8 [69]. The main
contributions from this PhD project are:
• An approach for how to determine the PST coverage based on experience
data.
• A clarification of the concept PST coverage and its main elements.
• A new framework for how to determine the PST coverage, taking into ac-
count the application specific conditions.
Several articles are published on how to determine the effect of PST on the
PFD, but little attention is given to how the PST coverage is determined. We
may ask why this is important, since most analyses indicate a PST coverage in
the range from 60% to 70%.
My main argument is that PST may easily be introduced on false premises.
This means that decision makers are not sufficiently aware of the conditions
under which the PST gives the intended results, and in what situations frequent
PST may introduce new risks. I strongly think that analysis should be used to
raise awareness of the assumptions, conditions, and limitations of using PST.
I think that the new framework represents new ideas and new insight to the
reliability effects of PST, and that the contributions therefore fulfil the intent of
the objective. Still, I think the framework needs further development. One issue
is the selection of questions that are used to determine the PST reliability factor.
The questions should be discussed with the industry and in particular with end
users, valve vendors, and vendors of PST technology. The discussions may lead
to new questions, modification of the existing ones, and perhaps an update of the
weights that have been assigned for each question.
At present, little field data are available on what type of failures that have
been revealed by PST, and if functional tests have revealed failures that should
have been detected by PST. Further analysis of field data may therefore be re-
quired to improve the framework.
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3.1.7 Contributions to objective 7
The seventh objective addresses CCFs and how they may be catered for in the
operational phase. The research questions associated with the objective are dis-
cussed in Section 1.2.6 and article 2 [67]. The main contributions from this PhD
project are:
• A clarification of CCF causes and CCF classification in the context of a SIS
that is subject to regular functional testing.
• A clarification of the differences and similarities between systematic failures
and CCFs.
• A new framework on defense against CCFs that may be integrated with cur-
rent practises for functional testing and inspection.
The new framework is not theoretically complicated, but includes small mod-
ification to existing practises that may increase the awareness, competence, and
treatment of CCFs. By implementing this framework, we are able to follow up
the assumptions that were taken during the SIS design phase and to avoid that
the attention to CCFs ends when the SIS design has been completed.
I am a little pessimistic about the adoption of the framework in the industry.
It seems to me that implementation and follow up of new initiatives may be dif-
ficult due to limited resources. As national authorities like the Petroleum Safety
Authority (PSA) are concerned with the increasing level of SIS complexity and
dependencies, we may expect that a future revision of the regulations will pay
more attention to defense against CCFs in design as well as operation. I have
also proposed an amendment on defense against CCFs to existing requirements
on maintenance planning and execution in IEC 61511.
3.1.8 Contributions to objective 8
The eighth objective concerns the need to collect field data and use this infor-
mation for follow-up of SIS performance in the operational phase. The research
questions associated with the objective are discussed in article 9 [28]. The main
contributions from this PhD project are:
• An approach for how to use field data for monitoring safety integrity.
• A procedure for when and how to adjust the functional test intervals.
Based on discussions and feedback from the oil and gas industry, I feel that
the contributions almost fulfil the objective. Two critical points have been raised;
(1) that the new approach does not cater for situations with insufficient operation
time or few observations, and (2) that more flexible adjustments than doubling
and halving should be allowed for the functional test interval. Regarding (1), I
fully agree that the approach needs to be improved. But for systems like fire and
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gas detection system, the number of components is sufficiently high to achieve a
rather good indication of performance at least with two years operation time.
Regarding (2), the oil companies often prefer to adjust the intervals in small
steps and within the normal scheduling regime. A typical scheduling regime is
functional testing every month, every three months, every sixth months, every
year, and every two years. So, in most cases doubling and halving are adequate
alternatives. Still, I think the approach would benefit from being more flexible.
The contributions from this PhD project have therefore, in collaboration with
the co-author of article 9, been developed further in a SINTEF report to account
for few observations, limited observation time, and more flexible adjustments of
the functional test interval.
The contributions to objective 8 address analysis of SIS failures, but to con-
firm SIS performance it may be necessary also to consider other data like the
spurious activation rates and the demand rates. The demand rate does not influ-
ence the SIS performance, but rather the SIS performance requirement (SIL). If
more frequent demands than initially assumed are experienced, it may be neces-
sary to increase the SIL to meet the acceptance criteria.
3.2 Discussion
Relating the results to the safety life cycle
This PhD project contributes with new approaches and concepts within the fol-
lowing phases of the SIS life cycle, see also Fig. 3.2:
• SIS realization phase, in particular in the design selection process: Articles
1, 3-7, 8 and 10.
• SIS operation and maintenance phase, in particular for data collection and
analysis and the execution of functional testing: Articles 2 and 9.
• SIS modification phase, in particular for decision making related to SIS per-
formance deviations: Article 9.
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 also use the concept of management of functional
safety. Management of functional safety includes all activities that are neces-
sary to ensure that the organization involved in the various SIS life cycle phases
has the necessary competence, procedures, and practises in place to achieve the
functional safety and safety integrity requirements of the SIS. Article 1 may be
considered as a contribution here, since it specifically addresses the adoption of
the IEC requirements.
What are the most important contributions from the PhD project?
The contributions may be viewed in light of different target groups, as indicated
in Table 3.1. For other researchers, I think the most important contribution is
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the article on spurious activation. This article indicates several areas of further
research, for example related to avoidance of spurious activations, on how to im-
prove the calculation methods for spurious activation rate, and how to credit spu-
rious activations as functional tests in the operational phase. Other researchers
may also find the articles on the architectural constraints interesting, for exam-
ple the discussion of the reliability effects of hardware fault tolerance and the
need for having other means to account for uncertainty than the architectural
constraints.
The most important contribution for the end users, like the oil and gas com-
panies, is the approach on the use of field data to monitor SIS performance and
update the functional test intervals. I hope the end users also find the approach
on defense against CCF useful, but I think it is necessary to first get the national
authorities’ attention to this issue. The authorities are therefore a target group for
the article on defense against CCFs. Both approaches may be easily integrated
with current practises and tools associated with SIS follow-up and maintenance
management.
The decision on whether or not to invest in PST technology is often taken in
an initial design phase, and the decision is highly influenced by the PST cover-
age. SIS designers and end users may therefore find the approach for determining
the PST coverage factor useful.
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The article on the architectural constraints may also be of interest for both
SIS designers and end users. The article may increase the awareness to some
unintended effects using the SFF as a design parameter, and thereby help SIS
designers and end users in their evaluation and selection of SIS components. In
addition, the article highlights some concerns about the architectural constraints,
for example related to added complexity.
The article on the architectural constraints is also a contribution to the IEC
61508 and IEC 61511 committee, in their evaluation of whether or not to keep
the architectural constraints, and in particular the SFF, as design parameters in
future revisions of the standards. This is an issue that is heavily discussed in the
technical committees right now as both standards are under revision.
All articles may be relevant for educational purposes, as they outline and
clarify many concepts, principles, and approaches for safety and reliability as-
sessments within the context of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.
Personally, I feel that the most important contribution is to be able to provide
new insight to methods and concepts that are recognized and found useful by
other researchers and experts within the same area.
3.2.1 Handling of uncertainty
Safety and reliability assessments are used to provide SIS designers, SIS man-
ufacturers, and end users with decision support regarding SIS design, construc-
tion, and follow-up. The assessments build on a number of assumptions about
the system and under what conditions it is to be operated. If decision makers
are not aware of the level of uncertainty associated with these assumptions and
conditions, they may misinterpret the results and select a SIS design that is either
too complex or too simple to provide necessary risk reduction.
Uncertainty is a concept that expresses our degree of knowledge about the
system [82]. While uncertainty analysis is a key element of reliability assess-
ments in nuclear and space industries [82, 32], it is not given the same attention
in guidelines and standards for SIS for the oil and gas industry. As uncertainty is
an area where I believe more research should be performed, I have made some
reflections on the underlying causes of uncertainty using the calculated PFD as
an example.
The calculated PFD is one out of several inputs that influences SIS design.
Other inputs may be related to other requirements in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511,
such as systematic safety integrity, software safety integrity, and architectural
constraints. Decision makers may also have to balance safety requirements with
production availability and maintenance strategies.
As illustrated in Fig. 3.3, the calculated PFD is influenced by three main
factors: (i) the model, (ii) the data, and (iii) the calculation approach. The uncer-
tainty associated with the PFD depends on whether or not the model, the data,
and the calculation approach reflect the main properties of the SIS in question.
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Fig. 3.3. Factors that influences the PFD
As indicated in Fig. 3.3, this is not only a question of the competence of the
reliability analysts.
In the following, we elaborate on how the underlying factors in Fig. 3.3 may
influence the level of uncertainty of the PFD.
Uncertainty related to the system model
The system model represents our interpretation of some real phenomena, for
example a SIS. A system model may be developed in two steps: first the con-
struction of a functional and/or architecture model and second the development
of one or more reliability models.
The system model expresses our degree of knowledge regarding:
• The system architecture or structure. How are the components configured and
how do they interact when performing a SIF?
• The degree of coupling or dependencies between redundant components, sys-
tems, and functions. What components may share common root causes and/or
coupling factors?
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• System properties, like for example life distribution of SIS components. Can
we, for example, assume that the time to failure is exponentially distributed?
• The modes under which the SIS operates. Is the SIS operated continuously
or on demand, and must the SIS respond to other hazardous events in other
modes than normal operation, for example start-up and when the plant is
shutdown.
• The maintenance and testing strategies. Can we assume an “as good as new”
condition after functional test.
• Other operational assumptions, like for example the downtime distribution
of SIS components. Can we assume that the downtime is exponentially dis-
tributed?
As indicated in Fig. 3.3, we may assume that the model construction is influ-
enced by:
• Regulations, standards, and guidelines: Different industry sectors may pre-
fer and therefore highly recommend different modeling strategies. We may
assume that many reliability analysts choose reliability block diagrams be-
cause IEC 61508 gives practical examples and formulas for calculating the
PFD using this approach.
• Competence: We may expect that previous experience and knowledge highly
influence the selection of modeling approach. Some have limited theoretical
background in mathematics and statistics, and may prefer the simpler mod-
eling approaches like fault tree analysis and reliability block diagrams, while
others having this competence may explore the benefits of the Markov meth-
ods, petri-net, binary decision diagrams, and Monte Carlo simulations.
• Time pressure: In many SIS design and construction projects, the reliability
analysts may have limited time available to perform the calculations and may
for this reason be forced to select simpler models rather than detailed ones.
• Phase of SIS life cycle: In an early design phase, the reliability analysts may
choose a simple reliability model for rough prediction and comparison be-
tween different SIS design alternatives. In a later phase, the reliability model
may be updated and extended with more features.
• Managers attitudes or values: If the organization does not see the need in
performing safety and reliability assessments, other than for satisfying a reg-
ulation, the reliability analysts may be forced to limit the scope and ambition
of the analysis.
• Available tools: Reliability analysts may prefer software tools that are avail-
able in-house, instead of purchasing new tools.
• Access to relevant data: Experience data, if available, may give guidance on
the dominating failure modes to consider for the analysis.
• Operation and maintenance strategies: Operation and maintenance strategies
indicate whether or not the planned and unplanned down times should be
considered in the analysis.
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Uncertainty related to data
The reliability model describes the relationship between input parameters (e.g.,
failure rates, functional test intervals, mean restoration times) and output param-
eters (e.g., PFD, beta-factor, diagnostic coverage, SFF). The level of uncertainty
associated with the input data may be influenced by:
• Relevance: To what extent the data is relevant for the technology being used
and its operating and environmental conditions.
• Quality: To what extent the data fulfil the quality specifications, for example
in terms of completeness and classification.
• Amount: How many failures that have been observed for a population of
components, and the length of the observation period.
Uncertainty associated with the amount of data is often referred to as statis-
tical uncertainty, and may be expressed using one of the three models [82]:
• Probability density function
• Cumulative distribution function
• Displaying selective percentiles, for example a confidence level of 90% of
the parameter value
The statistical uncertainty may be reduced with increasing amount of relevant
data and/or with increasing observation time.
As indicated in Fig. 3.3, there are several underlying factors that may influ-
ence to what extent we achieve relevant, high quality, and a sufficient amount of
data:
• System properties: We want to reflect the system properties through degrada-
tion models. The expected degradation mechanisms under the given operat-
ing and environmental conditions (e.g., arctic environment) may deviate from
the degradation shown in experience data, and such aspects are important to
cater for when selecting input data.
• Regulations, standards, and guidelines: Regulations, standards, and guide-
lines may provide recommendations or requirements regarding uncertainty
handling. IEC 61508 requires that any failure rate data should have a confi-
dence level of at least 70%. This means that the probability that the true value
is less than the used value is at least 70% [108, 38].
• Competence: If data are not available or not directly relevant for the tech-
nology in question, it may be necessary to determine the values of the input
parameters by expert judgments [30, 99, 106] or Bayesian methods [82, 9].
With expert judgments, the plant operators and maintenance personnel may
be asked how likely or how often a particular event, for example a valve fail-
ure, may occur. When we use Bayesian methods, we determine conditional
probabilities or failure distributions, based on our prior knowledge (e.g., ob-
servations or distributions) about the system or its components.
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• Access to relevant historical data: Many historical data bases provide failure
rates that are based on a number of installations and with components having
different technologies. This means that access to underlying information is
required to make proper selection of input parameters. In addition, the com-
pleteness of failure recording, the amount of data and the observation time
are factors that influence to what extent we can rely on historical data.
• Operation and maintenance strategies: Such strategies may give insight to the
mean time to repair, the mean downtime, and the distribution of down times.
Data requirements and model selection are closely related. It is often point-
less to select a modeling approach that uses parameters where data is not avail-
able. For example, the nuclear power industry collects data on CCFs [83, 84, 85,
86] and suggests comprehensive methods for calculating the contribution from
CCFs, but similar initiatives have not been taken in the oil and gas industry. For
practical purposes, we should therefore balance the modeling approach with the
availability of data.
Uncertainty related to calculation approaches
The PFD may be calculated by using mathematically exact expressions or ap-
proximation formulas [108]. Often, the two approaches give minor differences
in the results. We may therefore rank the calculation approach as the least im-
portant contributor to uncertainty compared to aspects of model and data. What
method to select can therefore be reduced to a question of preferences. The relia-
bility analysts preference may be influenced by competence, availability of tools,
and recommendations provided in relevant standards.
An issue that is sometimes raised, is whether to use the average or time de-
pendent PFD. Some authors think that the average PFD is misleading since the
PFD in approximately 50% of the time is higher than this value [18]. Currently,
the IEC 61508 and the IEC 61511 suggest using the average PFD. However, new
revisions of the standards may call for other practises.
Other perspectives to uncertainty
Perrow [107] distinguishes between systems that have linear and complex inter-
actions. Linear interaction means that there is a direct and deterministic relation-
ship between the inputs and the outputs. For complex interactions, this relation-
ship is not visible or not possible to comprehend. We may therefore assume that
uncertainty increases with increasing complexity, due to the difficulty of con-
structing adequate architecture and reliability models.
Perrow also characterizes systems by their degree of coupling. Coupling ex-
presses the degree of dependencies between system components, and may vary
from loose to tight. According to Perrow, both systems with linear and complex
interactions may have tight and loose coupling. To cater for tight coupling in the
40 3 Main results and further work
PFD calculations, we would need a comprehensive set of data that expresses this
coupling. In practise, it is often difficult to identify data at this level of detail, at
least for the oil and gas industry where limited focus is given to CCFs in the data
collection process. For this reason, we may assume that uncertainty increases
with increasing coupling due to the lack of adequate data.
Some authors distinguish between epistemic or aleatory uncertainty [82, 32].
Both concepts are usually discussed in relationship with data. Epistemic uncer-
tainty is the uncertainty caused by our incapability to interpret the real world.
Aleatory uncertainty expresses the uncertainty that is due to inherent, irre-
ducible, randomness of the world. While epistemic uncertainty is often asso-
ciated with non-observable quantities (like for example the failure rate), we as-
sociate aleatory uncertainty with observable quantities.
To what extent aleatory uncertainty exists and is a relevant issue to consider,
are still under debate among researchers. Personally, I think that aleatory un-
certainty is a useful concept for describing our inability to explain all aspects
of the world. Saying this, it is important to treat aleatory and epistemic uncer-
tainty as time dependent properties. As our knowledge about how systems work
increases, we may expect that some of the aleatory uncertainty is converted to
epistemic uncertainty. But even if our knowledge increases, the nature may de-
velop new relationships and introduce new aleatory uncertainty. This may be an
issue for models used to describe climatic changes.
Uncertainty analysis versus sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is often mentioned in the same context as uncertainty anal-
ysis, but the two types of analysis have slightly different meaning. While uncer-
tainty analysis is a tool for evaluating the degree of knowledge or confidence in
the results, the sensitivity analysis is used to improve the way we can interpret
the results. When we perform sensitivity analysis, we investigate how variations
in input data (model input parameters, assumptions) cause changes to the model
output parameters [82].
A number of importance ranking measures have been developed to support
sensitivity analyses, for example Birnbaum’s measure, the improvement poten-
tial measure, and the Fussel-Vesely’s measure [108, 82].
Sensitivity analyses may be used to complement uncertainty analyses. In the
nuclear industry, such analyses may be used to demonstrate that the system does
not exceed the specified safety margin [32]. The safety margin is here defined as
the difference between an acceptance criterion and the result that are obtained by
calculations.
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Specific areas for further research are indicated in each of the articles. In this
section, some overall recommendations for further research are given.
One research area is related to the assessment of uncertainty. While the nu-
clear power industry [32] and the aerospace industry [82] frequently discuss un-
certainty and sensitivity analyses, these are barely recognized by IEC 61508, IEC
61511, OLF-070 [100], and ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 [8].
The oil and gas industry uses the architectural constraints to reduce the con-
sequences of uncertain reliability predictions. However, in my PhD project, I
have concluded that the architectural constraints may not have the intended ef-
fect on safety and reliability. Further research may look at alternative strategies
for achieving adequate boundaries for SIS design, for example by developing
practical approaches for uncertainty handling in the context of IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511 frameworks. I think that uncertainty analysis should not be restricted
to parametric uncertainty, but also include the model construction and calculation
approaches.
I think that sensitivity analyses should be used more frequently in relation-
ship with PFD calculations to increase the robustness of the calculated results.
An area of further research may therefore be to find practical ways to implement
such sensitivity analyses. I use the term “practical approaches” rather than “the-
oretical approaches”, since the theoretical basis may be considered as mature
and that the main challenge is to develop methods that are possible to compre-
hend by engineers and reliability analysts working in the oil and gas industry.
The guidelines developed by ISA on safety integrity calculation methods [48]
discuss parametric uncertainty and sensitivity analysis. These guidelines may be
a good starting point for developing an overall approach to uncertainty and sen-
sitivity analysis.
I have previously indicated that there is a relationship between spurious acti-
vations and safety integrity. The spurious activations may have a positive effect
on safety integrity, if we assume that a spurious activation is similar to a func-
tional test. At the same time, spurious activations may have a negative impact
on safety integrity due to the stress imposed on components that are affected.
In addition, spurious activations may lead to hazardous events if the safe state
is different for different operating situations. An area of further research is to
develop a better understanding of the relationship between spurious activations
and safety integrity. A related area is to develop strategies for how to take credit
of spurious activations as functional tests.
In the PhD project, I have not studied continuously operating (high demand)
SIS. At the same time, I have indicated that such systems already exist on oil
and gas installations and that attempts are made to qualify them according to
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. So far, IEC 61511 only considers on demand SIS.
A number of methods exist for calculating the probability of dangerous failures
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per hour (PFH) [41, 38], which is the reliability measure used for continuously
operating SIS. However, the interpretation of the PFH is sometimes questioned
[46]. An area of further research may therefore be to investigate and improve
current methods for calculating the PFH.
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This paper presents a common cause failure (CCF) defense approach for safety instrumented systems (SIS) in the oil and gas industry.
The SIS normally operates in the low demand mode, which means that regular testing and inspection are required to reveal SIS failures.
The CCF defense approach comprises checklists and analytical tools which may be integrated with current approaches for function
testing, inspection and follow-up. The paper focuses on how defense measures may be implemented to increase awareness of CCFs, to
improve the ability to detect CCFs, and to avoid introducing new CCFs. The CCF defense approach may also be applicable for other
industry sectors.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Common cause failures; Safety instrumented systems; Defense measures; Function testing; Inspection1. Introduction
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used in the oil and
gas industry to detect the onset of hazardous events and/or
to mitigate their consequences to humans, material assets,
and the environment. A SIS generally consists of one or
more input elements (e.g., sensors, transmitters), one or
more logic solvers (e.g., programmable logic controllers
[PLC], relay logic systems), and one or more ﬁnal elements
(e.g., safety valves, circuit breakers). The main parts of a
SIS are illustrated in Fig. 1.
A SIS may perform several safety (instrumented)
functions (SIF) and is sometimes referred to as a safety
barrier or a protection layer (Sklet, 2006). Related SIFs
may be combined into more comprehensive protection
systems, like ﬁre and gas detection systems and emergency
shutdown systems.
The standards IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC 61511 (2003)
are extensively used in the oil and gas industry, during all
phases of the SIS life cycle. Both standards use safety
integrity level (SIL) as a measure of SIS reliability. Toe front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
.2007.03.007
ing author. Tel.: +4773 59 7101; fax: +47 73 59 7117.
ess: mary.a.lundteigen@ntnu.no (M.A. Lundteigen).enhance the reliability, redundancy is often introduced in
the SIS architecture. Independence between safety barriers
is achieved by combining diversity in design (e.g., by using
diverse technology, diverse design and implementation
approaches) with diversity in follow-up of SIS in the
operational phase (e.g., by using different operation and
maintenance procedures, scheduling or staff).
Common cause failures (CCF) are a serious threat to SIS
reliability (Smith & Simpson, 2005; Summers & Raney,
1999; Edwards & Watson, 1979), and may lead to
simultaneous failures of redundant components and safety
barriers. IEC 61511 (2003) deﬁnes a CCF as a failure which
is the result of one or more events, causing failures of two or
more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading
to a system failure. A channel is a single redundant path
within a SIF, or alternatively a single SIF in case more than
one SIF is required to obtain the necessary risk reduction.
Causes of potential CCFs may be introduced in design as
well as in the operational phase. In the design phase, CCF
causes may be a result of inadequate understanding of
failure mechanisms and responses, improper selection of
hardware components, and so forth. In the operational
phase, CCF causes may, for example, be introduced
because of improper testing, human errors during operation
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Fig. 1. Main parts of a safety instrumented system.
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design envelope.
Many authors ﬁnd it useful to split CCF causes into root
causes and coupling factors (Parry, 1991; Paula, Campbell,
& Rasmuson, 1991). A root cause is a basic cause of a
component failure (e.g., a corrosive environment), while a
coupling factor explains why several components are
affected by the same root cause (e.g., inadequate material
selection for several valves).
The nuclear industry is very concerned with CCFs, and is
recording and analyzing CCF events (NUREG/CR-5460,
1990; NUREG/CR-5485, 1998; NEA, 2004, 2002, 2003,
2004). Several guidelines have been developed for qualita-
tive and quantitative analysis of CCFs. The Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) has initiated the International
Common Cause Data Exchange (ICDE) project to
encourage collection and analysis of data related to CCF
events. Several analyses of CCF data that give insight into
why CCFs occur have been published.
The oil and gas industry is mainly focusing on CCFs in
the design phase of the SIS, while CCFs are given much less
attention in the operational phase. The oil companies have
systematically collected reliability data for more than 25
years through the OREDA project (Langseth, Haugen, &
Sandtorv, 1998; Sandtorv, Hokstad, & Thompson, 1996).
The data collection is based on maintenance reports from
single item failures. This approach does not easily provide
information about CCFs and the status related to CCFs is
therefore not fully known. The Norwegian Petroleum
Safety Authority (PSA) is, however, increasingly concerned
with how new technology, standardization, and new
operational concepts may reduce the independence be-
tween SIFs (Hauge et al., 2006).
Function testing and inspection are key activities for a
SIS operating in the low demand mode. Low demand
means that the SIS experiences few demands, typically less
than once every year. Function testing and inspection are
inﬂuencing the occurrence of CCFs in the operational
phase because: (i) main types of CCFs can be identiﬁed and
corrected through efﬁcient testing and inspection proce-
dures, and (ii) inadequate procedures and human errors
may cause simultaneous failures of several components
(Hirschberg, 1991; Johanson et al., 2003; Pyy, Laakso, &
Reiman, 1997).The objective of this paper is to propose a CCF defense
approach which is able to improve the awareness to CCFs,
prevent CCFs from being introduced during the execution
of function tests and inspections, identify CCFs and CCF
causes and select efﬁcient defenses against future CCFs.
The CCF defense approach is designed to be integrated
with current practices related to execution and follow-up of
function testing and inspection in the oil and gas industry.
The CCF defense approach has been developed for SIS
applications in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, but
should be applicable also to other industry sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we describe how CCFs currently are handled in the
Norwegian oil and gas industry. Section 3 describes how
diagnostic testing, function testing, and visual inspections
may inﬂuence the occurrence of CCFs. In Section 4 we
clarify and discuss the deﬁnition of a CCF and indicate
how CCFs may be classiﬁed. The new CCF defense
approach is described in Section 5. We conclude in Section
6 with a brief discussion of the proposed approach and give
some recommendations for further work in Section 7.
2. The oil and gas industry’s approach to CCFs
Recent SIS applications for the Norwegian oil and gas
industry are built according to IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC
61511 (2003). The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
(OLF) has developed a guideline on the practical applica-
tion of IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC 61511 (2003) in the oil
and gas industry, that is referred to as the OLF-070 (OLF-
070, 2004) guideline. The standards and the guideline
require that the effect of CCFs is taken into account in
reliability calculations. IEC 61508 (1998) recommends
using the b-factor model (e.g., see Rausand & Høyland,
2004), where b is the conditional probability of a CCF,
when a failure has occurred. An extended version of the
b-factor model, called the PDS method (Sintef, 2006), is
frequently used in the Norwegian oil and gas industry.
The IEC standards have few speciﬁc requirements
related to CCFs in the operational phase, and this may
be a reason why CCFs are not given much attention in this
phase. Another reason may be that there is a general lack
of knowledge on how CCFs affect operation and main-
tenance, since CCFs are not recorded and analyzed. There
is no guidance in OREDA (2002) on how to collect data on
CCFs, even though CCFs are mentioned in connection
with ﬁre and gas detectors. ISO 14224 (2006) recognizes the
importance of sector speciﬁc CCF data for SIL analysis,
and suggests that CCF data are derived from analysis of
single failures rather than being recorded directly. Cur-
rently, however, data related to CCFs are not collected.
IEC 61508 (1998), part 6, Humphreys (1987), and Smith
and Simpson (2005) provide checklists that can be used to
determine an application speciﬁc b value, while the PDS
method suggests generic b values for various SIS compo-
nents. The generic values are based on previous estimates
combined with expert judgments, and may not reﬂect the
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sensitive to single improvements, and a new or improved
defense tactic in the operational phase may therefore not
lead to a reduction of the estimated b-factor.
To save money and ease operation and maintenance, the
technical solutions become more and more standardized.
The same type of PLCs is, for example, used in several SIS
applications. This standardization may reduce the inde-
pendence between SIS applications (Hauge et al., 2006).
New operational concepts, like remote monitoring and
control, may introduce additional risks (Johnsen, Lundtei-
gen, Fartun, & Monsen, 2005; Sintef, 2003). Sintef, the
Norwegian research organization, has recently carried out
two studies that analyze CCFs and the level of indepen-
dence in typical SIS applications on oil and gas installa-
tions (Hauge, Hokstad, Herrera, Onshus, & Langseth,
2004; Hauge et al., 2006). The ﬁrst study was initiated by
SIS vendors, system integrators and end users participating
in a network on the application of the PDS method in
Norway. The second study was initiated by Hydro, the
Norwegian oil company. Unfortunately, there has, so far,
not been any follow-up of these studies.3. Diagnostic testing, function testing and visual inspection
Diagnostic testing, function testing, and visual inspec-
tions are important means to verify that the SIS is able to
perform its safety functions and to reveal any failures that
may impede the SIS from functioning on demand. Failures
that may prevent the SIS from functioning on demand are
referred to as dangerous failures by IEC 61508 (1998) and
IEC 61511 (2003).
Diagnostic testing is online means to detect deviations,
degradations and discrepancies, and is usually performed
by dedicated software and hardware, implemented inher-
ently in the components (e.g., watchdogs) or added to the
SIS conﬁguration (e.g., read-back of status signals from
ﬁeld elements for comparison with output signals set by the
PLC). Failures detected by diagnostic testing are called
dangerous detected failures in IEC 61511 (2003). The
diagnostic software and hardware usually do not test the
complete SIF, but give alarm upon various abnormalities
(e.g., drift, exceeded cycle time, and communication error)
on component level. Diagnostic alarms that share the same
cause may indicate the presence of a CCF.
Function testing and visual inspections are ofﬂine means
to detect SIS failures and are performed at regular
intervals. The objective of function testing is to conﬁrm
the correct functionality and to reveal undetected failures
that may impede the SIS from functioning on demand.
Visual inspection looks for observable deterioration and
unauthorized modiﬁcations. Failures revealed by function
testing and inspection are called dangerous undetected
failures in IEC 61511 (2003). The interval between function
tests (or inspections) has a direct inﬂuence on the SIF’s
probability of failure on demand.In most cases, function testing and inspection are
executed manually. However, new technology has been
developed for automated testing, for example, partial
stroke testing of valves (Lundteigen & Rausand, 2007;
Summers & Zachary, 2000). In the future it is expected that
new oil and gas installations may be built for more
extensive use of automated testing and inspection, but for
the current oil and gas installations (that may stay in
operation for another two decades) it is not realistic to
expect major changes in the function testing and inspection
strategies.
This paper focuses on current approaches to function
testing, and how defense measures may be implemented to
increase awareness of CCFs, to improve the ability to
detect CCFs, and to avoid introducing new CCFs.
Function testing and inspection generally comprise the
following six tasks:(1) Scheduling: Today, function testing and inspections are
scheduled automatically by the maintenance manage-
ment system. At a predeﬁned time, the function test or
inspection is submitted as a work package that includes
the test or inspection procedure.(2) Preparation, execution, and restoration:
(a) Preparation: Before the test or inspection is
executed, it is required to do certain preparations;
to obtain work permits, ﬁnd the necessary doc-
umentation, to coordinate with other involved
disciplines and, in some cases, to perform a job
safety analysis. Job safety analysis is commonly
used in the oil and gas industry to prepare for
critical and complex work activities with a poten-
tially high risk to humans, equipment or the
environment. A function test or inspection does
not always require a job safety analysis. This
depends on the complexity of the work, and the
total amount of ongoing activities in the same area.
(b) Execution: The prescribed steps in the test or
inspection procedure are executed, including setting
necessary overrides and inhibits.
(c) Restoration: After the test or inspection is com-
pleted, the affected components are put back into
operation in a safe and adequate manner. This may
involve opening/closing of isolation valves, follow-
ing interlock procedures, resetting solenoids and
valves and removing inhibits and overrides.(3) Failure reporting: Deviations and failures are reported
through the maintenance management system by the
personnel executing the function test or inspection.
Failures and deviations may be recorded as free text, as
numerical values (e.g., pressure readings) or by using
pre-deﬁned classiﬁcation systems of failure causes,
detection method, and failure effects.(4) Failure analysis: The purpose of the failure analysis is to
assess the SIS performance and compare with the target
performance (SIL requirements). The SIS performance
in the operational phase is usually derived from the
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function test, inspection, and real demands. To ensure
that the quality of the recorded data is adequate,
it is often necessary to reassess the initial failure
classiﬁcation and review the free text descriptions.
Performance monitoring has also been done prior to
the introduction of the IEC 61508 (1998) and the
IEC 61511 (2003). On the Norwegian continental shelf,
it has, for several years, been required to report the
status of safety barriers. The main difference between
the previous approach and the IEC 61508 (1998)/IEC
61511 (2003) requirements, is the focus on the
performance of safety functions rather than on safety
components.(5) Implementation: It is necessary to prepare and imple-
ment corrective means related to the recorded failures.
It is expected that failures detected by diagnostic
testing, function testing, and inspection are corrected
immediately to reduce the unavailability of the SIF. In
cases where failures are not possible to correct
immediately, compensating measures must be imple-
mented.(6) Validation and continuous improvements: At regular
intervals, it is necessary to review current work
practices and procedures and to analyze how they
comply with the overall objective of SIS follow-up,
which is to maintain the SIS performance during
operation and maintenance. It may be relevant to
review the extent of overdue tests, the adequacy
of the failure classiﬁcation system and the failure
reporting procedures, SIF performance versus
SIL targets, quality and scope of proof test
execution (HSE, 2002). Any deviations or deﬁciencies
should be captured and used to improve SIS
follow-up.4. Deﬁnition and classiﬁcation of CCFs
4.1. The main attributes of CCFs
There is no generally accepted deﬁnition of CCF. This
means that people in different industry sectors may have
different opinions of what a CCF is. Smith and Watson
(1980) review nine different deﬁnitions of CCF and suggest
that a deﬁnition must encompass the following six
attributes: (1) the components affected are unable to
perform as required, (2) multiple failures exist within (but
not limited to) redundant conﬁgurations, (3) the failures
are ‘‘ﬁrst in line’’ type of failures and not the result of
cascading failures, (4) the failures occur within a deﬁned
critical time interval (e.g., the time a plane is in the air
during a ﬂight), (5) the failures are due to a single
underlying defect or a physical phenomenon (the common
cause of failures), and (6) the effect of failures must lead to
some major disabling of the system’s ability to perform as
required.All these attributes are reﬂected in the CCF deﬁnition
that is used by the nuclear power industry (NEA, 2004).
Concerning attribute (4), the ICDE project deﬁnes the
critical time interval to be the time between two consecutive
inspections. IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC 61511 (2003) do not
include the critical time aspect in their deﬁnition of CCF. It
is, however, natural to restrict the analysis to dependent
failures occurring within the same function test interval. All
critical failures should, at least in principle, be identiﬁed
and corrected as part of the function test and repair action.
A failure in the next interval will therefore be a single
failure, even if it is dependent on a (corrected) failure in the
previous interval. To clarify when dependent failures are
deﬁned as CCF during failure analysis, the following
attributes may be applied: (1) the CCF event comprises
multiple (complete) failures of two or more redundant
components or two or more SIFs due to a shared cause, (2)
the multiple failures occur within the same inspection or
function test interval, and (3) the CCF event leads to
failure of a single SIF or loss of several SIFs.
4.2. Classification of CCF attributes
Failure classiﬁcation systems may be used to identify
potential failures and to structure both causes and effects.
Some authors distinguish between pre-operational and
operational failure causes (Humphreys & Jenkins, 1991;
Watson & Edwards, 1979), some use the concept of root
causes and coupling factors, where the root causes may be
further split into trigger events, conditioning events and
proximate causes (Parry, 1991; Mosleh et al., 1994).
Here, a proximate cause is a readily identiﬁable
cause of failure, a conditioning event is a condition that
predisposes the component to failure, and a triggering
event is an event that initiates the transition to the failed
state. The nuclear power industry has established classiﬁ-
cation systems for CCF causes and differentiate between
various types of root causes and coupling factors (NEA,
2004; NUREG/CR-5460, 1990; NUREG/CR-5485, 1998).
One such classiﬁcation system is shown in Table 1. The
operational failure causes proposed by, for example, by
Humphreys and Jenkins (1991), overlap quite well with the
coupling factors.
In many cases, CCF analysis is often limited to
dependent failures within a single SIF since the reliability
is estimated for each SIF separately. Cooper, Lofgren,
Samanta, and Wong (1993) have introduced common
failure mechanisms as an alternative concept to CCFs, to
ensure that also CCFs affecting different SIFs are identiﬁed
and followed up. A common failure mechanism comprises
failures that share failure mechanisms, design or function,
and time of occurrence. Failures that are classiﬁed with
common failure mechanisms do therefore share the same
coupling factors.
CCF causes are often identical to the systematic failure
causes. Systematic failures are in IEC 61508 (1998) and
IEC 61511 (2003) deﬁned as failures that are due to design,
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standards suggest, as a general rule, not to quantify
systematic failures. However, some systematic failures are
quantiﬁed through the modeling of CCFs.
It may be convenient to distinguish between classiﬁca-
tion systems for failure reporting and classiﬁcation systems
for in-depth failure analysis. For failure reporting it is
important that the taxonomy is intuitive and easy to
understand, giving an initial and rough classiﬁcation. For
failure analysis one may add more detailed taxonomy, as
suggested in OREDA (2002).5. New CCF defense approach
In this section, we describe a new CCF defense approach
which may be integrated with current approaches for
function testing, inspection and follow-up. The new
approach focuses on the following key aspects: (1) to
avoid introducing CCFs during function testing and
inspection, (2) to identify CCFs and CCF causes based
on failure reports, and (3) to use the insight of failureTable 1
ICDE classiﬁcation of common causes (NEA, 2004)
Classiﬁcation of root causes Classiﬁcation of coupling factors
State of other components Same/similar hardware
Design, manufacture or Hardware design
construction inadequacy System design
Human actions Hardware quality deﬁciency
Maintenance Same/similar operational conditions
Internal to component Maintenance/test schedule
Procedure inadequacy Maintenance/test procedure
Abnormal environmental stress Maintenance/test staff
Other Operation procedure
Operation staff
Same/similar environmental exposure
Internal
External
Other
Preparation Execu
Validat
and conti
improvem
(Task
Scheduling
Implementation
Avoid introducing 
Select and implement
defenses (Task 5)
Ensure that  neces-
sary improvements
are captured
(Task 1)
Fig. 2. Main concepts of thecauses to select efﬁcient means to defend against future
CCFs. The approach may be integrated into existing
function testing and inspection related work processes, and
has been designed to avoid any signiﬁcant additional work-
load on plant workers. The approach builds on experience
from the nuclear power industry (Hellstrøm, Johanson, &
Bento, 2004; Hirschberg, 1991; Johanson et al., 2003;
Parry, 1991; Paula et al., 1991; NUREG/CR-5460, 1990),
the process industry (Summers & Raney, 1999), the oil and
gas industry (Hauge et al., 2004, 2006) and own experience
from maintaining SIS on oil and gas installations.
The CCF defense approach follows the main tasks of
function testing and inspection that are described in
Section 3 and illustrated in Fig. 2. The six activities are
based on checklists and analytical methods like operational
sequence diagrams (OSD), inﬂuence diagrams and cause-
defense matrices.
5.1. Task 1: ensure that necessary improvements are
captured when scheduling
Scheduling of function test and inspection procedures is
usually performed automatically and with predeﬁned
intervals by the maintenance management system. During
the scheduling process, a work package is created specify-
ing the type of resources, estimated number of hours
needed to perform the work and the test procedure to be
used. An important defense against CCFs is to ensure that
any corrections and improvements to the test procedure are
captured when new function test or inspection work
packages are created.
5.2. Task 2: avoid introducing CCFs during preparation,
execution, and restoration
Experience shows that CCFs are often introduced during
maintenance due to human errors, erroneous procedures
and deﬁcient work processes (Hellstrøm et al., 2004; Pyy
et al., 1997). Human errors may be deliberate actions (e.g.,
carelessness due to inappropriate understanding of thetion Restoration
Failure reporting
ion
nuous
ents
 6)
Failure analysis
CCFs (Task 2)
Improve quality of
failure descriptions
(Task 3)
Identify CCFs and
related causes (Task 4)
CCF defense approach.
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of the instructions or leaving components inadvertently
inoperative), or inadequate execution of the prescribed
instructions (e.g., improper adjustments, miscalibration of
equipment, improper bypassing). Deﬁcient work processes
may lack adequate coordination between maintenance
disciplines, be based on deﬁcient procedures or inadequate
selection of tools.
Recommended defenses should be applied by the ﬁeld
technicians, and comprise means to improve self-checking,
improve work planning and preparation, improve the
operability readiness control, increase the respect to
procedures, and verify adequate training of personnel
(Hellstrøm et al., 2004). During execution of the tasks it is
required to maintain a high awareness to CCF causes.
Separate checklists are suggested for the three tasks:
preparation, execution, and restoration. Often, similar
components (e.g., pressure transmitters) within the same
area are tested simultaneously. In this case, the preparation
checklist may be applied once, while the execution and
restoration checklist must be repeated for each component
tested or inspected.
Checklist for preparation:(1) Have potential human errors during execution and
restoration been identiﬁed and discussed?(2) Have human error incidents been experienced during
previous execution?(3) Have compensating measures been identiﬁed and
implemented to avoid human errors?(4) Are the personnel executing the test familiar with the
testing and calibration tools?(5) Are the calibration tools calibrated?
(6) Does the procedure have known deﬁciencies, like
ambiguous instructions?
(7) Does the procedure describe necessary steps to safely
restore the SIS?Checklist for execution:(1) Are the components operated within the speciﬁed environ-
mental and operating conditions? (E.g., within the speciﬁed
temperature or pressure range, humidity constraints,
vibration constraints, ﬂow composition, and so on.)(2) Are the components protected against damage from
nearby work activities?(3) Are process connections free from plugging and (if
relevant) heat-traced?(4) Are all ﬁeld SIS components (constituting the safety
function being tested) labeled?(5) Are additional components that are operated during
SIS function testing and inspection sufﬁciently labeled?Checklist for restoration:(1) Has the physical restoration (e.g., isolation valves and
bypasses) been veriﬁed (e.g, by a colleague)?(2) Have all suspensions of inhibits and overrides been
veriﬁed and communicated?(3) Are any remaining inhibits, overrides or bypasses
logged, and compensating measures identiﬁed and
implemented?(4) Has the safety function been veriﬁed before start-up?Any question given an answer ‘‘no’’ indicates a deviation
(or a potential cause) that may lead to a CCF. Deviations
should therefore be discussed and compensating measures
or corrections implemented.
5.3. Task 3: improve the quality of failure reporting
The maintenance management systems that are currently
used in the oil and gas industry are not suited for direct
recording of CCFs. CFFs have to be identiﬁed from the
recorded single failure events. The nuclear industry applies
a similar approach (Hirschberg, 1991). Unfortunately, the
failure classiﬁcation systems used for failure reporting have
ambiguous taxonomy that may be interpreted differently
by different persons. In addition, the failure classes are
incomplete and insufﬁcient to use for further in-depth
analysis of failure causes. It is therefore necessary to record
free text descriptions of failure causes, effects and detection
methods in order to verify the initial failure classiﬁcation
and provide necessary information to decide whether or
not a CCF has occurred.
Analysis of CCFs is not the only reason for using extra
time on failure descriptions. Databases like OREDA (2002)
also require access to more in-depth descriptions of failure
causes and effects. Any deﬁcient information may be
difﬁcult to collect at a later stage since the involved
personnel may (due to offshore work schedules) be off for
three or four weeks at a time.
A set of questions has been proposed for use by ﬁeld
technicians during failure recording, and may be added as
default text in the input ﬁeld for free-text description. The
questions enable a more complete description of failures
and failure causes.
Checklist questions for failure reporting:(1) How was the failure discovered or observed? (Inciden-
tal, by diagnostics, during function testing, inspection
or repair, upon a demand or by review/audit.)(2) What is believed to be the cause(s) of failure? (Several
possible explanations may be included.)(3) What was the effect of the failure on the safety
function? (Loss of complete function, degraded, none.)(4) Was the component tested or inspected differently than
described in the test or inspection procedure, and why
was the approach different?(5) Has the component been overexposed (operational or
by environmental stresses), and if so, what may be the
related causes?(6) Have—to your knowledge—similar failures been ex-
perienced previously?
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by system or equipment responsible engineers. It is
proposed to use failure reports generated by the main-
tenance management system to identify CCFs. This is in
line with ISO 14224 (2006) and what is also done in the
nuclear power industry (Hirschberg, 1991). The nuclear
power plants have for several years collected and shared
CCF data, through, for example, the ICDE project. Our
main objective is to identify CCFs for the purpose of
selecting appropriate and plant speciﬁc defenses. In light of
ISO 14224 (2006), it may be required also to develop
procedures and systems for collecting and sharing data on
CCFs.
The starting point for the failure analysis is the failure
reports and supplementary failure descriptions (free text) in
the maintenance management system. It is suggested to
identify CCFs through a four step process: (1) review the
failure descriptions and verify (and if necessary correct) the
initial failure classiﬁcation, (2) perform an initial screening
that captures failures that (a) have similar design or
physical location, (b) share failure causes, (c) have been
discovered within the same test or inspection interval, and
(d) the failure causes are not random (as deﬁned by IEC
61508, 1998 and IEC 61511, 2003), (3) perform a root cause
and coupling factor analysis by using inﬂuence diagrams,
and (4) list the root cause and coupling factors in a cause-
defense matrix as shown in Table 2. Whereas corrective
work packages are generated automatically when single
failures are registered in the maintenance management
system, step 1–step 4 must be performed as additional
activities.
Step 1 is necessary for validating single failures as well as
CFF causes and effects to ensure appropriate follow-up.
Step 2 raises attention to failures that have common failure
mechanisms, and that have not been detected by diag-
nostics. If failures detected by diagnostics are not repaired
within a prescribed time, or if the same type of dangerous
detected failures occurs rather frequently, they should be
included in the analyses as well.Table 2
Simpliﬁed cause-defense matrix
Root Coupling Defense
CCF cause factor alternatives
Failure of Solenoid Same Implement r
ESD valves stuck due to design quality chec
pollution in hydraulics
hydraulic Hook-up
supply to same Installing ﬁl
hydraulic in hydraulic
supply
Replacing e
solenoids wi
and more roIn step 3, it is proposed to identify the root causes and
coupling factors by using a root cause and coupling factor
analysis diagram. The main objective is to get more insight
into the CCF causes, and thereby have a well-prepared
basis for selecting suitable defenses. The analysis should be
performed by a group of relevant personnel, rather than by
individuals, and may include plant workers as well as
engineers. A separate diagram may be constructed for each
CCF identiﬁed in step 2. The root cause and coupling
factor diagram may start with a description of the CCF,
including the failure mode and the components having
caused the failure, as shown in Fig. 3. The failure mode is
the non-fulﬁllment of the required SIS performance. From
there, the root cause and coupling factor diagram is drawn
from right to left through iterative asking for underlying
failure causes.
The CCF causes are always a result of a root cause and a
coupling factor, indicated by an ‘‘and’’ gate in Fig. 3. In
some cases it may, however, be difﬁcult to determine the
root causes (due to inadequate failure descriptions). In this
case, one may focus on the coupling factors and still ﬁnd
adequate defenses against future CCFs. The analysis stops
when no further insight into failure causes is available.
The diagram may also be used pro-actively, to identify
failure causes that may lead to CCFs in the near future. In
this case, one may extend the diagram with analysis of
other relevant SIS components that may lead to loss of the
safety function, as illustrated in Fig. 3 by dashed arrows
and nodes. Relevant components may, in this context,
mean redundant components. To identify potential failure
causes, one may use a simple checklist of typical failure
causes, for example the one shown in Table 1.
The application of the checklist may be illustrated for a
pressure transmitter in a pipeline. A pressure transmitter
performs the following subfunctions; to sense the pipeline
pressure, convert the pressure reading to an analogue
signal and transmit the pressure reading to the logic solver.
Failure of one of the subfunctions leads to failure of the
pressure transmitter. The root causes and coupling
factors may be analyzed for each subfunction failure. The
root causes of sensing failures may, for example,Impact Cost
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Fig. 3. Root cause and coupling factor analysis diagram.
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pressure sensing line) or human actions (e.g., leaving the
transmitter isolated). Several pressure transmitters may fail
simultaneously because the same inappropriate design is
selected for all components, or they are tested using the
same deﬁcient procedure. This failure analysis process may
be continued for all components and their related
subfunctions.
The main results from the analysis, which are the root
causes and the coupling factors, may be listed in a
simpliﬁed cause-defense matrix, as illustrated in Table 2.
5.5. Task 5: implement defense measures
Implementation of CCF defense measures is important
to prevent future occurrences of similar failures. In the
nuclear industry, cause-defense matrices are used for
detailed assessment of defenses (NUREG/CR-5460, 1990;
Paula et al., 1991). In the cause-defense matrices, a set of
predeﬁned defenses are considered for each root cause and
coupling factor. Several types of defenses are covered, like
design related improvements, procedure related improve-
ments, and physical barriers. The expected impact of all
defense alternatives are evaluated, and used to rank their
efﬁciency. In the nuclear power industry, the impact
analysis is also used to estimate the rate of occurrence of
CCFs, as input to the reliability models (e.g., see Mosleh,Parry, & Zikria, 1994). In the proposed CCF defense
approach, it is recommended to apply a simpliﬁed cause-
defence matrix, where simpliﬁed means that impact
analysis is limited to a smaller selection of defense options.
The CCF defense approach applies the simpliﬁed cause-
defense matrix in combination with a set of generic defense
options, see Tables 2 and 3. The generic defense options
have been adapted from NUREG/CR-5460 (1990) and
Parry (1991). This list may be used in group discussions to
suggest application speciﬁc defenses. The defense strategies
‘‘new procedure’’ and ‘‘improved quality control’’ may, for
example, be used to derive the more speciﬁc defense
strategy ‘‘regular quality checks of hydraulics’’.
It should be noted that the list of generic defense options
does not include staggering of staff and staggered testing,
even if these measures defend against CCFs (Summers &
Raney, 1999). Offshore oil and gas installations are often
scarcely manned, and staggered testing may be unrealistic
to implement. In addition, it may be more complex to
coordinate and more time consuming. However, in other
applications staggered testing and staggering of staff may
be relevant and should then be added to the list.
Each plant speciﬁc defense is evaluated with respect to
protection impact (the ability to protect against future
occurrences) and cost impact. The protection impact is
evaluated qualitatively, as either high (H) or low (L), an
approach which is also used in the more extensive cause-
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Table 3
Generic defense options
Administrative Improved preparation
control Improved coordination
Improved responsibilities
Improved feedback of experience
Improved safety culture
Improved training
Improved quality control
Documentation Improved drawings
Improved functional description
Procedures New procedure
Improved procedure text (clariﬁcation,
added scope or information)
Improved quality control of restoration
Improved test tools and calibration
Monitoring and
surveillance
New alarm or alert. Implementation must
follow IEC 61508 (1998)/61511 (2003)
New condition or logic sequence
Physical barriers Improved physical support or fastening
Improved physical protection
Hardware or software
modiﬁcations of SIS
Modiﬁcations requiring design changes.
Redesign following IEC 61508 (1998)/61511
(2003)
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symbols). The cost impact may be evaluated qualitatively
(high (H), medium (M) or low (L)) or quantitatively (based
on a cost estimate). If the costs are considered quantita-
tively, the cost impact may include design and installation
costs or the life cycle costs. For each selected defense, it
should be indicated if the root cause (R), the coupling
factor (C) or both are affected. The information may be
useful for assessing the estimated impact on reliability
parameters, for example, the b-factor (in case the b-factor
model is selected) or the dangerous failure rate. At the
current stage, the CCF defense approach does not
recommend how the reliability parameters should be
updated.
5.6. Task 6: validation and continuous improvements
Systematic failures that may lead to CCFs, are not
always captures through execution and follow-up of
function testing and inspection. According to Summers
and Raney (1999), the most critical cause of CCFs during
SIS design and implementation is an erroneous or
incomplete safety requirement speciﬁcation. If, for exam-
ple, an inadequate ﬁre protection is speciﬁed, the detectors
may fail to detect a real ﬁre. The similar argument may be
relevant for the operational phase; if the work processes,
procedures, tools and competence are inappropriate for
avoidance, identiﬁcation and follow-up of CCFs, they may
not provide the intended protection against CCFs.
Validating all work tasks at regular intervals with respectto how they comply with the new approach may capture
weaknesses and lead to continuous improvement. It may
also be relevant to evaluate the effect of implemented
defenses, either qualitatively or quantitatively.
The CCF defense approach suggests two new validation
activities: (1) task analysis of function testing and inspec-
tion execution, and (2) use of a new validation checklist.
The task analysis is suitable for capturing the causes of
human interaction failures (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992),
and the selected approach builds on operational sequence
diagrams OSD as illustrated in Fig. 4. One may choose to
concentrate on those work processes that are related to SIS
components where CCFs or CCF causes have been
experienced. The new validation checklist builds on the
SIS life cycle checklists proposed by Summers and Raney
(1999). Many oil and gas companies perform regular audits
of, for example, SIS follow-up and performance. Some of
the questions suggested for the validation checklist may
therefore be covered by existing audit procedures.
Checklist questions for validation:(1) Are requirements for the safety function covered by
the function test or inspection procedure(s)?(2) Are all disciplines involved in SIS testing, inspection,
maintenance and follow-up familiar with the concept
of CCFs?(3) Are dangerous undetected failure modes known and
sufﬁciently catered for in the function test and
inspection procedures?(4) Are the test limitations (compared to the real demand
conditions) known?(5) Are all redundant channels of the safety function
covered by the function test or inspection procedures?(6) Are failures introduced during function testing and
inspection captured, analyzed and used to improve the
associated procedures?(7) Are failures detected upon real demands analyzed to
verify that they would have been detected during a
function test or inspection?(8) Are changes in operating or environmental conditions
captured and analyzed for necessary modiﬁcations to
the SIS or related procedures?(9) Are the calibration and test tools suitable and
maintained according to the vendor recommenda-
tions?(10) Are personnel using the calibration and test tools
familiar with their application?(11) Are procedure deﬁciencies communicated to the
responsible persons and followed up?(12) Are the diagnostic alarms followed up within the
speciﬁed mean time to restoration?(13) Are CCF systematically identiﬁed and analyzed, and
defenses implemented to prevent their recurrence?Questions given the answer ‘‘no’’ indicate a potential
weakness in the defense against CCFs, and should be
discussed to determine corrective actions.
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The proposed CCF defense approach is based on a set of
checklists and is supported by inﬂuence diagrams, task
analyses, and simpliﬁed cause-defense matrices. The oil and
gas industry is familiar with checklists that are used to
initiate discussions on focus areas and identify deviations
from regulations and engineering standards. One example
is the crisis intervention and operability analysis (CRIOP)
methodology that uses checklists to verify the design of
offshore control centers (Johnsen et al., 2004).
Several important features related to the development of
efﬁcient checklists are discussed by Summers and Raney
(1999), Summers, Raney, and Dejmek (1999), and Walker
(1997). The questions must be relevant (so that they
provide information on factors that are relevant to CCFs),
complete (cover all relevant aspects of CCFs), speciﬁc
(so that the attainable response is obtained), repeatable
(so that the user gives the same answer when the question is
repeated under similar circumstances) and reproducible
(meaning that different users give the same answer under
similar circumstances).
The CCF defense approach recommends that analyses of
root causes and coupling factors are based on inﬂuence
diagrams. Inﬂuence diagrams are suitable for qualitative as
well as quantitative analyses (e.g., see Jensen, 2001).
Methods like fault tree analysis, the modiﬁed FMEA
analysis tool (Childs & Mosleh, 1999) and the failure
classiﬁcation sheets used in the nuclear power industry
(Mosleh et al., 1994) may also be applied. Inﬂuencediagrams are, however, preferred since they give a simple
illustration that is easy to grasp by practitioners. Cooper
et al. (1993) recommend to skip the analysis of root causes,
and rather focus on common failure mechanisms (which
captures coupling factors). Their argument is that failure
descriptions often lack sufﬁcient information to determine
the root causes, that the root causes may be interpreted
differently by different people, and that the root causes are
not as relevant for selecting efﬁcient defenses against CCFs
as the common failure mechanisms. In our approach, we
have maintained the attention to defense tactics against
root causes. However, if adequate failure descriptions are
not available, one may limit the attention to the coupling
factors.
A simpliﬁed cause-defense matrix has been selected
rather than the more extensive version used in the nuclear
power industry (Paula, 1990). To perform very detailed
analysis of defense measures and their impact may not be
realistic in the oil and gas industry that (at the current
stage) does not use this information to estimate the CCF
failure rates.
Task analysis may be used to verify that all relevant CCF
causes are catered for in the checklists and procedures
(e.g., see Davoudian, Wu, & Apostolakis, 1994). Task
analysis is a method where the sequence of tasks, the role of
the various actors and their way of communicating are
analyzed. There are several approaches to task analysis
(e.g., see Hendrick & Benner, 1987; Kirwan & Ainsworth,
1992). The concept of OSD has been selected for the CCF
defense approach, since it is an intuitive way of visualizing
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and technology. The OSD is organized similar to a
sequential timed events plotting (STEP), an approach that
has proved to be efﬁcient in similar applications (Sintef,
1998, 2003).
The current version of the CCF defense approach does
not relate the efﬁciency of defenses to the reliability
parameters. Several approaches may be considered for
future extensions. One alternative is to wait and see if the
failure reports indicate a reduced failure rate. Another
alternative is to take credit for the expected effect, by
estimating a new failure rate or a new b-factor. However, it
may be difﬁcult to determine if the reduction is due to a
certain defense measure or to other factors. The failure rate
may be updated following the approach, for example, by
Vatn (2006) or Sintef (2006). To update the b-factor, the
PDS method (Sintef, 2006), the betaplus method Smith and
Simpson (2005), IEC 61508 (1998) b-factor checklists or
the checklists developed by Humphreys (1987) may be
applied.
Other effects from using the CCF defense approach that
may be difﬁcult to measure quantitatively is the increased
awareness to the causes and effects of CCFs. Increased
awareness may improve the detection of CCFs during
execution and follow-up of function testing and inspection,
and give more attention to how human interaction related
failures may be avoided. The importance of maintaining
independence between safety functions and redundant
components may also be more evident to all actors
working with SIS operation, maintenance, and follow-up.
7. Conclusions and ideas for further work
The CCF defense approach presents a practical im-
plementation of defenses during the operational phase of
oil and gas installations. It builds on generic and
recognized methodologies combined with related research
results and experience from other industry sectors. To our
knowledge, a similar approach has not been developed,
and may therefore be a valuable contribution for SIS
follow-up. The approach has yet not been tested in real
applications, but this type of testing will be performed and
reported later.
A main limitation of the current version of the CCF
defense approach is the lack of quantitative means to
indicate any trends in the status of CCF defenses in the
operational phase. This is therefore an important area for
future research. There are several other ideas for further
work. One obvious issue is to test the checklists and tools in
the oil and gas industry, and analyze feedback for further
improvements of the methodology. Another area is to
consider alternative analytical techniques, for example, for
analyzing the root causes and coupling factors. The
recommendation by ISO 14224 (2006) to collect data on
CCFs may also represent a challenge for the oil and gas
industry data, and it may be important to develop common
approaches to classiﬁcation of CCFs. A last issue is toanalyze new operational concepts and technology and how
they may introduce new CCF causes. In the future,
one may expect extensive use of automated function testing
and new ways of human interaction that may introduce
new stresses to technology as well as to humans and
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Spurious activation of safety instrumented systems in the oil and gas industry may lead to production loss, stress on affected
components and systems, and hazards during system restoration. This article deﬁnes and clariﬁes concepts related to spurious activation.
A clear distinction is made between spurious operation, spurious trip, and spurious shutdown. The causes and effects of spurious
activation are discussed and related to the concepts used in IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and OREDA. A new set of formulas for calculating
the spurious activation rate is presented, and compared with formulas that are frequently used in the oil and gas industry. The new
approach is illustrated in a simple case study.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Spurious trip; Spurious activation; Spurious operation; Safety instrumented system; False process demand1. Introduction
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used in the oil and
gas industry to detect hazardous events, and to perform
required safety actions to maintain—or bring the process
back to—a safe state. The safety functions implemented
into a SIS are called safety instrumented functions (SIF). A
SIS comprises input elements (e.g., sensors), logic solvers
(e.g., programmable electronic solver [PLC]), and ﬁnal
elements (e.g., safety valves, circuit breakers, alarms). The
overall objective of SIS design, implementation, and
follow-up is to ensure that the SIS is able to perform the
intended safety functions if speciﬁc process demands
should occur.
Spurious activation of the SIS may lead to a partial or
full process shutdown. The spurious activation may be due
to false process demands or SIS element failures. A false
process demand is a demand that is erroneously treated as
a real process demand, for example, a stray ray of sunlight
that is mistakenly read as a ﬁre by a ﬂame detector. In the
oil and gas industry, it is important to reduce the number
of spurious activations to (i) avoid unnecessary productionatter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
7.004
or. Tel.: +4773597101; fax: +4773597117.
y.a.lundteigen@ntnu.no (M.A. Lundteigen).loss, (ii) reduce the risk related to stresses caused by the
spurious activation, and (iii) avoid hazards during un-
scheduled system restoration and restart.
The main focus of the IEC 61508 [1] and the IEC 61511
[2] is to ensure that the SIS is able to perform on demand.
Limited focus is given to spurious activations, their causes
and effects, and how to estimate the rate of spurious
activations. IEC 61508 has no requirements related to
spurious activations, while IEC 61511 requires that a
maximum spurious trip rate (STR) is speciﬁed, but the
standard does not provide any deﬁnition of a spurious trip
or guidance on how the rate should be estimated.
To estimate the STR, the oil and gas industry often uses
the formulas presented in [3–6]. When comparing these
formulas, it is evident that there is no unique interpretation
of the concept of spurious trip. While the PDS1 method [5]
deﬁnes a spurious trip as a spurious activation of a single
SIS element or of a SIF, ANSI/ISA 84.01 [7] refers to a
spurious trip as a non-intended process shutdown. As a
result, the concept of spurious trip is rather confusing and
it is difﬁcult to compare the STR in different applications.1PDS is the Norwegian abbreviation of ‘‘reliability of computer-based
safety systems’’.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
M.A. Lundteigen, M. Rausand / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 93 (2008) 1208–1217 1209The objectives of this article are to (i) deﬁne and discuss
terms and concepts related to spurious activation of a SIS,
(ii) clarify the spurious activation causes, and (iii) establish
a set of formulas for calculating the rate of spurious
activations and to compare them with the formulas
provided by [4,5].
The article is organized as follows: In Section 2, the main
concepts of spurious activation are deﬁned and discussed.
The causes of spurious activation are discussed in Section 3
in light of the spurious activation concepts proposed in
Section 2 using an inﬂuence diagram. Here, we also address
the relationship between spurious activation and danger-
ous detected (DD) failures. Section 4 gives an overview of
failure modes and discusses how spurious activations may
be classiﬁed in this respect. A set of formulas are
established in Section 5, and a case study gives a brief
comparison with some of the alternative approaches used
in the oil and gas industry today. Finally, some concluding
remarks are given in Section 6.
2. Main concepts of spurious activation
Spurious activation is known under several different
names in the literature, for example, spurious operation
(SO), spurious trip, spurious stop, nuisance trip, spurious
actuation, spurious initiation, false trip, and premature
closure (PC) [4,8–11]. In this article, spurious activation is
used as a collective term. Spurious indicates that the cause
of activation is improper, false, or non-genuine, while
activation indicates that there is some type of transition
from one state to another.
There are three main types of spurious activation: (1)
spurious activation of individual SIS elements, (2) spurious
activation of a SIS (i.e., of a SIF), and (3) spurious
shutdown of the process. Using the same concept to
describe all three types may lead to misunderstanding and
confusion. A spurious activation of, for example, a single
gas detector in a 2-out-of-3 (2oo3) voted conﬁguration of
detectors will not lead to a spurious activation of the SIF,
and a spurious activation of a SIF leading to start-up of a
ﬁre pump will not necessarily disturb the process.
To distinguish between the different types of spurious
activation, we suggest the following terms and deﬁnitions: Spurious operation: A SO is an activation of a SIS
element without the presence of a speciﬁed process
demand. Examples comprise: (i) a false signal about
high level from a level transmitter due to an internal
failure of the transmitter, or (ii) a PC of a spring loaded,
hydraulically operated, fail-safe-close safety valve due to
leakage in the hydraulic circuit, and (iii) a high level
alarm from a level transmitter without the liquid level
having exceeded the upper limit, due to failure to
distinguish the foam from the real level of the liquid in
the separator. Spurious trip: A spurious trip is activation of one or
more SIS elements such that the SIS performs a SIFwithout the presence of a speciﬁed process demand.
Examples comprise: (i) two ﬂame detectors in a 2oo3
conﬁguration give false signal about ﬁre, causing the
ﬁnal elements of the SIF to be activated, and (ii) one out
of two shutdown valves in a 1oo2 conﬁguration of ﬁnal
elements closes prematurely due to an internal failure. Spurious shutdown: A spurious shutdown is a partial or
full process shutdown without the presence of a speciﬁed
process demand.
All the three terms are used in the literature, but
unfortunately, with ambiguous meanings. In ISO 14224
[11] and OREDA [8], the offshore reliability data acquisi-
tion project [8,12], the term SO is close to our deﬁnition,
but they also give spurious trip the same meaning as SO.
The term spurious trip is, for example, used for unexpected
shutdowns of machinery.
3. Causes of spurious activation
In Fig. 1, the main causes of spurious activation are
identiﬁed and illustrated in an inﬂuence diagram. SO,
spurious trip, and spurious shutdown are shown as
performance nodes (rounded rectangles), since their rates
of occurrence are performance quantities that we want to
minimize in order to reduce the production loss. The
chance nodes (circles) represent the factors that inﬂuence
the rates of spurious activation. We are not able to control
these factors directly, but we may inﬂuence them indirectly
through a set of decisions. A decision may be to select an
element with a higher reliability than speciﬁed. Another
decision may be to invest in more training and higher
personnel competence in order to reduce human errors
during operation and maintenance. Relevant decisions are
illustrated in the ﬁgure as decision nodes (rectangles). The
arrows indicate the relationships between decisions, fac-
tors, and performance measures.
Fig. 1 also illustrates the links between the three types of
spurious activation: a SO (in the following referred to as
SO-failure) may be one of several causes of a spurious trip,
and a spurious trip may be one of several causes of a
spurious shutdown. The dashed arrows in Fig. 1 indicate
that the link is present under certain conditions, for
example, for a speciﬁc hardware conﬁguration.
3.1. Causes of SO
There are two main causes of SO of a SIS element:(1) An internal failure of the element (or its supporting
equipment) leads to a SO.(2) The input element responds to a false demand.SO-failures due to internal failures are often considered as
safe failures since they do not impede the SIS from
performing on a demand. However, all safe failures are
not leading to SO, and it is therefore necessary to study the
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ones are relevant for SO. An internal leakage in the v
alve actuator of a fail-safe-close safety valve may, for
example, lead to a SO, while a failure of a valve position
indicator (limit switch) will not. In the following, we are
using SO-failures to describe the safe failure modes that
lead to a SO of the essential (safety) function of the
element.
The IEC standards [1,2] distinguish between two
categories of safe failures: safe random hardware failures
and safe systematic failures. The safe random hardware
failures are mainly due to normal degradation, while the
safe systematic failures are due to causes like design error,
procedure deﬁciency, or excessive environmental exposure
that may only be removed by modifying the design,
implementation, installation, operation or maintenance
processes, tools or procedures. We therefore distinguish
between random hardware SO-failures and systematic SO-
failures in Fig. 1.The element design and the material selection inﬂu-
ence the rate of random hardware SO-failures. This
is illustrated by an arrow from ‘element quality’ to ‘ran-
dom hardware SO-failures’ in Fig. 1. A particular mate-
rial may, for example, withstand high temperature and
high pressure conditions better than another material,
and a sensor principle used for a level transmitter may be
more vulnerable to a speciﬁc operating condition than
another.
As indicated in Fig. 1, operation and maintenance
procedures, tools, and work processes, design, implemen-
tation and installation procedures, competence and train-
ing, and environmental exposure may inﬂuence the
likelihood of systematic failures.
The IEC standards [1,2] consider systematic failures as
unpredictable failures and therefore the rates of these
failures do not need to be quantiﬁed. However, PDS [5]
suggests a quantiﬁcation method where the contribution
from systematic failures is included.
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of the occurrence of systematic failures. Veriﬁcation means
to check and conﬁrm (e.g., by testing or review) that the
implemented design meets the speciﬁcations, while valida-
tion means to also assess the adequacy of selected design
and implementation approaches and tools. In the opera-
tional phase, the rate of systematic failures may be reduced
by veriﬁcation and validation of, for example, function
testing, visual inspection procedures, and work processes.
Competence and training initiatives are important to reduce
human errors during function tests. The environmental
conditions inﬂuence the occurrence of systematic failures if
the conditions are outside the design envelope. However, in
most cases it is not possible to inﬂuence the environmental
conditions. The contribution from the environment is
therefore illustrated by a chance node in Fig. 1.
A common cause failure (CCF) occurs when two or
more elements fail due to a shared cause. In the current
context, we are not only interested in the dangerous CCFs
that are included in the PFD calculations. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, it is also necessary to consider CCFs that lead to SO
of two or more elements. The spurious CCFs do not have
the same root causes and coupling factors as the dangerous
CCFs. Two safety valves may, for example, fail to close
(FTC) on demand due to scaling, while scaling will never
lead to SO of the same valves. A leakage in a common
hydraulic supply system for two (fail-safe-close) safety
valves may lead to SO and may not impede the safety
valves from closing. IEC 61508 [1] recommends that
dangerous CCFs are modeled by a beta-factor model,
and part 6 of the standard includes a procedure that can be
used to estimate a plant speciﬁc value of the parameter b
for dangerous CCFs. Since the dangerous CCFs are
different in nature from the spurious CCFs, the procedure
in part 6 of [1] is not suitable for estimating the parameter
bSO for spurious CCFs. However, the same type of
defences against coupling factors (e.g., reduce similarities
in design, installation or procedures) apply to spurious, as
well dangerous CCFs.
False demands are important contributors to SO of SIS
elements. A false demand often shares some characteristics
(e.g., visual appearance and composition) with a real
process demand, and it may therefore be difﬁcult for the
input element to distinguish the two. A stray ray of
sunlight may, for example, look like a small ﬂame from
certain angles, and a ﬂame detector may therefore
erroneously read it as a ﬂame.
It may not be possible to reduce the occurrence of false
demands, but we may inﬂuence how the input elements
respond to them. It may, for example, not be possible to
remove sunlight or alter the density of foam, but we may
select elements that are designed to better distinguish
between false and real process demands, or we may
relocate the elements to make them less vulnerable to false
demands.
Some false demands are man-made, which means that
we are able to inﬂuence how often they occur by improvingoperation and maintenance procedures and work pro-
cesses. If we, for example, want to avoid ﬂame detectors
from responding to welding, we must ensure that the
necessary inhibits are set, alternatively that the ﬂame
detectors are covered so that they do no ‘see’ the welding
ﬂame. This is illustrated by an arrow from ‘operation and
maintenance’ to the chance node ‘real, but unintended
demand’ in Fig. 1.
3.2. Causes of spurious trips
One of the main contributors to spurious trips is
evidently SO of SIS elements. SO may lead to a spurious
trip if the number of activated elements corresponds to the
number of elements needed to perform the safety function.
The selected hardware conﬁguration therefore determines
whether or not a SO leads to a spurious trip. This ‘condi-
tional’ inﬂuence is illustrated by dashed arrows in Fig. 1.
There are several other causes of spurious trips, for
example: Loss of utilities, like pneumatic, hydraulic or power
supply: Loss of utilities may directly lead to spurious
trip if the SIF is designed fail-safe (which is the typical
situation on oil and gas installations). DD failures: In some cases, the SIS may be designed to
spuriously activate a SIF if the presence of DD failures
are impeding the SIF from functioning on demand. The
IEC standards [1,2] require this performance if the
elements have not been restored within the speciﬁed
mean time to restoration. A 2oo3 conﬁguration is still
able to act if a single dangerous detected failure is
present. If two DD failures are present, the SIF is unable
to respond to a real process demand, and the time the
SIS is in such a condition should be minimized. This
spurious trip may be activated automatically or
manually. If the spurious trip causes a process shut-
down, the shutdown will usually be more controlled/
smooth than a spurious trip of the two previous types.
A SIF may also trip due to a human error during, for
example, function testing. We have chosen to relate such
events to the SO level (through the safe systematic failures
and safe CCFs), since the human errors are affecting
elements rather than the function.
3.3. Causes of spurious shutdowns
A spurious trip will usually, but not always, lead to a
spurious shutdown of the process. If the SIF does not
interact directly (or indirectly by activating other SIFs)
with the process, the process may not be disturbed upon a
spurious trip. A dashed arrow is therefore used to indicate
that a spurious trip may (but not always) lead to a spurious
shutdown. Fig. 1 also indicates (by dashed arrows and
nodes) that different types of SIFs may lead to process
shutdowns.
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closure/stop of non-SIS equipment that interacts with the
process, like control valves and pumps. A spurious closure
of a control valve or a spurious stop of a pump may be due
to element internal failures, human errors or automatic
control system errors. In Fig. 1, we have illustrated non-
SIS element failures and automatic control system failures
by the chance node ‘process equipment failures,’ and
human errors as the chance node ‘human errors.’
4. Classiﬁcation of failure modes
Fig. 2 illustrates how the various failure modes contri-
bute to spurious trips. The failure modes are classiﬁed
based on a combination of the schemes used by OREDA
and the IEC standards [1,2].
OREDA [8] distinguishes between critical, degraded, and
incipient failures. A critical failure is a failure that is sudden
and causes a cessation of one or more fundamental
functions, where cessation implies that the function is
impeded, lost, unavailable or outside the speciﬁed limits. It
should be noted that a critical failure in OREDA is not the
same as a dangerous failure in the IEC standards [1,2].
Unlike the IEC 61508 and the IEC 61511, OREDA does
not relate the failure categories to the consequences of
failures.
OREDA deﬁnes a degraded failure as a failure that may
compromise one or several functions without immediately
affecting the main or fundamental functions. If a degraded
failure is not corrected, it may develop into a critical
failure. An incipient failure is an imperfection of the
element state or condition that may, if not corrected, lead
to a degraded failure and in some cases also to a critical
failure. Often, it is difﬁcult to distinguish degraded from
incipient failures, and the two categories are consequently
considered as one group. The IEC standards [1,2] do not
deﬁne degraded/incipient failure categories, but in many
cases safe failures, other than SO-failures, may be consi-
dered as degraded/incipient failures.Failure 
(SIS component)
LCP, DOP
PC
Degraded/ 
incipient
OREDA
Critical
FTC, 
Fig. 2. ClassiﬁcationFailure modes may be studied on the element level as
well as on the SIF level. In Fig. 2 we have focused on the
element level. Different failure categories are relevant for
different types of SIS elements, and in Fig. 2 we have used
terms that apply to fail-safe-close safety valves. OREDA
deﬁnes several failure modes as critical for safety valves, for
example, FTC, delayed operation (DOP), and leakage in
closed position (LCP). PC and SO are also considered
critical failure modes by OREDA, since the main function
of the valve is unavailable. A valve with longer closing time
than expected, but where the closing time is still below the
upper time constraint may be considered to have a
degraded/incipient failure mode.
As discussed in Section 3, only the critical failure modes
corresponding to DD and safe (S) failures are relevant when
estimating the STR. The ‘conditional’ relationships between
SO, DD failures, and spurious trips are indicated with a
dashed arrow, in the same way as in Fig. 1. It should be noted
that IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 distinguish between safe
detected (SD) and safe undetected (SU) failures. An SO-failure
may be considered as an SU-failure as well as an SD-failure. If
a SO does not lead to a spurious trip, for example, a single SIS
element raising an alarm in a 2oo3 conﬁguration, we may
deﬁne the SO-failure as SD since the failure is detected before
the SIF is executed. However, if the SO-failure leads to a
spurious trip, for example, when a valve spuriously closes in a
1oo2 conﬁguration, we may classify the failure as SU since the
failure is detected after the SIF has been executed.
5. New formulas for the STR
We deﬁne the STR as the mean number of spurious
activations of the SIF per time unit. There are three main
causes of spurious trips (of a SIS):(1)of faSO, caused by:
 Internal failures of one or more of the SIS elements.
The number of elements that have to fail to give a
spurious trip depends on the SIS conﬁguration.IEC
IEC
ilurDU
DD
S
 61508/
 61511
Spurious
trip
SO
e modes.
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demands: (a) Demands that are not real, but which
share some properties or characteristics with the real
demands, and (b) Demands that are real, but where
the response should have been prohibited, for
example, when welding has not been covered from
the ﬂame detectors.
False demands of type (a) can only be prevented
by a redesign of the system. False demands of type
(b) are mainly caused by human errors or inadequate
procedures, and can therefore be more easily
prevented.(2) DD failures. Whether or not one or more DD-failures
will result in a spurious trip of the SIS, depends on the
SIS conﬁguration and the operating philosophy.(3) Loss of utilities. The SIS is often designed so that the
safe state of the process is obtained when the SIS is de-
energized or upon loss of hydraulic or pneumatic power
(so-called fail-safe design).We discuss the causes of spurious trips separately. In this
article, the term koon is always used with respect to
function. A koon is functioning if at least k of the n
elements are functioning. A koon will therefore fail if at
least ðn  k þ 1Þ of the n elements fail.
5.1. Spurious operation
5.1.1. Internal failures
Let lSO;j denote the rate of SOs of a SIS element of type j.
First, consider a 1oon conﬁguration (i.e., a parallel
structure) of n independent elements of the same type j.
Any SO-failure of an element in the 1oon conﬁguration will
give a spurious output from the system. If the 1oon
conﬁguration is in series with the rest of the SIS, for
example, as input or ﬁnal elements, any SO-failure will give
a spurious trip. The STR due to internal failures of a 1oon
conﬁguration of elements of type j is therefore
STR1;j ¼ nlSO;j . (1)
If the elements are exposed to CCFs that can be modeled by
a beta-factor model such that the rate of CCFs is bSOj lSO;j,
the rate of spurious trips caused by the 1oon conﬁguration
is
STR1;j ¼ nð1 bSOj ÞlSO;j þ bSOj lSO;j
¼ nlSO;j  ðn  1ÞbSOj lSO;j. ð2Þ
When modeled by a beta-factor model, a 1oon structure of
dependent elements has a lower STR than a structure of n
independent elements. This fact is easy to explain, but may
be considered to be a ‘strange’ behavior of the beta-factor
model.
Now, consider a koon conﬁguration of elements of type
j, where nXkX2. If we use the beta-factor model, the SO-
failures of each element may be split into independent
failures (i.e., with multiplicity 1) and CCFs (i.e., withmultiplicity n). If a CCF occurs, with rate bSOj lSO;j, a
spurious trip will occur.
Independent SO-failures can also lead to a spurious trip.
The ﬁrst independent SO-failure will occur with rate
nð1 bSOj ÞlSO;j. This failure is assumed to be revealed
immediately (e.g., by a local alarm), and a repair action is
initiated to bring the element back to a functioning state.
The mean restoration time for an element of type j is MDTj.
To get a spurious trip, at least ðk  1Þ of the other ðn  1Þ
elements must have an SO-failure before the restoration
action of the ﬁrst element is ﬁnished. This may be described
as a binomial situation: (i) we have ðn  1Þ independent
elements, (ii) each element will either survive the interval
MDTj without a SO-failure or not survive the interval, and
(iii) the probability that an element will have a SO-failure in
the restoration interval is p ¼ 1 eð1bSOj ÞlSO;jMDTj 
ð1 bSOj ÞlSO;jMDTj. The number M of SO-failures that
occur in the restoration interval will therefore have a
binomial distribution ðn  1; pÞ.
The STR of a koon conﬁguration of elements of type j
due to internal failures is
STRkoon1;j ¼ nð1 bSOj ÞlSO;j PrðMXk  1Þ þ bSOj lSO;j
 nð1 bSOj ÞlSO;j
Xn1
m¼k1
n  1
m
 !
pmð1 pÞn1m
" #
þ bSOj lSO;j, ð3Þ
where p ¼ ð1 bSOj ÞlSO;jMDTj.
Formula (3) is correct for k ¼ 2 but will slightly under-
estimate the STR for kX3. To have a spurious trip, additional,
independent SO-failures have to occur while the initial failure
is repaired. These failures will also have restoration times that
may extend beyond the initial restoration time, but these
restoration times will generally be shorter thanMDTj since the
repair personnel is already on site. The error caused by the
approximation is considered to be negligible, because of the
remote probability of having more than one additional,
independent SO-failure in the short interval of length MDTj.
The beta factor bSOj and the restoration time MDTj may
obviously be different for different types of elements. The
index j is used to ﬁt Eqs. (2) and (3) to the relevant types of
elements. When several types of elements are used in the
same conﬁguration, we need to use a more comprehensive
approach, e.g., as described in [13].5.1.2. False demands
Let lF be the rate of false demands of type (a), and let
lSF be the rate of false demands of type (b). The IEC
standards [1,2] deﬁne failures caused by false demands of
type (b) and we have therefore chosen to use the subscript
SF for this rate. When a false demand occurs, the SIS will
treat this demand as a real demand and carry out its safety
function. It may be situations where the false demand is
only detected by at most ðk  1Þ elements in a koon
conﬁguration of input elements and therefore will not
initiate the SIF. To be on the conservative side, the STR of
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STR2;j ¼ ðlF þ lSFÞð1 PFDÞ. (4)
The PFD of the SIF is usually so small that ð1 PFDÞ can
be omitted from Eq. (5).
Historical databases like OREDA do not provide
estimates for lF and lSF, but other sources may provide
insight into how frequent such events occur. Some oil
companies record non-intended incidents that have led to
hazardous situations or production losses. By reviewing
these records, it may be possible to estimate lSF for the
SIF. Information management systems (IMS) are some-
times installed to record the number of process shutdowns
and system trips. By reviewing the events recorded in the
IMS, it may be possible to estimate lF.
5.2. DD failures
Let lDD;j denote the rate of DD-failures for elements of
type j. When a DD-failure is revealed, a repair action is
initiated to restore the function. The mean restoration time
is denoted MDTj . This restoration time may, or may not,
be equal to the restoration time MDTj for SO-failures. A
reason for a difference may be different priorities of the
two types of failure.
DD-failures may be independent failures or CCFs. We
will, also in this case, use a beta-factor model for the CCFs
with parameter bDDj . If a CCF of DD-failures occur, with
rate bDDj lDD;j, the system is not able to perform its safety
function, and the system will be stopped. Several references
[4,6] treat this stop as a spurious trip.
Consider a koon conﬁguration of elements of type j. In
the following we assume an operating strategy where the
SIF is spuriously tripped as soon as at least ðn  k þ 1Þ
dangerous failures are detected. DD CCFs (with multi-
plicity n) will always lead to spurious trips. We will now
consider the independent DD-failures (i.e., with multi-
plicity 1). The ﬁrst independent DD-failure will occur with
rate nð1 bDDj ÞlDD;j. The failure is assumed to be revealed
almost immediately and a repair action is initiated. To have
a spurious trip, at least ðn  kÞ of the remaining ðn  1Þ
elements must get a DD-failure before the restoration of
the ﬁrst DD-failure is ﬁnished. In the same way as for SO-
failures, this can be treated as a binomial situation where
the number M of DD-failures in the interval of length
MDTj is binomially distributed ðn  1; pÞ, where
p ¼ 1 eð1bDDj ÞlDD;jMDTj  ð1 bDDj ÞlDD;jMDTj .
The STR of a koon conﬁguration of elements of type j
due to DD-failures is
STRkoon3;j ¼ nð1 bDDj ÞlDD;j PrðMXn  kÞ þ bDDj lDD;j
 nð1 bDDj ÞlDD;j
Xn1
m¼nk
n  1
m
 !
ðpÞm
"
ð1 pÞn1m
#
þ bDDj lDD;j, ð5Þ
where p ¼ ð1 bDDj ÞlDD;jMDTj .Formulas (3) and (5) do not take into account degraded
operation, for example, that the SIS upon a single SO-
failure or a single DD-failure in a 2oo3 conﬁguration may
be reconﬁgured to a 1oo2 conﬁguration. Degraded opera-
tion is used to allow for delayed repair without compro-
mising the reliability of the SIS. The PDS method suggests
formulas for degraded operation when calculating PFD. A
similar approach may be selected for modeling spurious
trips in degraded mode. Markov methods may also be used
to derive formulas for degraded operation.
5.3. Loss of utilities
A utility loss (UL) may directly lead to a spurious trip
when we assume a fail-safe design of the SIS. The STR due
to ULs associated with elements of type j is therefore
STR4;j ¼ lUL;j. (6)
The rate of ULs is not found in historical databases like
OREDA. The occurrence of ULs strongly depends on the
actual plant, for example, the number of redundant power
supplies, the power supply capacities, and the pneumatic/
hydraulic supply capacities. By investigating the failure
reports from a speciﬁc plant, one may identify failure
records associated with utility failures and use these as
basis for estimating the frequency of ULs.
5.4. Simplified formulas
The total STR, STRT , is now found by adding the
contributions from the above categories and for all groups
of elements.
In Table 1, the new formulas are summarized for some
selected conﬁgurations together with the formulas provided
by [4,5]. The following assumptions and simpliﬁcations are
made: The contributions from false demands, non-intended
demands, and systematic failures will in most cases be
negligible and are therefore omitted from the formulas
in Table 1. The contribution from independent failures occurring
during the MDT (alternatively MDT) has been omitted
since their contribution in most cases will be negligible
compared to the contribution from CCFs. ISA [4] and PDS [5] use the ‘conventional’ (dangerous)
b-factor, which we have denoted bD. ISA [4] includes all safe failures in their formulas. To
compare the formulas, we assume that lS is equal to lSO.
For 1oon conﬁgurations, the contribution from indepen-
dent failures is included. For koon ðkX2Þ conﬁgurations,
the contribution from independent failures is negligible
compared to the contribution from the CCFs. In the
simpliﬁed formulas, the ﬁrst part of formulas (3) and (5)
may therefore be omitted. Having assumed that a CCF will
affect all channels simultaneously, the new approach
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Table 1
STR formulas (approximations)
Conﬁguration Approach
New PDS [5] ISA [4]
1oo1 lSO þ lDD lSO lS þ lDD
1oo2 ð2 bSOÞlSO þ bDDlDD 2lSO 2ðlS þ lDDÞ þ bDðlS þ lDDÞ
1oo3 ð3 2bSOÞlSO þ bDDlDD 3lSO 3ðlS þ lDDÞ þ bDðlS þ lDDÞ
2oo3 bSOlSO þ bDDlDD 2:4bDlSO bDðlS þ lDDÞ
2oo4 bSOlSO þ bDDlDD 4bDlSO bDðlS þ lDDÞ
Table 2
Spurious trip rates for case 1
Conﬁguration New PDS [5] ISA [4]
1oo1 2:00E 6 1:00E 6 2:00E 6
1oo2 2:00E 6 2:00E 6 4:04E 6
1oo3 2:98E 6 3:00E 6 6:04E 6
2oo3 4:00E 8 4:80E 8 4:00E 8
2oo4 4:00E 8 8:00E 8 4:00E 8
Table 3
Spurious trip rates for case 2
Conﬁguration New PDS [5] ISA [4]
1oo1 2:00E 6 1:00E 6 2:00E 6
1oo2 1:92E 6 2:00E 6 4:04E 6
1oo3 2:82E 6 3:00E 6 6:04E 6
2oo3 1:20E 7 4:80E 8 4:00E 8
2oo4 1:20E 7 8:00E 8 4:00E 8
Table 4
Spurious trip rates for case 3
Conﬁguration New PDS [5] ISA [4]
1oo1 3:00E 6 2:00E 6 3:00E 6
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tions, as for the 2oo3 and 2oo4 in Table 1. ISA has made
the same assumption, while the PDS uses conﬁguration
factors to cater for CCFs in conﬁgurations other than
1oo2.
PDS [5] does not use the standard beta-factor model for
CCF modeling, but a specially designed model called the
multiple beta-factor model (MBF). The contribution of
CCFs in a koon conﬁguration is estimated as Ckoonb, where
b is the fraction of CCFs among two components and
Ckoon is a correction factor for koon conﬁgurations. The b
used in the PDS method is therefore different from the b
used in the beta-factor model. For 2oo3 and 2oo4 the
correction factors are 2.4 and 4.0, respectively, as seen in
Table 1.
As long as lSO and lDD, as well as b
SO and bDD, are in
the same order of magnitude, the formulas provide nearly
the same results. However, when their order of magnitude
starts to deviate, the formulas provide different results.
This is demonstrated in a brief case study below.
5.5. Case study
In the following, the STR is calculated using the
formulas in Table 1, when we assume that lDD ¼ 1
106 ðhoursÞ1 and that bDD ¼ 2%. Calculations are
performed for the following cases:1oo2 3:82E 6 4:00E 6 6:06E 6
1oo3 5:62E 6 6:00E 6 9:06E 6
2oo3 2:20E 7 9:60E 8 6:00E 8
2oo4 2:20E 7 1:60E 7 6:00E 8(1) b
SO  bDD and lSO  lDD,
(2) bSO is 5 times larger than bDD (and lSO  lDD),
(3) lSO is 2 times larger than lDD (and b
SO is still 5 times
larger than bDD).The resulting STRs for case 1 are shown in Table 2. For
a 1oo1 conﬁguration, the ISA formula provides the
same result as the new formulas (since they consider both
DD failures and SO failures). This is also the situation
for 2oo3 and 2oo4 conﬁgurations. The PDS method
provides a lower STR since PSD only considers the SO
failures.
In cases 2 and 3, the STRs calculated by the new
formulas deviate from the rates calculated by the ISA and
the PDS method. The magnitude of deviations is inﬂuencedby the fraction of bSO to the bDD and the fraction of lSO to
the lDD. This is illustrated in Tables 3 and 4.
For some conﬁgurations, like the 2oo3 conﬁguration in
case 1 and the 2oo4 conﬁguration in case 3, the STRs
calculated by the PDS method are close to the rates
calculated by the new formulas. This is more due to
coincidence than logic reasoning, since the formulas
include different types of parameters that are not related
to each other. Common for all methods is that the STR is
low for conﬁgurations where kX2.
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The oil and gas industry seeks to reduce the number of
spurious activations. As a means to understand the causes
of spurious activation and their related effects, new
deﬁnitions have been proposed. The new deﬁnitions
distinguish between SO (on component level), spurious
trip (on SIF level), and spurious shutdown (considering the
production availability aspect).
New formulas have been established based on the new
deﬁnitions of spurious trips. The main advantages of the
new formulas are that (i) they are generic and may be used
to any koon conﬁguration, (ii) they capture the most
important causes of spurious trips identiﬁed in Fig. 1, (iii)
they cater for the different ways dangerous and SO-failures
contribute to the STR, and (iv) they distinguish between
bSO and bD.
The new formulas have been compared with other
formulas that are frequently used in the oil and gas
industry [4,5]. Even though the formulas may, at ﬁrst
glance, seem quite different, they do not produce very
different results. When the results deviate, this may be
explained as follows: PDS [5] only considers the SO-failures, and not the DD-
failures. ISA [4] applies the same philosophy for DD-failures as
for SO-failures, which means that they assume a
spurious trip in case the number of DD-failures is the
same as the number of failures required to spuriously
activate the SIF. Our formulas are based on a different
philosophy for these two categories of failures, and we
believe that this is a more realistic approach. The PDS method applies a conﬁguration factor to
‘calibrate’ the contribution of CCFs (SO and dangerous)
to the selected conﬁguration. The standard beta-factor
model suggested in IEC 61508 [1] and used as basis for
the formulas in [4] and in our approach, assumes that if
a CCF occurs, all the voted elements fail. However,
when the STR is compared for a 2oo3 and a 2oo4
conﬁguration (where one would expect a difference
between the approaches by PDS and ISA), the results
are rather similar. It should, however, be noted that
PDS [5] uses a slightly different deﬁnition of b. ISA [4] and PDS [5] do not distinguish between bSO and
the bDD. We believe that they should be considered as
two separate parameters, due to their different nature.
It should further be noted that the MDT (of SO-failures as
well as DD-failures) in most cases has a negligible inﬂuence
on the STR. The reason is that the MDT comes into
account in the case of multiple, independent failures that
have a very low probability of occurrence.
There are other approaches for calculating the STR, for
example, as proposed by Lu and Jiang [14], Andrews and
Bartlett [15] and Cho and Jiang [16]. Lu and Jiang [14]
suggest an approach that is similar to our approach sincethey treat the number of SOs as a binomial random
variable. However, their focus is to assess spurious
activation under different maintenance strategies, and they
do not include other failures than independent SO failures.
Andrews and Bartlett [15] use a branching search algorithm
to model the contribution from spurious activation which
may be used to koon conﬁgurations. Their algorithm
focuses on the optimal selection of k and n (in a koon
conﬁguration) that leads to minimum costs and a system
performing within preset constraints (like the maximum
rate of spurious trips). Cho and Jiang [16] suggest using a
Markov model to estimate the STR. For small systems, a
Markov model may be a good alternative to our approach.
However, for larger systems, the state transition diagrams
get complex and difﬁcult to handle. Cho and Jiang [16] do
not consider the contribution from CCFs.
One may argue against introducing a new parameter bSO
in addition to the bD, particularly since it is already difﬁcult
to collect data and estimate bD. However, the distinction
may still be important when it comes to understanding the
underlaying causes. Defending against CCFs that may lead
to dangerous failures of the SIF may be performed by
other means than defending against failures that may lead
to spurious activation. For example, implementing means
to reduce the occurrence of loss of utilities (e.g., air supply
or power supply) may lead to a reduced number of
spurious trips, while it does not affect (at least directly) the
occurrence of dangerous failures.
An important area for future research may be to get
more insight into the causes of SOs and spurious trips, and
how safety and availability may be balanced. In many
industry sectors, the fail-safe state is not well deﬁned and a
spurious trip or a spurious shutdown may lead to
hazardous situations. With more subsea processing and
longer transportation distances of three phase ﬂuids, the oil
and gas industry is challenged with higher availability on
their process control and safety systems.
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Partial stroke testing (PST) has recently been introduced as a semi-automatic means to test process
shutdown valves. Normally, this type of testing does not disturb the process and can detect many of the
failures that traditionally have been revealed only by functional testing. The fraction of all dangerous
failures that are detected by PST is called the PST coverage and is decisive for the effectiveness of the
PST. So far, limited guidance on how to determine the PST coverage has been given. This paper discusses
the application and limitations of PST and suggests a new procedure for how to determine the PST
coverage factor.
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Process shutdown valves are normally operated in a so-called
low demand mode of operation (IEC 61508, 1998). This means that
the valves are kept idle in open position for long periods and are
designed to close and keep tight in case a process demand should
occur. The valves usually have hydraulic or pneumatic fail-safe
close actuators. Failures may occur while in open position and may
cause the valve to ‘‘fail to close’’ or to ‘‘leak in closed position’’ in a
demand situation. Such failures may remain for a long period and
are called dangerous undetected (DU) failures (IEC 61508, 1998).
Functional testing is required to reveal potential DU failures and
involves full stroke operation and leakage testing. The process
needs to be shut down during the functional test—if no bypass of
the valve is available. In recent years, partial stroke testing (PST)
has been introduced as a supplement to functional testing (Ali &
Goble, 2004; ISA-TR 84.00.03, 2002; Summers & Zachary, 2000).
PST means to partially close a valve, and then return it to the
initial position. The valve movement is so small that the impact on
the process ﬂow or pressure is negligible, but the valve movement
may still be sufﬁcient to reveal several types of dangerous failures.
PST may be suitable for processes where a small value movement
does not cause disturbances that may lead to process shutdowns.
For such processes, it may be economically viable to run PST more
frequently than functional testing.ll rights reserved.
4773597117.
Lundteigen).Process shutdown valves are often used as ﬁnal elements in
safety instrumented systems (SIS). These systems are important
protection layers in process plants, and comprise input elements
(e.g., pressure transmitters (PT), gas detectors), logic solvers
(e.g., relay based logic, programmable logic controllers), and ﬁnal
elements (e.g., valves, circuit breakers). A SIS may perform one or
more safety instrumented functions (SIF). The international
standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 give safety life cycle
requirements to the SIS, and use safety integrity level (SIL) as a
measure of SIS reliability. To comply to a SIL, it is necessary to
(i) implement various measures to avoid, reveal, and control
failures that may be introduced during the SIS safety life cycle,
ranging from the initial speciﬁcation, to design, implementation,
operation, maintenance, modiﬁcations, and ﬁnally decommission-
ing, (ii) select hardware architecture according to the speciﬁed
architectural constraints, and (iii) demonstrate by calculations
that the SIS reliability meets the speciﬁed reliability targets. The
IEC standards use the probability of failure on demand (PFD) as a
measure of SIS reliability.
The increased reliability that is gained by introducing PST may
be used to improve safety and/or to reduce cost (Lundteigen &
Rausand, 2007). Safety is improved if PST is added without
changing the interval between the periodic functional tests. Cost
is reduced if the reliability gained is used to extend the functional
test interval. The reliability gained is inﬂuenced by the PST
coverage, that is, the fraction of DU failures that are detected by
the PST. While several authors have discussed how to take credit
for PST in reliability calculations (Ali, 2004; Ali & Goble, 2004;
Knegtering, 2004; McCrea-Steele, 2005; Summers & Zachary,
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PST coverage factor. Lundteigen and Rausand (2007) show that
past data indicate quite different PST coverage, and ISA-TR
84.00.03 and Goble and Cheddie (2005) suggest using FMEA to
determine the PST coverage.
The objective of this paper is to develop a procedure for how to
determine the PST coverage, taking into account plant speciﬁc
conditions, valve design, and historical data on valve performance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some
typical implementation approaches for PST. A case study is
introduced to illustrate how PST may be implemented for a SIS
application. Section 3 discusses the main attributes of PST and
relates PST to other testing strategies. In Section 4, formulas for
determining the reliability effects of PST are presented. Section 5
discusses the positive and negative effects of introducing PST,
which at the present time are not catered for in the basic
formulas. In Section 6, a new procedure for how to determine the
PST coverage is presented and discussed. We conclude in Section 7
with a brief discussion of the new approach and give some
recommendations for further work.2. PST implementation approaches
PST is introduced to detect, without disturbing the process,
failures that otherwise require functional tests. To what extent the
PST can detect failures, depends on how the PST is implemented.
PST can be implemented in various ways (Ali & Goble, 2004; Ali &
Jero, 2003; ISA-TR 84.00.03, 2002; Summers & Zachary, 2000,
2002). Two variants are illustrated in Fig. 1: (i) a PST that is
integrated with the SIS, and (ii) a separate vendor PST package.
In Fig. 1(i), the hardware and software necessary to perform
the PST are implemented into the SIS logic solver. When PST isManually 
activated PST
SIS
logic solver
PT PTPressuretransmitters
To process
control system
Pipeline
SIS
logic solver
PT PTPressuretransmitters
To process
control system
Pipeline
Fig. 1. Two different PST concepts: (i) integrated with the Sinitiated based on a manual request, the logic solver deactivates
its outputs for a certain period of time (typically a few seconds).
The deactivated outputs cause the solenoid operated valve to start
depressurizing the shutdown valve, and the shutdown valve starts
to move towards the fail safe (closed) position. Just as the valve
has started to move, the logic solver outputs are re-energized, and
the safety valve returns to normal (open) position. The test results
may be monitored manually from the operator stations, by
verifying that the valve travels to the requested position and
returns to the normal state when the test is completed. In some
cases, an automatically generated alarm may be activated, if the
valve fails to move, or to return to its initial position.
The vendor PST packages perform the same type of test
sequence, but the hardware and software are implemented into
separate systems. Some vendors interface the existing solenoid
operated valve, while others install a separate solenoid for testing
purposes (see Fig. 1(ii)). The vendor supplied PST package may
automatically generate the PST at regular intervals. In many cases,
the control room operators want to be in control with the actual
timing of the PST, andmanual activationmay therefore be preferred.
The SIS implemented PST is able to test a larger part of the SIF
than the vendor packages, since the test includes all components
from the logic solver output cards to the shutdown valve. On the
other hand, the vendor PST packages often include additional
sensors or positioning devices that may collect more information
on the valve condition (Ali & Goble, 2004; ISA-TR 84.00.03, 2002;
Summers & Zachary, 2004), and may, as such, obtain higher PST
coverage for the valve.
2.1. Case study
We illustrate a PST implementation by a high integrity
pressure protection system (HIPPS) that is installed on a subseaActuator
Solenoid
Pilot valve
Tank
Pump
Shutdown valve
Manually or automatically
activated PST
Actuator
Shutdown valve
Vendor
PST package
IS and (ii) through an additional vendor PST package.
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2004). The HIPPS is installed to detect if the pipeline pressure
exceeds a speciﬁed set pressure, and close dedicated valves to
avoid further pressure build-up that may cause pipeline rupture
(Aarø, Lund, & Onshus, 1995; Lund, Onshus, & Aarø, 1995; Onshus,
Aarø, & Lund, 1995; Summers, 2003; Summers & Zachary, 2004).
The potential pressure build-up may arise from well shut-in
pressure (i.e., the maximumwellhead pressure), or from a sudden
pipeline blockage, for example a spurious closure of a down-
stream valve. A HIPPS typically comprises PTs, logic solver(s),
solenoid operated hydraulic control valve(s), and shutdown
valves.
In the case study, we consider the subsea HIPPS that is
installed in the Kristin subsea oil/gas ﬁeld in the North Sea
(Bak, Sirevaag, & Stokke, 2006). The HIPPS and its PST implemen-
tation is used to demonstrate how to determine the PST coverage.
In the Kristin ﬁeld, there are six HIPPSs that are installed to
protect subsea pipelines that are rated 330bar against the well
shut-in pressure of 740bar. Each HIPPS comprises four PTs, one
solid state logic solver, two solenoid operated hydraulic control
valves (HCV), and two shutdown gate valves with hydraulic fail-
safe actuators.
The pipelines are used to transport a mixture of water,
condensate, and hydrocarbon gases. The gate valves are designed
for the well shut-in pressure and for temperatures in the range
from 33 to 175 C (Bak et al., 2006). Each HIPPS arrangement is
installed on a dedicated HIPPS manifold as illustrated in Fig. 2,
where the gate valves are marked with a circle.
The four PTs have set-point at 280bar and are voted 2004,
meaning that two transmitters must detect a high pressure to
initiate valve closure (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). The two gate
valves are installed in series and voted 1002, meaning that closure
of one of the valves is sufﬁcient to stop further pressure build-up.
Each of the two gate valves are operated by a HCV. When high
pressure is detected, the logic solver deactivates the signal to the
HCVs, causing the HCVs to depressurize the gate valve actuators.
Upon loss of hydraulic pressure in the gate valve actuators, the
gate valves close.
The functional safety requirements for the HIPPS are to
(1) close at least one of the two gate valves within 12 seconds,
and (2) not leak above a speciﬁed limit (Bak et al., 2006). The SIS
implemented PST is selected to perform PST every second month,
while functional testing is performed once a year. This means that
hardware and software are added to the logic solver to handle a
PST. Upon a request by the control room operators, the logic solver
starts a timer and keeps the outputs deactivated until the timer isFig. 2. Illustration of a HIPPS manifold at the Kreset. The timer is set to 2 s. The PST is considered a success if the
operators observe that signals from the valve position indicator
show that the valve starts to move and then returns to the open
position.3. Test aspects
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 distinguish between two main types
of SIS related tests in the operating phase; (1) diagnostic tests that
automatically identify and report certain types of failures and
failure causes, and (2) functional tests that are performed to
reveal all dangerous SIS failures, so that the SIS may be restored to
its design functionality after the test (CCPS, 2007; IEC 61511,
2003). The hardware and software necessary to implement
the diagnostic test are sometimes referred to as diagnostics
(CCPS, 2007). The diagnostics may be an integral part of a SIS
component, or added as separate software and hardware.
We distinguish between diagnostic testing and functional
testing based on their differences with respect to (ANSI/ISA 84.01,
1996; IEC 61511, 2003; ISA-TR 84.00.03, 2002):ristiBeing automatic:
 A diagnostic test is usually fully automatic.
 A functional test often requires human interaction during
preparation (e.g., setting inhibits and overrides), execution
(e.g., to initiate the test), and restoration (e.g., to suspend
the inhibits and overrides).n su Effect on production:
 A diagnostic test does not require process shutdown.
 A functional test normally requires process shutdown since
operation of most ﬁnal elements interfere with the process. The time to detection of a dangerous failure:
 A diagnostic test is run frequently, typically in the range of
every millisecond and up to every few hours, and may
therefore detect dangerous failures shortly after they occur.
Dangerous failures that are detected by diagnostics are
called dangerous detected (DD) failures.
 A functional test is performed less frequently, typically
ranging from every few months to every few years, and a
dangerous failure may therefore be present (and hidden) for
a longer period of time. Degree of detection:
 A diagnostic test intends to detect failures without causing
process disturbances, and the degree of detection expresses
to what extent failures are revealed by this approach.bsea oil/gas ﬁeld (Bak et al., 2006).
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integrity, sequence, and run-time checks without affecting
production, and may, as a result, reveal more failures than
what would be found during a functional test. For other
components, like valves and circuit breakers, it may be
impossible to achieve a high degree of detection without
fully operating the components.
 A functional test is often intended to reveal all failures.
However, the degree of detection is inﬂuenced by operational
factors. One factor is to what extent the test conditions reﬂect
the real demand conditions. Another aspect is to what extent
operation and maintenance personnel are capable of reveal-
ing failures and avoid introducing new failures. Here, the
quality of procedures, tools, and training is of importance. State of the SIS after the test:
 A diagnostic test reports failures automatically, and, in
some cases, forces an automated transition of the SIS to the
safe state. However, the repair may not necessarily restore
the component to an as good as new condition. A re-
alignment of a line gas detector that has been reported out
of focus is, for example, not always supplemented by a
calibration check.
 Functional tests are often aimed at restoring the SIS to an as
good as new (or design) condition. However, again the state
of the SIS relies on how well operational and maintenance
personnel are able to reveal, correct, and avoid introducing
failures.ANSI/ISA 84.01 and ISA-TR 84.00.03 relate functional testing to
safety instrumented functions (SIF) rather than to individual SIS
components, but they recognize that functional testing for
practical reasons is often split into subtests. As a result, we may
distinguish between functional testing on three levels; (1) of the
SIF, which ISA-TR 84.00.03 refers to as a complete functional test,
(2) of a subsystem, for example, the conﬁguration of input
elements or output elements, and (3) of a single SIS component,
for example a process shutdown valve. As opposed to the
complete functional tests, the functional tests on subsystem and
component level are incomplete.
A test that can be performed without process disturbance
while the process is operational is called an online test (ISA-TR
84.00.03, 2002; Rausand & Høyland, 2004). A diagnostic test is
therefore an online test. Some functional tests may also be
performed online. One example is functional testing of input
elements, where input elements can be isolated during the test.
For online functional testing of ﬁnal elements, it is necessary to
have a full bypass available so that the process can remain
undisturbed during the test.
A test that reveals all dangerous failures and where the SIS
after the test is restored to an as good as new condition, is called a
perfect test (Mostia, 2002; ANSI/ISA 84.01, 1996). In reliability
calculations, it is usually assumed that functional tests are perfect
tests, but there are several reasons to why a functional test is not
perfect in practice. One reason may be inadequate preparation,
execution, and restoration, which may introduce new failures or
leave existing failures unrevealed. Another reason is that a
functional test is performed under test conditions rather than
demand conditions. To test a SIF under real demand conditions,
for example, slam shutting a valve in a high pressure and high
ﬂowrate oil/gas pipeline, may lead to hammer effects that may
damage the valve and the pipeline. Instead, the shutdown
function is tested when the ﬂow has been stopped by some choke
device or a less critical valve (ISA-TR 84.00.03, 2002).
There are several ways to include the aspect of imperfect
testing when the PFD is calculated. One way is to add a certainprobability p to the PFD that caters for the DU failures that remain
after a functional test (e.g., see SINTEF, 2006); another approach
is to assume that the functional test is not capable of detecting
all dangerous failure causes, and consider the remaining un-
detected failures as undetected during the SIS lifetime (Rausand &
Høyland, 2004).
A PST is obviously an imperfect test, since a fraction of the
failures may remain unrevealed after the test. PST may also be
considered an incomplete functional test, since it tests only a part
of the SIF. PST shares some properties of a diagnostic test, for
example that it is fully or partially automatic and that it detects a
fraction of the dangerous failures without disturbing the process.
The question is, however, whether or not PST should be used as a
means to improve the safe failure fraction (SFF). The SFF is the
fraction of the rate of ‘‘safe’’ failures to the total failure rate, where
‘‘safe’’ failures include failures that are safe by deﬁnition plus
dangerous detected (DD) failures which are detected by diagnostic
testing. The SFF is used by IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 to determine
the architectural constraints, and a high SFF generally allows for
less hardware redundancy. Different authors have different views
on whether or not failures that are detected by PST should be
considered DD failures. Some authors argue that PST may be used
to improve the SFF (Ali & Goble, 2004; Knegtering, 2004) provided
that the requirements of being a diagnostic test are fulﬁlled, while
others claim that PST is not performed frequently enough to meet
the intentions of being a diagnostic test (Lundteigen & Rausand,
2008, 2007; Velten-Philipp & Houtermans, 2006) What is meant
by frequently enough is often the core of the dispute. Some claim
that a PST interval of a magnitude less than the expected demand
rate is frequently enough to consider the timing aspect of a
diagnostic test as fulﬁlled. However, if the number of demands per
year is less than one, we may end up by allowing diagnostic test
intervals of weeks and months. We believe that intervals of this
length do not meet the intentions of how frequent diagnostic tests
should be run, and we do therefore not recommend that PST is
introduced as a means to improve the SFF. But again, this is an
issue for further discussion within the industry.4. Reliability effects of introducing PST
The fraction of DU failures that are detected by PST among all
DU failures is called the PST coverage, and is deﬁned as
yPST ¼
lDU;PST
lDU
(1)
where lDU;PST is the rate of DU failures that can be detected by PST
and lDU is the total rate of DU failures.
The PST coverage may also be expressed as the conditional
probability
yPST ¼ Pr ðDetect DU failure by PSTjDU failure is presentÞ (2)
The PST coverage for shutdown valves is often considered to be in
the range of 60–70% (Summers & Zachary, 2000; Lundteigen &
Rausand, 2007). The value of yPST for a speciﬁc application should
be determined based on plant speciﬁc conditions, such as valve
type, functional requirements, and operational and environmental
conditions. This is further discussed in Section 5.
When PST is not implemented, the average PFD of the
shutdown valve is approximately the sum of the average PFD for
functional testing (PFDFT) and the average PFD for diagnostic
testing (PFDDT):
PFD  PFDFT þ PFDDT 
lDU  tFT
2
þ lDD  tDT
2
(3)
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Fig. 3. PST contribution to PFD.
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test interval. The diagnostic test interval is generally very short,
and PFDDT is therefore negligible. It is here assumed that the
functional test comprises necessary activities to reveal and correct
all failures, and that the valve may be considered as good as new
after the test/repair (Rausand & Høyland, 2004).
Since PST can detect only a fraction, yPST, of the DU failures, the
probability of failure on demand may be expressed as (Houter-
mans, Rouvroye, & Karydas, 2004; Knegtering, 2004; Lundteigen &
Rausand, 2007; McCrea-Steele, 2005; Summers & Zachary, 2000):
PFD  PFDFT þ PFDPST
 ð1 yPSTÞ 
lDUtFT
2
þ yPST 
lDUtPST
2
(4)
where tPST is the PST interval. The PFDwith andwithout taking PST
into account are illustrated in Fig. 3.
The PFD is reduced when PST is introduced, since a fraction of
the DU failures are revealed and corrected within a shorter time
interval after they occur, than by functional testing. Thus, if the
functional test interval is kept unchanged, the SIF reliability is
improved.5. Pros and cons of introducing PST
PST is a supplement rather than a means to eliminate the need
for functional testing (Summers & Zachary, 2000; Nuis, 2005). The
reliability improvement that is obtained by introducing PST may
be used in two ways:(1) To improve safety: PST is added to the initially scheduled
functional tests. This leads to a reduction in the calculated
PFD. With a lower PFD, the safety improves.(2) To reduce costs: The potential reliability improvement is used
to extend the interval between functional tests so that the
calculated PFD is kept unchanged. As a result, the operating
and maintenance costs may be reduced as less man-hours and
fewer scheduled production stops are required.The reliability improvement is inﬂuenced by two factors; the PST
coverage and the PST interval. The PST interval is a decision
variable which is entirely up to the end user to follow up, while
the PST coverage must be estimated based on a number of
assumptions. The assumptions related to the PST coverage should
be made for the plant speciﬁc application rather than for an
average valve performance (ISA-TR 84.00.03, 2002; Goble &
Cheddie, 2005). The factors that may inﬂuence the PST coverage
are, for example: Valve design: Different types of valves may have different
failure properties. One type of valve may, for example, have
more failures related to leakage in closed position than anothertype of valve where most failures are caused by a stuck stem.
For the ﬁrst valve, we expect a lower PST coverage than for the
latter. The failure properties may be derived from an FMEA
analysis. The FMEA analysis may be provided by or performed
in close collaboration with the valve vendor. Functional requirements: PST is not able to verify all types of
functional requirements. A PST reveals whether or not a valve
starts to move, but is not able to verify that the valve will
continue to a fully closed position and that it keeps tight in this
position. ISA-TR 84.00.03 cautions that PST does not detect
failures associated with tight shutoff, as for example leakage in
closed position. The speciﬁed valve closing time may also
impact the PST coverage. For valves where 2–3 s closing time is
speciﬁed, one may obtain less information about the valve
failures and performance deviations than for valves with
longer closing times (Nuis, 2005). PST technology: The PST technology may affect which and to
what extent failures are detected. While a SIS implemented PST
with simple readback of the valve position signal may detect
that a valve fails to start closing, a more advanced PST
technology solution with additional sensors may indicate if
other failures are present by analyzing performance deviations
(in e.g., valve’s speed of response) (Ali, 2004; Ali & Goble, 2004).
ISA-TR 84.00.03 emphasizes that readback of position signal
should conﬁrm that the requested position has been reached. To
simply verify that the limit switches have left and returned to
their end position is not always considered a valid test. Operational and environmental conditions: Some operational
and environmental conditions may lead to obstructions and
build-up in the path towards the valve end position. Concern
has been raised that build-up is more likely for valves that are
moved to a ﬁxed intermediate position (ISA-TR 84.00.03,
2002). While a stuck valve may be detected by the PST, other
obstructions or build-up that impede the valve from reaching
the end position, are not identiﬁed. If the operating or
environmental conditions are likely to cause build-up or
obstructions, (e.g., multi-phase ﬂow, seawater ﬂow), one may
expect a lower PST coverage than if the valve is operated in a
clean (e.g., gas) environment. ISA-TR 84.00.03 cautions the use
of PST for valves in unclean environment where, for example,
dirt, polymerization products, deposition, crystallization, cor-
rosive chemicals are present.
Based on the discussion above, PST seems most suited to detect
that a valve is stuck and does not start to move. To what extent
other dangerous failures may be detected, is inﬂuenced by the
features of the selected PST technology. The PST coverage is not
only inﬂuenced by what the PST technology is able to detect. It is
just as important to consider how frequent these dangerous
failures occur compared to the occurrence of other dangerous
failures. Here, the functional requirements, the valve design, and
the documented valve performance must be considered.
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ways than through the PST coverage. Soft seated valves are more
vulnerable to wear when the valve is moved to the end position
(Summers & Zachary, 2000). If PST is used to extend the time
between functional tests, this may increase the expected lifetime
of the valve seat. As a result, less failures may be experienced with
this particular failure cause. PST may also provide additional
information about the valve condition, like valve signatures,
which may be used for earlier detection of performance deviations
(Ali, 2004; Ali & Goble, 2004). Finally, automatic tests like PST
require less human interaction which may lead to less systematic
failures.
PST may also have unwanted effects. The risk of more spurious
valve closures has been discussed by several authors (Ali & Goble,
2004; McCrea-Steele, 2005; Mostia Jr., 2003; Summers & Zachary,
2000). Even if spurious closure is normally considered as a safe
failure, it may introduce other hazardous events at the plant due
to, for example, water hammer effects (Langeron, Barros, Grall, &
Berenguer, 2007; Signoret, 2007).
Another concern is that more frequent stroking leads to more
wear on components, for example, on the valve stem and the stem
seals. This may lead to failures like valve leakages. Since valve
leakages are normally not detected by PST, such failures may be
hidden for a longer period of time if the PST is used to extend the
intervals between functional testing.6. New procedure for determining the PST coverage
This section presents a new procedure for determining the PST
coverage in a speciﬁc application. In Section 5, we identiﬁed
factors that inﬂuence the PST coverage. The new procedure
suggests how these factors can be taken into account. The
procedure is set up for the initial design phase, but may also be
used to update the estimate of the PST coverage in the operational
phase.
An important assumption is that the PST coverage is a property
of individual SIS components rather than for a group of
components, and should therefore be determined at this level.
We may express Eq. (2) as
yPST ¼
Pr ðDetect DU failure by PST \ DU failure is presentÞÞ
Pr ðDU failure is presentÞ (5)
Let FM1; FM2; . . . ; FMn be the relevant DU failure modes. Typical
DU failure modes for a shutdown valve are: fail to close, delayed
operation, and leakage in closed position, but there may also be
several more failure modes in speciﬁc applications. Even if it is
possible that two or more of these failure modes can be present at
the same time, the likelihood of such an event is very small. We
can therefore assume the failure modes to be mutually exclusive,
and we can therefore write (5) as
yPST 
Xn
i¼1
Pr ðDetect FMijFMi is presentÞ  Pr ðFMi is presentÞ
Pr ðDU failure is presentÞ (6)
Analogous to (1) we deﬁne
yFM;i ¼ Pr ðDetect FMijFMi is presentÞ (7)
to be the PST coverage of the DU failure mode FMi, for
i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n.
The fraction
wi ¼
Pr ðFMi is presentÞ
Pr ðDU failure is presentÞ (8)
is the fraction of FMi failures among all DU failures, for
i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n.The PST coverage can therefore be expressed as
yPST ¼
Xn
i¼1
yFM;i wi (9)
We suggest that the PST coverage per failure mode is determined
in two sub-steps, since successful detection of a failure mode
relies on two factors: (i) the failure mode must be revealable
during a partial stroke operation, and (ii) it is important that the
test results are reliable, such that the announced results reﬂect
the valve condition. We refer to factor (i) as revealability
(per failure mode), and factor (ii) as the PST reliability (per failure
mode). This means that
yFM;i ¼ PSTRev;i  PSTRel;i (10)
where PSTRev;i denotes the revealability of failure mode i by PST,
and PSTRel;i is the PST reliability of failure mode i.
The revealability may be determined by expert judgment,
while we suggest that the PST reliability is assessed based on a
checklist. The details on how they are determined are further
discussed in the procedure steps.
The procedure comprises six steps. The Kristin subsea HIPPS
that was introduced in Section 2, is used to illustrate the
procedure. The main focus is the HIPPS shutdown valves. The
procedure builds on recognized techniques like FMEA (e.g., see
Rausand & Høyland, 2004) and the use of checklists (Johnsen et
al., 2004; Summers & Raney, 1999; Summers, Raney, & Dejmek,
1999; Walker, 1997). FMEA is a powerful tool to increase the
knowledge of system behavior upon failures, while checklists may
be used to give credit to desired behavior. Both methods are
widely used in the oil and gas industry. The procedure also makes
use of historical data, for example collected through the OREDA
projects (OREDA, 1997, 2002). The procedure should, to the extent
that is practical, be performed by a group of persons with relevant
competence on the equipment, the operation, and safety issues.
Step 1: Get familiar with the PST and its implementation.
The objective of this step is to collect relevant information on
the PST implementation and the application speciﬁc conditions,
including:(1) Which SIS components that are operated during a PST.
(2) The functional safety requirements of the SIS components, like
valve closing time and maximum allowed leakage in closed
position.(3) How PST is initiated and controlled by dedicated hardware
and software.(4) The PST interface to the SIS and other systems, like the process
control system.(5) The operational and environmental conditions under which
the SIF operates, including ﬂuid characteristics, temperature,
and pressure.For the Kristin HIPPS, the PST implementation approach is
illustrated in the upper section of Fig. 1. The additional informa-
tion requested in this step is covered in Section 3.
Step 2: Analyze the PST hardware and software.
The objective of this step is to identify and analyze how PST
hardware and software failures affect the PST execution and the
SIS itself. This analysis provides an important basis to later answer
the checklist questions, and should be performed in close
collaboration between the end users and the valve vendors. The
review may be time consuming, but nevertheless important to
gain insight to the functionality of the PST, the PST interaction
with the SIS, and the consequences of PST failures. The analysis
gives insight to constraints and potential secondary effects of
using PST.
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assess the potential PST hardware and software failures. It is
possible to use a top down or bottom up approach to FMEA. The
top down approach starts with a list of functions, and may be an
appropriate approach if the PST hardware and software have not
been decided. The bottom up approach is illustrated in Table 1.
The starting point is to list all PST related components and their
functions in an FMEA worksheet, which for the case of Kristin
HIPPS may be as shown in Table 1.
The FMEA worksheet may be extended by more columns, for
example on how to detect the PST hardware and software failures.
As seen from the analysis, the conﬁdence of the PST test results is
highly inﬂuenced by the reliability of the position indicators. The
reliability of the position indicators is therefore important to
consider when we calculate the PST reliability.
Step 3: Determine the PST reliability.
The PST reliability is a measure of the PST hardware and
software ability to provide reliable and useful test results, within
the scope of the test. A checklist is proposed for calculating the
PST reliability. Each question gives credit to the preferred
behavior, and have an effect on the reliability and usefulness of
the test results. In addition, the questions are weighted according
to their importance. Weight 1 is used as credit for questions that
reﬂect recommended practice, weight 5 is used for highly
recommended practice, and weight 10 represents mandatory
practice. In this context, we use mandatory for those questions
that reﬂect requirements in SIS related standards, highly recom-
mended for questions that address behavior recognized by
guidelines and/or several authors, and recommended for other
issues which may have an effect on the PST reliability.
The PST reliability is scaled from 0.5 to 1.0. If all questions are
given the answer ‘‘no’’, the PST reliability is 0.5, meaning that a
failure, if present, has a 50% chance of being useful and correctly
announced to the operators. In the case where all questions are
given the answer ‘‘yes,’’ the PST reliability is 1.0, meaning that we
fully rely on the PST hardware and software’s ability to announce
useful and reliable information about a failure.
For each question, the corresponding credit to the PST
reliability is calculated by the following formulas:
Credit when ‘‘yes’’ ¼ Weight of question
Sum of all weights
 1:0 (11)
Credit when ‘‘no’’ ¼Weight of question
Sum of all weights
 0:5 (12)Table 1
Simpliﬁed FMEA for PST hardware and software
Description of component Failure and the fa
Component Type Function Failure mode
Test initiator SW To initiate a PST Fail to initiate
Timer SW Deactivate output
according to timer setpoint
Fail to start
Fail to reset
Position indicators HW Measure valve position No signal
Wrong signal
a Remotely operated vehicle.The authors realize that the questions and their weights are
issues that should be further discussed, but they may represent a
good starting point. It is also important that the questions are
generic, and reﬂect the commonly accepted issues of importance.
If a user or vendor introduces a number of new questions,
they may be able to reduce the contribution of the generic
questions.
The questions and the corresponding weights are shown in
Table 2. The table may be an integral part of an FMEA worksheet.
In the table, some assumptions have been made regarding the
Kristin HIPPS implementation. These assumptions have not been
fully veriﬁed, and are only used to illustrate the application of the
checklist. Ideally, the checklist should be applied for each
dangerous undetected failure mode. In this example, we have
only used the checklist once, which means that a common PST
reliability has been assumed for all the failure modes.
Question 1 addresses the need for establishing criteria for
successful execution of PST. The question is given weight 10, since
deﬁning fail/pass criteria is required by IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.
Question 2 calls for application speciﬁc analysis, rather than
generically selected PST coverage per failure mode. Such a plant
speciﬁc analysis is the intention of the IEC standards and is also
recommended by ISA-TR00.03-2002. We therefore suggest weight
10 for this question.
Question 3 asks for analysis of PST related failures and how
they impact the PST execution and the SIS. IEC 61508 and IEC
61511 require that systems interfacing the SIS do not have a
negative impact on the execution of the SIF. We therefore consider
such analysis as mandatory by the standards, and weight 10 is
suggested.
Concerns have been raised to the secondary effects of PST.
Introducing PST may lead to more frequent operation of some
components (e.g., solenoid operated valves) and less frequent
operation of others (e.g., full stroke operation of valves). Question
4 addresses the need for analysis of potential negative effects on
the SIS reliability. The issue has been addressed by ISA-TR
84.00.03, but the need to analyze secondary effects of testing is
not addressed in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. We therefore suggest
weight 5. ISA-TR 84.00.03 expresses some concerns that may be
relevant to consider. If the ﬂuid running through the valve
contains corrosive chemicals, dirt, polymerization products, or
particles that may deposit or crystallize, a more in depth analysis
should be performed to consider the gain and impact of PST.
It is often recommended to use position indicators to measure
the actual valve movement, rather than just verifying that theilure effects
Effect on PST Effect on SIS
No execution of PST None
No execution of PST None
Valve not returned to initial
position
Spurious valve closure
PST may be executed, but valve
position indicator does not show
that the valve moves.
Repair must be initiated to correct
position indicators.
Visual inspection of valve position
may have to be inspected by ROVa
May fail to announce the correct
valve position
SIS may be left with undiscovered
failures.
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Checklist to determine the PST reliability
No Question Answer Weight Credit
1 Have success criteria for the partial stroke test been clearly deﬁned? Y 10 0.14
2 Has an FMEA been performed to identify the SIS failure modes, and to what extent the failure modes can
be detected during a partial valve operation?
Y 10 0.14
3 Have potential failures of the PST hardware and software been identiﬁed and analyzed? N 10 0.07
4 Have potential secondary effects of PST on the reliability of valve, actuator and control devices (e.g.,
solenoid operated valves) been analyzed?
N 5 0.04
5 Is the actual stem movement measured (in %), as opposed to just verifying that the valves leaves and
returns to the initial position?
Y 5 0.07
6 Is additional instrumentation installed, and is it capable of providing more insight to failure causes? N 1 0.01
7 Is the PST hardware and software regularly inspected and tested (or otherwise veriﬁed)? Y 5 0.07
8 Is the feedback from PST recorded and further analyzed? Y 10 0.14
9 If short closure time is required: Has it been analyzed if the PST is able to provide useful information? Y 10 0.14
10 Are means implemented to verify that the position indicators are reliable? Y 5 0.07
Sum: 71 0.89
Table 3
Failure modes weights and PST revealability
Failure mode Reﬁnement Revealability
factor (%)
Sub failure modes
Fail to close Fail to start moving 100
Starts, but does not reach
end position
0
Delayed operation Delayed start 100
Starts, but uses too long
closing time
70
Leakage in closed position Minor leakage 0
Major leakage 0
M.A. Lundteigen, M. Rausand / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21 (2008) 579–588586valve leaves and returns to the initial position (ISA-TR
84.00.03,2002). Question 5 has been included to address this
particular issue. The need for actual valve movement will be most
important in cases where the valve movement is not conﬁrmed by
visual inspection or pressure readings. We have assigned weight 5
to this question, but it might be argued that weight 10 would also
be applicable since ISA-TR 84.00.03 so clearly states the
importance of this issue.
Question 6 gives some credit to additional instrumentation
installed to measure and analyze for example the valve’s speed of
response, torque and hydraulic or pneumatic supply and return
pressures. These may be features provided by vendor packages.
Despite their ability to provide additional information about the
valve condition, the vendor packages are not a necessary means to
verify that the valve is able to partially move.
Question 7 recognizes the need to verify that the PST software
and hardware continue to perform as speciﬁed. The IEC standards
do not speciﬁcally address regular veriﬁcation of PST and
diagnostics hardware and software. The need for regular con-
ﬁrmation of the PST hardware and software ability to perform as
intended may be analogue to the adopted practice of regular
calibration and inspection of tools used for functional testing. As a
result, we assign weight 5 to the question.
Question 8 concerns the need to record and analyze the PST
test results. Failure reporting and analysis are required by IEC
61508 and IEC 61511. The question has therefore been given
weight 10.
Some authors indicate that PST is not suitable for valves that
have a very short closing time (e.g., 1–3 s). In this case, the valve
may be unable to move at all during the short time available for
the PST. Question 9 addresses this issue. The question is given
weight 5, as authors indicate that this may reduce the reliability
gain of introducing PST (Nuis, 2005; ISA-TR 84.00.02, 2002).
Question 10 addresses position indicators and to what extent it
is being veriﬁed that they provide reliable readings. The reliability
of position indicators is important for the validity of PST results, as
indicated in the FMEA analysis in Step 3. We therefore give weight
5 for this question.With the answers suggested for Kristin HIPPS, which in this
case are based on our assumptions of the actual implementation,
we obtain a PST reliability of 0.89.
Step 4: Determine the revealability (per failure mode).
Table 3 shows columns that may be added to the FMEA
worksheet for the purpose of including the revealability. The
analysis considers the dangerous failure modes: fail to close,
delayed operation, and leakage in closed position. A reﬁnement of
the failure modes may give a better basis for deciding whether or
not the failure mode may be revealed by a partial stroke
operation. It should be noted that we reﬁne the failure modes
rather than the failure causes as PST (in most cases) is unable to
identify failure causes.
If we believe that the sub failure mode is fully observable
during a partial movement, we assign 100% to the revealability. If
it is not observable at all, we assign a value 0%. If we believe that
the failure mode may be revealable with a certain probability, for
example 70%, we use this value as the revealability. Table 3 lists
the revealabilities that are suggested for the dangerous failure
modes.
As seen in Table 3, the failure mode ‘‘fail to close’’ may be
further split into the sub failure modes ‘‘fail to start moving’’ and
‘‘starts (to move), but does not reach end position.’’ It is evident
that the ﬁrst one may be detected just as well by a partial stroke
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Table 4
Failure modes weights and PST revealability
Failure mode Weight (%) Reﬁnement Resulting weight (%)
Sub failure modes Split (%)
Fail to close 40 Fail to start moving 80 32
Starts, but does not reach end position 20 8
Delayed operation 40 Delayed start 40 16
Too long travel time 60 24
Leakage in closed position 20 Minor leakage 60 12
Major leakage 40 8
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to be detected.
Step 5: Determine the failure mode weights.
The failure mode weight wi in Eq. (8) may be determined by
expert judgement or analysis of historical failure data. The latter
approach is discussed by Lundteigen and Rausand (2007). The
failure mode weights may be included in the FMEA worksheet
directly, or as separate failure rates as shown by Goble and
Cheddie (2005). Since we consider the revealability at the sub
failure mode level, we must also assign failure mode weights
accordingly. The allocation of failure mode weights down to the
sub failure modes may be based on a more in depth analysis of
historical data. OREDA (1997, 2002) provide some underlaying
details of failures, but in many cases it is necessary to also study
the failure records that where used to construct the data. The
distribution of weights that is shown in Table 4 is just for
illustration.
Step 6: Determine the PST coverage.
The PST coverage can now be determined by using Eq. (9). With
the assumptions made for the PST of the Kristin HIPPS valves, we
end up with a PST coverage of 65%.7. Discussion and concluding remarks
The reliability that may be gained by introducing PST is
inﬂuenced by two factors; (i) the PST coverage, and (ii) the PST
interval. The PST coverage is partly a design parameter (e.g., valve
design, PST hardware and software), and partly an operational
parameter (e.g., operational and environmental conditions). While
vendors may inﬂuence the PST coverage by selecting valve design
and PST hardware and software in accordance with the speciﬁed
operational and environmental conditions, the frequency by
which the PST is executed is a decision that relies on the end
user alone.
To determine the reliability gain of introducing PST, it is
necessary for vendors and end users to collaborate. The valve
manufacturer knows how the valve is designed and the PST
vendor or supplier understands the features of the PST hardware
and software. This knowledge must be combined with the end
users’ insight into maintenance and testing strategies and
operational and environmental conditions. The new procedure
suggests a framework that requires a joint effort from end users
and valve vendors to estimate the PST coverage for a particular
valve application.
So, what is gained by using our new procedure? Is it
worthwhile using this effort to estimate a PST coverage that often
ends up between 60% and 70%? We believe that the main
advantage of this procedure is not only the ﬁnal result, but the
process of getting there. The process increases the awareness to
which factors that may inﬂuence the PST coverage. It is evident
that some factors are revealable, but not controllable, for example
the failure mode weights, which are properties of the SIScomponents. Other factors may be controlled, like the factors
we address in the PST reliability checklist. PST contributes to
earlier detection of failures, and less frequent failures may be
experienced when PST is applied, due to the secondary effects
discussed in Section 5.
We hope that this procedure also demonstrates some of the
pitfalls of introducing PST. PST becomes false comfort if the PST
coverage is estimated from false premises. We may install the PST
hardware and software, but refrain from implementing adequate
follow-up of PST results. We may use PST to save operation and
maintenance costs, but fail to consider the secondary effects of
extending the intervals between full stroke testing. Our procedure
asks for certain steps and analysis which may lead to a higher
conﬁdence in the selected PST coverage, and where to put focus in
order to maintain the conﬁdence throughout the operation phase.
We therefore propose that the PST reliability checklist is used in
the design phase as well as in the operation and maintenance
phases.
The main disadvantages of the new procedure may be related
to the practical implementation. First, the checklist questions may
be used to make erroneous improvements to the PST coverage,
particularly if the implementation of the checklist questions does
not correspond to how PST is performed in the operational phase.
It is therefore necessary to review the checklist questions during
the operational phase and verify that the PST continues to meet
the initially estimated coverage. Second, the procedure also
requires that the end user spends more time on understanding
PST hardware and software than what is normally done. One may
question if this is realistic and if the PST hardware and software
may be too complex to understand for others than the valve or PST
vendor. On the other hand, the responsibility still lays on the end
user, and the PST hardware and software should not be so
complex that the end user is unable to verify the PST functionality
under normal and failure conditions.
Further research may be necessary to develop a generic and
widely accepted checklist for the PST reliability, similar to what
has been done for the checklist on the determination of the beta
factors in IEC 61508. Also the secondary effects of PST should be
analyzed further and supported by data collection. At the present
time, databases like OREDA do not suggest a separate classiﬁca-
tion for failures that are detected by PST. Without this type of
classiﬁcation, it may be difﬁcult to use historical data to conﬁrm
to what extent PST is able to reveal DU failures.Acknowledgements
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Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are important protection
layers in the process industry. A SIS comprises input elements
(e.g., pressure transmitters (PTs), gas detectors), logic solvers
(e.g., relay based logic, programmable logic controllers), and ﬁnal
elements (e.g., valves, circuit breakers). A SIS is used to detect the
onset of hazardous events (e.g., gas leakages, high pressures) and/
or to mitigate their consequences to humans, the environment,
and material assets. A simpliﬁed SIS is illustrated in Fig. 1, where a
shutdown valve is installed to stop the ﬂow in the pipeline when
high pressure is detected by the PTs. The international standards
IEC61508 [1] and IEC61511 [2] require that reliability targets for
the SIS are deﬁned and demonstrated. The reliability targets are
assigned to each safety instrumented function (SIF) that is
implemented into the SIS. The IEC standards use safety integrity
level (SIL) as a measure for reliability.
Compliance to a SIL must be demonstrated by quantitative and
qualitative assessments. The quantitative assessment includes
estimating the SIS reliability. For a SIS operating on demand,
which is often the case when the SIS is used as an independent
protection layer in addition to the process control system, the
average probability of failure on demand (PFD) is calculated [1,2].
The qualitative assessment veriﬁes that all requirements related
to work processes, tools, and procedures are fulﬁlled in each phase
of the SIS life cycle.ll rights reserved.
4773597117.
Lundteigen).The PFD does not cover all aspects that may cause SIS failure,
and the calculated PFD may therefore indicate a better perfor-
mance than will be experienced in the operating phase. Based on
this argument, the IEC standards [1,2] have included a set of
additional requirements to achieve a sufﬁciently robust architec-
ture. These requirements are referred to as architectural con-
straints, and their intention is to have one (or more) additional
channels that can activate the SIF in case of a fault within the SIS.
The architectural constraints prevent SIS designers and system
integrators from selecting architecture based on PFD calculations
alone, and the requirements may therefore be seen as restrictions
in the freedom to choose hardware architecture.
For each part of the SIS, the architectural constraints are
expressed by the hardware fault tolerance (HFT), which again is
determined by the type of the components (type A or B), the safe
failure fraction (SFF), and the speciﬁed SIL. The SFF is the
proportion of ‘‘safe’’ failures among all failures and the HFT
expresses the number of faults that can be tolerated before a SIS is
unable to perform the SIF. A ‘‘safe’’ failure is either a failure that is
safe by design, or a dangerous failure that is immediately detected
and corrected. The IEC standards [1,2] deﬁne a safe failure as a
failure that does not have the potential to put the SIS in a
hazardous or fail-to-function state. A dangerous failure is a failure
that can prevent the SIS from performing a speciﬁc SIF, but when
detected soon after its occurrence, for example, by online
diagnostics, the failure is considered to be ‘‘safe’’ since the
operators are notiﬁed and given the opportunity to implement
compensating measures and necessary repairs. In some cases, the
SIS may automatically respond to a dangerous detected failure as
if it were a true demand, for example, causing shutdown of a
process section or the whole plant.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a SIS.
Table 1
SFF–HFT–SIL relationship in IEC 61508
SFF 0 1 2
HFT requirements (type A)
o60% SIL1 SIL2 SIL3
60–90% SIL2 SIL3 SIL4
90–99% SIL3 SIL4 SIL4
499% SIL3 SIL4 SIL4
HFT requirements (type B)
o60% – SIL1 SIL2
60–90% SIL1 SIL2 SIL3
90–99% SIL2 SIL3 SIL4
499% SIL3 SIL4 SIL4
M.A. Lundteigen, M. Rausand / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94 (2009) 520–525 521The architectural constraints are sometimes interpreted as
a mistrust to the quantitative reliability analysis. Reliability
experts frequently debate whether or not the architectural
constraints are necessary, and if the SFF–HFT–SIL relationship is
well-founded. It is particularly the suitability of the SFF that has
been questioned [3–5].
The objectives of this article are to (i) provide more insight into
the architectural constraints and how the HFT is determined from
the type of components and the SFF, (ii) discuss and illustrate by
case studies the non-intended effects of a high SFF, and (iii) decide
whether or not SFF and HFT are useful concepts related to SIFs.
The article is organized as follows: The rationale for introdu-
cing the architectural constraints and for relating the architectural
constraints to the SFF is discussed in Section 2. Whether or not a
high SFF implies a high safety level is discussed in Section 3.
The main characteristics and properties of the SFF are further
analyzed and discussed in Section 4 based on two simple case
studies. In Section 5, we discuss whether the concept of
architectural constraints is really needed. In Section 6, we
conclude and discuss the ﬁndings of the article and present some
ideas for future work.2. Hardware fault tolerance and safe failure fraction
The HFT gives restrictions to hardware architecture [6–8]. If
HFT ¼ 1 is speciﬁed, the selected conﬁguration must tolerate one
failure without affecting the SIF. Conﬁgurations that provide
HFT ¼ 1, are, for example, 1oo2, 2oo3, and 3oo4, where a koon
system is functioning if at least k out of n components are
functioning. The HFT needed to comply with a speciﬁed SIL is
determined by the component type and the SFF.
SFF is a property of a component or component group. The IEC
standards [1,2] deﬁne SFF as the proportion of ‘‘safe’’ failures
among all component failures
SFF ¼ lS þ lDD
lS þ lDD þ lDU
(1)
where lS is the rate of safe failures, lDD is the rate of dangerous
detected (DD) failures, and lDU is the rate of dangerous
undetected (DU) failures of a component.
An alternative representation of (1) is to express SFF as a
conditional probability:
SFF ¼ PrðThe failure is ‘‘safe’’jA component failure occursÞ (2)
Hence, we may interpret SFF as a measure of the inherent safeness
of a component, that is, to what extent the component responds in
a safe way when a failure occurs.
The second parameter that is used to determine the HFT, is the
component type. IEC61508 [1] distinguishes between type A and
type B components. A type A component is characterized by: (i) all
failure modes are well deﬁned, (ii) the behavior of the componentunder fault conditions is well known, and (iii) ﬁeld data are
dependable and able to conﬁrm the failure rates that are claimed.
The last criterion is often referred to as ‘‘proven in use.’’ A type B
component does not fulﬁll one or more of these criteria. IEC61511
[2] uses a slightly different classiﬁcation, and distinguishes between
programmable electronic (PE) logic solvers on one side and non-PE-
logic solvers/ﬁeld devices on the other side. In practice, PE-logic
solvers are classiﬁed as type B according to IEC 61508, while non-
PE-logic solvers may fulﬁl the criteria for type A. Field devices may
in some cases be type A and in other cases type B, depending on
how many advanced (and programmable) features they have.
IEC61508 [1] provides separate SFF–HFT–SIL relationships for
type A and type B components, see Table 1. To our knowledge, the
SFF–HFT–SIL relationship is not theoretically founded, but based
on a previous concept of a diagnostic (DC)–HFT–SIL relationship
[8]. In the table, the SFF is split into four intervals; below 60%,
between 60% and 90%, between 90% and 99%, and above 99%.
Similarly, IEC 61511 [2] suggests two separate tables, one table for
non-PE-logic solvers/ﬁeld devices and one table for PE-logic
solvers, to reﬂect sector speciﬁc categories of components. The
main differences between the approach taken in IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511, are [3,9]: IEC 61511 does not treat SIL 4 systems; in this case the
standard refers to IEC 61508. IEC 61511 does not give additional credit for SFF above 99%,
whereas IEC 61508 does. In IEC 61511, the HFT table for non-PE-logic solvers/ﬁeld
devices is independent of the SFF. It is assumed that such
devices, when built for safety applications, have SFF in the area
of 60–90%. The HFT–SIL relationship proposed for non-PE-logic
solvers/ﬁeld devices corresponds to the HFT–SIL relationship
for PE-logic solvers with SFF between 60% and 90%. IEC 61511 allows a reduction in HFT by one for non-PE-logic
solvers/ﬁeld devices if certain conditions, for example being
proven in use, are met. Having fulﬁlled these conditions, the
HFT–SIL relationship corresponds to the HFT–SIL relationship
for type A components in IEC 61508, provided that the SFF is
between 60% and 90%. IEC 61511 suggests increasing the HFT by one for non-PE-logic
solvers/ﬁeld devices, if the dominant failure mode is DU rather
than safe or DD. In other words, if the SFF is below 50%, which
may be the case for an ‘‘energize to trip’’ device, it is required
to increase HFT by one. In this situation, IEC 61511 requires
higher HFT than IEC 61508 for devices that fulﬁl the criteria of
being type A and with SFF o60%.
It is therefore not a one-to-one relationship between the HFT
tables in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, but in most cases, we will end
up with the same requirement for HFT for the same SFF and SIL.
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adopted by many oil and gas companies and also by OLF-070 [10].
From Table 1, we note that: Components of type B require a higher HFT than components
of type A, for the same SIL and SFF. The required HFT increases when the SFF decreases.
 The required HFT increases with increasing SIL.
For conﬁgurations of different types of components, for example,
PTs and level transmitters, it is not possible to use the HFT tables
directly, since the components may have different SFF. Instead,
IEC61508 [1] suggests that the achievable SIL is ﬁrst determined
for the individual components. A set of rules is then used to ﬁnd
the achievable SIL for the total conﬁguration. These rules, which
we refer to as merging rules, are further explained in [3].3. Does high SFF indicate safe design?
As seen from Table 1, SFF is a crucial parameter when selecting
hardware architecture as required by IEC 61508. Conﬁgurations
based on components with SFF 490% may require a lower HFT
than for components with SFF of, for example, 75%. We may
therefore deduce that components with high SFF are preferred to a
similar components with low SFF. But does a high SFF indicate
safe design?
Reliability experts, system integrators, and end users have
questioned the suitability of SFF as an indicator of a safe design.
Some concerns that have been raised, are: ‘‘Safe’’ failures are not always positive for safety. The SFF is based
on the assumption that the SIS response to safe and DD-
failures is safe, for the SIS as well as for the plant. However, the
SIS response may sometimes induce new hazardous events
[4,5]. Langeron et al. [11] argue that safe failures may evolve
into dangerous failures, and therefore that the SFF is not an
indicator of a safe design. A spurious closure of a shutdown
valve may, for example, lead to water hammer effects that can
deteriorate the valve and also affect a number of other
components. Operators may lose conﬁdence in the SIS if there
are frequent alarms caused by ‘‘safe’’ SIS failures. There are
several examples where operators have bypassed safety
functions that have caused frequent alarms or process
disturbances. In addition, human errors during repair and
restoration of the SIS may introduce new failures. The SFF may credit unneeded hardware. The SFF gives credit to a
high rate of ‘‘safe’’ failures, and for producers it is a business
advantage to claim a high SFF. With a high SFF, components
may be used in conﬁgurations with low HFT, which means
lower cost for the customers.
At present, the IEC standards [1,2] give little guidance to what
type of safe failures to include in the SFF calculations. As a
result, producers may use different approaches when calculat-
ing the SFF. Some include all types of safe failures, while others
include only those failures that are relevant for the perfor-
mance of the SIF (e.g., spurious operation failures). The PDS
method [12] suggests that failures of non-critical components
are omitted, which at least prevent these failures from being
included with the purpose of increasing the SFF. This approach
is supported by CCPS [6], which also poses additional
constraints on the calculations by suggesting that only DD-
failures that automatically lead to a safe state of the process
are considered in the calculations. Sometimes the SFF is only calculated for parts of the components.
IEC61508 [1] covers electrical, electronic, and PE components,and as a result, producers may sometimes calculate SFF for this
part of the component, and assume that the mechanical part is
functioning perfectly. In this case, the SFF may not reﬂect the
performance of the component as a whole [13]. If the PFD is affected by uncertain reliability data, then so is the
calculated SFF. The architectural constraints are meant to
compensate for the uncertainty in the PFD estimate. However,
if the reliability data that are used to ﬁnd the PFD are
uncertain, the data used to calculate the SFF are usually even
more uncertain. Experience from the OREDA project has clearly
shown that safe failures get less attention than dangerous
failures in the data collection [14].
Despite these concerns, it is sometimes claimed that the SFF is
‘‘good for safety’’, since safe failures and DD-failures that lead to
activation of ﬁnal elements may act as functional tests. However,
the reliability gain from this additional testing may be counter-
acted by the reliability loss due to stress during spurious
activations.4. SFF characteristics
The characteristics of the SFF become more clear if we rewrite
Eq. (1), such that
SFF ¼ lS
ltot
þ DC lD
ltot
(3)
where ltot ¼ lS þ lDD þ lDU, lD ¼ lDD þ lDU, and DC is the
diagnostic coverage (of dangerous failures) deﬁned by
DC ¼ lDD=ðlDD þ lDUÞ.
From Eq. (3), some characteristics of the SFF become evident:(1) Two components with the same total failure rate and the
same SFF do not necessarily have the same properties. One
component may have a higher rate of safe failures (compared
to the total failure rate) than the other, while the the other
component has a higher DC.(2) The SFF is a relative number and components with the same
SFF–DC relationship may therefore have quite different
properties. A component with a high rate of safe failures
and a high total failure rate, may have the same SFF as another
component with lower failure rates.As a result, the SFF does not necessarily indicate whether or not
a component has a safe design. If a high SFF is obtained by a high
rate of safe- and/or DD-failures, these failures may create a higher
rate of hazardous events, as indicated in Section 2. The ambiguity
of the SFF is further illustrated in two case studies.
4.1. Case studies
Two case studies have been designed to illustrate that:(i) the SFF may have ambiguous effects on safety and production
availability;(ii) the SFF may favor unsafe design of components.Case study I: SFF versus safety and production availability. In this
case study, we study how the various properties of a single
component can affect safety and production availability. The
following component properties are used to illustrate the effects: the initial failure rates for safe and dangerous failures are equal
to 1 106 failures per hour;
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 a low (L) failure rate that is a tenth of the initial failure rate;
 a high DC equal to 90%;
 a low DC equal to 10%;
 the functional test interval is 1 year.
The tree structure in Fig. 2 shows how the SFF, the safety, and
the production availability are affected by high and low values of
lS, lD, and DC, respectively. We assume that the production
availability is inﬂuenced by the spurious trip rate (STR) of the
component. For a single component, the STR is given by [15,16]
STR  lSO þ lDD (4)
where lSO is the rate of spurious operation failures [15]. In this
case study, we assume that all safe failures give a spurious
operation, such that lSO ¼ lS. In addition, we assume that the
system is conﬁgured such that a trip occurs when a DD-failure is
detected [15,16], but other operating philosophies may also be
selected [12,15,16].
It is further assumed that safety is measured by the average
PFD, which for a single component is [17]
PFD  ð1 DCÞ  lDt
2
¼ lDUt
2
(5)
where t is the functional test interval. The formula is valid when
the component is restored to an ‘‘as good as new’’ condition after
each functional test, the test and repair times are negligible
compared to the length of the functional test interval, and when
safe- and DD-failures are detected immediately and restored
within a short time compared to the functional test interval. The
PFD is seen to decrease when the dangerous failure rate decreases
and/or when the DC, increases. Eq. (5) does not take into account
any potential, secondary effects on safety from safe- and DD-
failures.
The SFF is calculated from Eq. (1). With the suggested input
data, the SFF is either below 60% or above 90%. In Fig. 2, an SFF
below 60% is marked as low (L) and above 90% as high (H). We
assume that 1 103 is the PFD target for the component, and
classify an average PFD below this target as positive for safety ðþÞ,
and above this target as negative for safety ðÞ. Similarly, we
assume that a high rate of safe failures and/or a high rate of DD-
failures corresponds to a high STR which is negative for the
production availability ðÞ. With the given input data, this means
that an STR above 9:1 106 failures per hour is considered asnegative for the production availability, and an STR below this rate
is considered as positive.
As seen from Fig. 2, a high SFF often has a positive effect on
safety, but in some cases, when a high SFF has been derived from
high failure rates, the safety may suffer. A high SFF may be both
positive and negative for production availability, depending on the
magnitude of the rates of safe- and DD-failures. From this simple
example, it is evident that the SFF has ambiguous effects on safety
and production availability.
Case study II: SFF versus safe design. The unintended effects of
the SFF become even more evident if we take the producer’s
perspective and decide to improve the SFF of a certain type of
component. In this case study, the producer may choose between
the following strategies:(1) The component is redesigned so that internal sub-component
failures lead to a safe, rather than a dangerous component
failure. In many cases, reduction of the rate of dangerous
failures corresponds to a comparable increase in the rate of
spurious operation failures (e.g., by installing a spring return
so that a solenoid valve automatically goes to the speciﬁed
safe position upon loss of power).(2) The component is designed with more reliable sub-compo-
nents, so that the rates of safe as well as dangerous failures
decrease (e.g., by improving a valve actuator with more robust
spring materials and better protection against leakage).(3) The component is redesigned with less reliable sub-compo-
nents so that the rate of spurious operations increases, while
we assume that the rate of dangerous failures remains
unchanged (e.g., by reducing the seal quality of a fail-safe
valve actuator such that we get more frequent hydraulic
leakages).(4) The producer adds new hardware and software to the current
design to detect a fraction of the previously undetectable
dangerous failures, such that the DC increases (e.g., by adding
an online sonic leak detection system to a valve).(5) The component is redesigned to make it less vulnerable to
spurious operation. We may assume a lower rate of spurious
operation, while the rate of dangerous failures remain
unchanged (e.g., by improving a valve actuator so that less
frequent leakages may be expected).In Table 2, the effects of these ﬁve design changes are shown
with respect to ‘‘good engineering practice’’ and SFF. Good
engineering practice may be considered as design in accordance
with relevant standards and regulations with the purpose of
preventing hazardous events [18]. For components used in a SIS
application, good engineering practice is a means to ensure safe
and reliable components.
The case study shows that some improvements that are in
accordance with good engineering practice, for example, cases 2
and 5, have no, or a negative effect on the SFF. This means that the
SFF does not encourage such design changes. The case study also
shows that modiﬁcations leading to a worse design, for example,
as shown in case 3, is given credit through a higher SFF. For cases 1
and 4, the SFF responds as expected, that is, the SFF increases
when the improvements are in line with good engineering
practice.
One may question if there is a logical reasoning behind the
relationship between SFF and HFT. HFT is a measure of the
robustness against component failures, that is, the ability of the SIF
to be activated in the presence of dangerous failures in one or
more channels. Linking safe failures to architecture robustness
does not seem reasonable, since the safe failures do not have the
potential to prevent the SIF from performing its function. In fact,
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Table 2
The effect of design modiﬁcations on the SFF
Good engineering practice? Effect on the SFF
Case 1 Yes. As long as the total failure rate is
not increased.
Increases
Case 2 Yes. The valve is expected to be more
reliable with respect to dangerous as
well as safe failures.
No effect
Case 3 No. The valve will cause more
spurious trips, which is not the
intention of the standards.
Increases
Case 4 Yes and no. Increasing the DC may
also increase the complexity, and
potentially introduce new dangerous
failure modes. On the other hand, if
these aspects are catered for, a higher
DC improves safety.
Increases
Case 5 Yes. The valve will cause less process
disturbances.
Decreases
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intended. Thus, we may claim that there is no well-founded
reason for reducing the HFT if the high SFF is based on a high
fraction of safe failures.5. Do we need the architectural constraints at all?
The rationale for introducing the architectural constraints is to
‘‘achieve a sufﬁciently robust architecture, taking into account the
level of subsystem complexity’’ [1,2]. The underlying concern is that
quantitative assessments alone may underestimate the reliability,
and as a result, lead to selection of unsafe architectures. The IEC
standards [1,2] assume that the reliability increases with increas-
ing HFT. But does the architectural constraints lead to more
reliable architectures?
One immediate effect of increasing the HFT is that the STR
increases [15]. As mentioned in Section 3, more frequent spurious
trips may have a negative effect on safety, due to the secondary
effects from process disturbances, like stress on affected physical
components as well as on the personnel. The correlation between
HFT and reliability improvements may be further questioned in
cases where: The SIF is likely to fail due to common cause failures (CCF) rather
than independent failures. Higher HFT makes the SIF less
vulnerable to independent (random) dangerous failures. How-
ever, if redundant components share the same or similar
design principles, follow-up, or are exposed to same opera-
tional and environmental conditions, one may experience that
two or more components fail simultaneously. These CCFs
[19–21] will reduce the reliability beneﬁt from increasing the
HFT. The reliability model is incomplete. HFT is considered for those
components that have been identiﬁed to have an effect on the
SIS’s ability to perform the SIF and, consequently, are included
in the reliability model. If the SIS is complex, have complex
interactions with other systems, or if we have not put enough
effort into understanding the complete SIF loop, we may fail to
capture all relevant components. If some of these unidentiﬁed
components alone may cause failure of the SIF, a higher HFT of
the identiﬁed components may not lead to a more reliable
system.An additional concern when increasing the HFT is that we add
complexity and potentially new vulnerabilities to the SIS. As a
result, we may experience that the reliability is reduced rather
than increased by raising the HFT.
One argument that may support a higher HFT, at least at ﬁrst
glance, is the potential for systematic failures. Systematic failures
are safe and dangerous failures caused by design errors,
implementation errors, installation errors, and operation and
maintenance related errors. Systematic failures also embrace
software failures, and failures that are due to the selection of
inappropriate hardware for the current environmental conditions.
The IEC standards [1,2] recommend that systematic failures are
omitted in the PFD calculations, since they do not have the same
predictable characteristics as random hardware failures. HFT can
therefore be a means to compensate for systematic failures.
Operational experience indicates that a signiﬁcant fraction of SIS
failures are systematic rather than random hardware failures
[1,2,12,17]. Some reliability databases, like OREDA [14], therefore
include systematic failures in their failure rate predictions. Other
reliability databases cover only random hardware failures. This is,
for example, the case for MIL-HDBK-217F [22], where the data
come from controlled laboratory testing.
The robustness against systematic failures from raising the HFT
may not be as high as expected. First of all, the systematic failures
may be safe as well as dangerous, which means that the frequency
of process disturbances increases with increasing HFT. Secondly,
the causes of systematic failures often share the properties of CCF
causes [20], and a systematic failure is therefore likely to affect
several components rather than a single component. As discussed
above, a higher HFT has a limited effect on the reliability of the SIF
if a considerable fraction of the failures are due to CCFs.6. Discussion and further work
According to the IEC standards [1,2], the SIS hardware
architecture must be selected so that (i) the calculated reliability
meets the speciﬁed SIL, and (ii) the HFT is according to the
architectural constraints. In some cases, the architectural con-
straints call for higher HFT than is necessary based on the
reliability calculations. End users and system integrators have
therefore questioned the need for architectural constraints, and
whether architectural constraints lead to safer design. Their
concern has been addressed and discussed in this article.
The architectural constraints specify a minimum HFT for each
subsystem (input elements, logic solver, ﬁnal elements) based on
the SIL target, the component type, and the SFF. The IEC standards
use the SFF as a measure of inherent safeness of components, and
allow lower HFT for conﬁgurations of components with high SFF.
This article has critically examined the properties of the SFF in two
case studies, and investigated if a high SFF necessarily leads to a
safe design. Based on the case studies, we conclude that: The SFF is not an adequate indicator of a component’s
reliability properties. Two components with the same SFF
may have quite different characteristics with respect to rate of
spurious operations, rate of dangerous failures, and DC. A high SFF does not always indicate a safe component, in the
same way as a low SFF is not always synonymous with an
unsafe component. The SFF may give credit (in terms of
increased SFF) to unsafe designs as well as punishment (in
terms of unchanged or decreased SFF) for safe designs.
We have argued that reliability models and reliability data may
fail to capture all failures of a SIF. One example is that reliability
calculations often omit the contribution from systematic failures.
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included in reliability calculations, and argue for other means to
identify and prevent such failures, for example, use of checklists.
The increasing use of PE-logic solvers and smart ﬁeld devices, will
inevitably lead to more failures with systematic causes, intro-
duced during design, construction, and sometimes also during
operation, maintenance, and modiﬁcations. Adding more HFT to
such functions may increase the robustness against systematic
failures, but will also increase the system complexity.
A project has recently been initiated to study the relationship
between the SFF and the PFD, using Markov methods [23]. It may
be useful to explore the results from this project, to gain more
insight into the effects of high and low SFF.
More research should be devoted to treat systematic failures in
reliability assessments. New methods to predict and analyze
systematic failures should be developed. A ﬁrst steps in this
development has been taken by the PDS project [12]. In a new
method, the contribution from software failures represents a
major challenge. Hardware functions are increasingly being
replaced by software implemented functions, to allow new and
more ﬂexible technical solutions and to save costs. The cost of
writing software code once is lower than the cost of having
hardware in all systems. As mainly hardware components are
catered for in reliability calculations, it is a need to clarify how the
contribution from systematic failures may affect the reliability of
SIS.
As a supplement to the architectural constraints, we believe
that more attention should be directed to the construction of
reliability models, and the system and functional analyses on
which the models are based. With more complex features of SIS
components it is important to analyze the functionality of each SIS
component, rather than assuming a certain behavior, and also to
take into account their interactions. Such a qualitative analysis
gives two beneﬁts: improved reliability models and improved
insight into the SIS functionality.Acknowledgments
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Abstract
This article presents a practical approach to reliability assessment of a com-
plex safety instrumented system that is susceptible to common cause failures.
The approach is based on fault tree analysis where the common cause failures
are included by post-processing the minimal cut sets. The approach is illus-
trated by a case study of a safety instrumented function of a workover control
system that is used during maintenance interventions into subsea oil and gas
wells. The case study shows that the approach is well suited for identifying po-
tential failures in complex systems and for including design engineers in the
verification of the reliability analyses. Unlike many software tools for fault tree
analysis, the approach gives conservative estimates for reliability. The suggested
approach represents a useful extension to current reliability analysis methods.
1 Introduction
Many oil and gas installations rely on safety instrumented systems (SISs) to respond
to hazardous events and mitigate their consequences to humans, the environment,
andmaterial assets. Reliability targets are often assigned to each safety instrumented
function (SIF) that is performed by a SIS and detailed reliability analyses are car-
ried out to prove compliance to these targets. If the specified target is not met, the
analyses should help the design engineers to make improvements to the SIS. Such
improvements may be related to physical design changes, changes to the voting
logic, improved diagnostic test routines, protection against common cause failures
(CCFs), and so forth. An important objective is therefore that the reliability analyses
are possible to comprehend by design engineers who are usually not trained in re-
liability engineering. If the system is already in operation, the analyses should also
be comprehensible for operators andmaintenance personnel such that the analyses
can help them to get an increased awareness to potential failure combinations.
The authors have recently carried out an industry project to determine the reli-
ability of a SIF that is performed by a well workover system. The workover system
is used for maintenance interventions into subsea oil and/or gas wells, and the pur-
pose of the SIF is to stop flow from the well when demanded by the operator.
A reliability target for the SIF is usually set according to IEC61508 and IEC61511,
two widely accepted standards in the oil and gas industry. These standards use
1
safety integrity as a measure of reliability and distinguish between four safety in-
tegrity levels (SILs), where SIL1 is the lowest (least reliable) level and SIL4 is the
highest (most reliable) level. For a SIS in a so-called low demandmode of operation
[13] that is subject to periodic testing, the reliability target is expressed by the av-
erage probability of failure on demand (PFD). For the SIF in this project, the target
SIL2 was specified.
To verify compliance to, for example, SIL2, one needs to demonstrate by relia-
bility analysis that the PFD is less than 1 ·10−2. IEC61508 and IEC61511 suggest the
use of fault tree analysis (FTA), reliability block diagrams (RBD), or Markov meth-
ods for this analysis. Methods like Petri Net and Monte Carlo simulations are also
sometimes used [2, 3]. The effect of CCFs must be taken care of in the analysis.
The calculations are usually based on approximation formulas, and it is there-
fore essential that these approximations are conservative, such that the “true” PFD
is less than the computed PFD. A problem here is that several software tools use
non-conservative approximations for systems of periodically tested components.
The objective of this article is to suggest a practical approach for reliability as-
sessment of a low demand, periodically tested, complex SIS that is susceptible to
various types of CCFs. The approach must produce a conservative estimate of the
system’s PFD and be easy to comprehend by practitioners who are not trained in
reliability engineering.
The suggested approach is illustrated for the SIF “shut in well flow by the lower
riser package upon demand” that is performed by the subsea well workover sys-
tem mentioned above. For confidentially reasons, the system is slightly altered and
anonymized. Additional analyses are required to verify compliance to a SIL, but this
article only considers the requirements related to the PFD.
The main focus of this article is the analysis approach. Reliability data that were
used in the project, are not included in the article.
The article is organized as follows; Section 2 discusses alternative modeling and
calculation approaches, and gives the main arguments for selecting FTA. In Section
3, the approach for making conservative estimation of the PFD is presented as a
stepwise procedure. The case study in Section 4 illustrates the application of the
approach. Sections 5 and 6 make some final comments and ideas for further work.
2 Background for the approach
2.1 Selection ofmodeling approach
Both RBD and FTA are applicable methods for analyzing the reliability of a complex
SIF. An RBD often resembles the physical structure of the SIS, and the sequence of
the functional blocks in the RBDmay be set up to be similar to the sequence the SIS
components are activated. When establishing an RBD, we think in terms of func-
tions: “How can this function be achieved?” This may be a strength, but is also
a weakness, since it is easy to forget functions that are installed (or should be in-
stalled) to protect the main system functions in specific fault situations. Unlike the
physical structure, an RBD may include the same component in different sections
of themodel. This may be confusing for persons who are not familiar with reliability
modeling.
When constructing a fault tree, our mindset is different, and we focus on how a
function may fail rather than how the function may be achieved [26, 14, 5, 10]. This
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failure oriented approach is considered more comprehensive and complete than
RBD [26] since it is easier to identify failures that are not directly linked to a compo-
nent function. A fault tree (with only AND and OR gates) can always be transferred
to an RBD and visa versa. When the model is established, the two approaches give
the same result. Even so, fault trees are easier to understand for persons who are not
familiar with reliability analysis, due to the intuitive and structured approach when
establishing the fault tree.
An RBD and a fault tree provide a “static picture” of a system function and fault,
respectively, and can not easily be used tomodel systems that are switching between
different operational modes or systems with complex maintenance procedures. For
such systems, Markovmethods aremore suitable [15, 26, 6]. For systems with a high
number of components, the Markov models will be very large and the multitude of
fault states, operational modes, andmaintenance modes can be difficult to compre-
hend by practitioners.
For the current SIF, the reliability analysis was restricted to a single operational
mode, the intervention mode. It was further considered to be important to involve
design engineers, operators, andmaintenance personnel in the analysis to verify the
model, increase their awareness of critical failure combinations, and to give them a
background to implement design changes and/or modified operational procedures
that will improve the system reliability.
Based on these arguments, FTA was found to be the most appropriate modeling
approach for the reliability assessment of the SIF.
2.2 PFD calculation
Assume that a fault tree for a specified TOP event has been constructed and that
m minimal cut sets {MC1,MC2, . . . ,MCm} have been identified. This case study is
restricted to the technical features of the workover system, and all the basic events in
the fault tree are therefore related to technical component failures. In the following,
we will therefore refer to the components of a cut set rather than the basic events of
the cut set.
Let PFD j ,i denote the (average) probability of failure on demand of component i
in minimal cut set j , for j = 1,2, . . . ,m. Minimal cut j of ordermj is a 1-out-of-mj :G
structure, and will only fail when all its mj components are in a failed state at the
same time. To simplify the notation, the cut parallel structure of a minimal cut set is
called a minimal cut. When all the components in the cut set are independent, the
probability of failure on demand of minimal cut j is usually calculated by
PFDMC j ≈
mj∏
i=1
PFD j ,i (1)
Equation (1) is used by many software tools for FTA, but does not give an accurate
result [3]. This is due to thewell-knownSchwartz’ inequality saying that “the average
of a product is not equal to the product of averages”. Equation (1) is therefore an
approximation, and the approximation is non-conservative.
The average PFD j ,i for a single component that is periodically tested may be
calculated as [26]
PFD j ,i = 1
τ
∫τ
0
(
1−exp(−λDU, j ,i · t
)
dt 
λDU, j ,i ·τ
2
(2)
3
where λDU, j ,i is the rate of dangerous undetected (DU) failures of component i in
minimal cut j , and τ is the functional test interval. A dangerous (D) failure is a failure
that may prevent the execution of a safety function, and when it is also classified as
undetected (U), the failure can only be revealed by a functional test or a demand. In
this article, all components are covered by the same functional test, and the index i
is therefore omitted for the functional test interval τ.
Equation (2) gives a conservative approximation [26] and the approximation is
generally considered to be adequate when:
• λDU, j ,i ·τ is “small” (i.e., < 10−2). For higher values, the approximation might
be too conservative.
• The operation is stopped when a DU failure is revealed and not restarted until
the failure has been repaired. This means that the function of the component
is not demanded while the component is being repaired.
• The functional test is perfect, which means that all DU failures are revealed
during the test.
If the operation continues while the component is being repaired such that de-
mands for the component may occur, the unavailability due to the repair downtime
must be added to (2). This contribution is approximately λDU, j ,i ·MTTR j ,i , where
MTTR j ,i is the mean time required to repair (or restore) a DU failure of component
i in minimal cut j .
Non-perfect test conditionsmay be accounted for by introducing a test coverage
factor C. This means that a fraction (1−C) of the DU-failures, remains unrevealed
by the test and the unavailability due to these failures must be added to (2) to obtain
the actual PFDMC j .
Consider a minimal cut j withmj independent components with test interval τ.
The PFDMC j of this minimal cut is
PFDMC j =
1
τ
∫τ
0
mj∏
i=1
(
1−exp(−λDU, j ,i · t
)
dt
 1
τ
∫τ
0
mj∏
i=1
(
λDU, j ,i · t
)
dt =
(∏mj
i=1λDU, j ,i
)
·τmj
mj +1
=
(
λ¯DU, j ·τ
)mj
mj +1
(3)
where
λ¯DU, j =
(mj∏
i=1
λDU, j ,i
) 1
mj
(4)
is the geometric mean of themj DU-failure rates λDU, j ,1,λDU, j ,2, . . . ,λDU, j ,mj .
For a minimal cut j of two independent components with failure rates λDU, j ,1
and λDU, j ,2, the average PFDMC j is from (3):
PFDMC j 
λDU, j ,1 ·λDU, j ,2 ·τ2
3
(5)
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By combining (1) and (2), we get PFDMC j ≈λDU, j ,1 ·λDU, j ,2 ·τ2/4 which is a non-
conservative approximation. Software tools for FTA that use this approachwill there-
fore get a PFD for this cut set that is around 25% lower than the correct value. This
percentage increases with the ordermj of the minimal cut.
The “correct” approximation (3) for a minimal cut of order mj is obtained by
multiplying the result obtained from (1) and (2) by the correction factor
2mj
mj +1
(6)
For a minimal cut set of order 2, this corresponds to a correction factor of 4/3.
2.3 Modeling of CCFs
CCFs may be modeled explicitly as separate events in the fault tree, or implicitly,
by post-processing the minimal cut sets [7, 11, 18, 35, 33]. For systems with several
types of common causes, the explicit approach may lead to large fault trees that
are difficult to interpret. In addition, it may be easy to overlook, or make incorrect
inclusion of, events that are dependent, but located in different branches of the fault
tree.
With the implicit approach, the fault tree is kept simple and the CCFs are identi-
fied from the minimal cut sets.
IEC61508 and IEC61511 recommend the beta-factor model for including CCFs
in the calculations. This model assigns a fraction, β of the failures of a component
to be CCF, and assumes that when a CCF occurs, all components in that group will
fail due to the same cause. The associated formulas for calculating the PFD are pre-
sented in, for example [15, 26, 29].
In practise, we may expect to have CCFs where not all redundant components
fail. This means that the effect of a CCF may be different for different voted con-
figurations, such as 1-out-of-3:G and 2-out-of-3:G. The PDS method [28, 27] uses a
correction factor to adjust the CCF rate for such configurations. In this article, the
standard beta-factor model is used, since it gives adequate results, is easy to under-
stand, and the parameter β is easy to interpret.
3 Stepwise Procedure
This section presents the approach that was developed to analyze the well workover
system. The approach has eight steps, each of which represents a stage where an
intermediate result may be discussed with design engineers, operators, and main-
tenance personnel.
Step 1: System familiarization
System familiarization is always an important part of a reliability analysis. The start-
ing point is to list the SIFs, and to describe the operational modes and conditions
where a SIF response may be required. Relevant operational modes may be normal
operation, test modes, and contingency modes induced by failures, faults, or opera-
tor errors [26].
System familiarization then continues with a review of documentation that de-
scribes each SIF, like topology drawings, loop drawings for pneumatic, hydraulic,
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and electrical hook-up, cause and effects diagrams, and operation manuals. The
outcome of the review should describe: The criteria for successful SIF execution,
which components that are operated to achieve the SIF, and how these components
may fail due to normal degradation, design failures, misuse, or excessive stresses
from operations or the environment.
Step 2: TOP event definition
Based on the system familiarization and description of the SIF, the next task is to de-
fine and delimit the TOP event of the fault tree. The TOP event is the non-fulfillment
of the SIF, and must be thoroughly discussed with the design engineers to ensure
that all participants have a common understanding of the event. The description of
the TOP event should answer the following questions [26]: (i)What is the TOP event?
What is really happening when the TOP event occurs? (ii)Where does the TOP event
occur? and (iii)When does the TOP event occur – during what operation?
The same type of eventmay occur inmore than one operational mode, for exam-
ple, during start-up and during normal operation. TOP events for these operational
modes must be analyzed separately.
Step 3: Fault tree construction
A fault tree for the TOP event is then constructed in close cooperation with the de-
sign engineers and operators.
Fault tree construction is described in several guidelines [18, 14, 12]. The guide-
lines should be carefully adhered to and a suitable software tool for FTA should be
selected. For the analysis of the workover system, CARA FaultTree [32] was used.
Step 4: Identification and verification ofminimal cut sets
Most software tools for FTA have efficient algorithms that can find the minimal cut
sets.
The minimal cuts are used as basis for thorough discussions with design engi-
neers and operators. The review is important in order to verify that the fault tree
reflects the current design, in the documentation as well as the physical installa-
tion, and that the reliability analysts and the personnel designing or working with
the system share a common understanding of how the systemmay fail.
The same component can be amember of severalminimal cuts. This means that
the minimal cuts become dependent even when the components are independent.
The effect on the calculations is discussed in step 7.
Step 5: Identification of common cause component groups
For each minimal cut, say MC j , wemust determine whether the components of the
cut set are independent or dependent. Components that are dependent and share
the same common failure cause, are included in the same common cause compo-
nent group CG j ,ν, for j = 1,2, . . . ,m, and ν = 1,2, . . . ,r j , where r j is the number of
different common cause component groups in minimal cut MC j . To each CG j ,ν, we
may assign a corresponding beta factor, β j ,ν. The index νmay be omitted when the
minimal cut includes a single common cause component group.
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Figure 1: Minimal cut with two common cause component groups
A minimal cut of order six is illustrated in Fig. 1 as an RBD with two common
cause component groups, CG1 and CG2, each with two components. The CCF is
included as a virtual component in series with the parallel structure comprising the
components of the common cause component group [26].
The remaining components, H j = MC j \
(⋃r j
ν=1CG j ,ν
)
, are the components in
MC j that are considered to be independent. We denote the order of H j by k
(I )
j and
the order of CG j ,ν by k
(C )
j ,ν . The components in H j have failure rates λ
(I )
DU,i for i =
1,2, . . . ,k(I )j and the components in CG j ,ν have λDU, j ,ν, for ν = 1,2, . . . ,r j and  =
1,2, . . . ,k(C )j ,ν . For the minimal cut in Fig. 1, k
(I ) = 2, r = 2, k(C )1 = 2, and k(C )2 = 2.
To determine whether or not the components are dependent, we start by look-
ing for common root causes and coupling factors of the various components of the
minimal cuts. A root cause is a basic cause of a component failure (e.g., a corrosive
environment), while a coupling factor explains why several components are affected
by the same root cause (e.g., same design specification, same materials, same envi-
ronmental exposure).
Several guidelines and checklists for identification of coupling factors and root
causes have been developed [1, 4, 30, 31, 25, 24, 19, 20, 17, 8]. Some authors also
address various ways to automate the identification and inclusion of CCFs in fault
tree analysis, see for example [37, 36, 7, 23, 35, 34, 38, 40, 39]. To analyze potential
CCFs within a minimal cut, we first ask if coupling factors are present, and then
assess the potential root causes to decide if a CCF is likely to occur.
Step 6: Determine β j ,ν for CG j ,ν
The beta factor β j ,ν for common cause component group CG j ,ν should preferably
be determined based on plant specific conditions. Checklists have been developed
for this purpose, for example in part 6 of IEC61508, and in [29, 9, 28].
Another approach is to determine a generic β based on data bases like OREDA
[22] or by expert judgments. OLF070 [21], a guideline developed by the Norwegian
oil and gas industry to support the application of IEC61508 and IEC61511, has se-
lected this approach.
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Step 7: Determine PFDMC j for j = 1,2, . . . ,m
Two important assumptions were made for (2) in section 2: That the functional test
is perfect and that the operation is stopped while a DU failure is being repaired. This
step should start by confirming the validity of these assumptions.
It is therefore important to clarify with design engineers and operators if all com-
ponents are operated during the functional test, to what extent the functional test is
capable of revealing all DU failures, and if the operation is stopped once a danger-
ous failure is revealed. If any of these conditions are not according to the assump-
tions, it is necessary to consider the options that were presented in section 2. In our
approach, it is assumed that the assumptions of (2) are valid.
For a minimal cut of order mj , i.e., a 1-out-of-mj :G structure, the approach for
calculating the PFDMC j is influenced by:
1. The ordermj of the minimal cut
2. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are identical
3. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are dependent
4. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are tested simultaneously
Based on the factors above, we get the following equations for calculating the
average PFDMC j of minimal cut j .
Alternative 1: Independent components
Consider a minimal cut with mj independent components with DU failure rates
λDU, j ,1,λDU, j ,2, . . . ,λDU, j ,mj and assume that all the components are tested at the
same time with test interval τ. In this case, (3) and (4) apply directly.
Alternative 2: Identical and dependent components
Consider aminimal cut withmj identical and dependent components with DU fail-
ure rateλDU, j andbeta factorβ j . Assume that all the components of theminimal cut
are tested simultaneously with test interval τ. The PFD for this structure, PFDMC j ,
then becomes [26]:
PFDMC j 
(
(1−β j )λDU, j ·τ
)mj
mj +1
+ β jλDU, j ·τ
2
(7)
Alternative 3: Non-identical and dependent components
In some cases, the components of a minimal cut are non-identical but still vulnera-
ble to the same common cause of failure. One example is that vibration may lead to
failure of two different types of sensors. Generally, this beta factor should be smaller
than for identical components, as “diverse redundancy” gives a lower degree of de-
pendency or coupling [28].
Some care must be taken when calculating the contribution from CCFs with the
beta factor model. Some authors have proposed that the beta factor is a fraction of
the geometric mean of the failure rates of the components [8]. This approach may
be adequate when the component failure rates are similar, but may lead to a CCF
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rate that is higher than the lowest component failure rate when the failure rates are
different.
To overcome this problem, we define the beta factor to be a fraction of the lowest
component failure rate as this rate limits how often a parallel structure of compo-
nents fails simultaneously.
Consider a minimal cut MC j where all components are dependent and non-
identical such that they belong to the same common cause component group with
β j . In this case, the PFDMC j becomes:
PFDMC j ≈
[(
1−β j
)
λ¯DU, j ·τ
]mj
mj +1
+β j ·λminDU, j ·
τ
2
(8)
where
λminDU, j = mini∈MC j {λDU, j ,i } (9)
is the lowest DU failure rate in MC j .
Alternative 4: More complexminimal cuts
Aminimal cutmay havemore thanone common cause component groupor include
independent as well as dependent components. In this case, it is not possible to
apply (7) and (8) directly.
The proposed approach may be illustrated by using Fig. 1 as basis. The minimal
cut in Fig. 1 has “virtual” cut sets of order 4, 5, and 6. For a general cut set, the
lowest order is k(I )j +r j . Sincewe assume that the common cause component groups
within a minimal cut are independent, we can now find the probability of failure on
demand, PFDMC j for minimal cut j by using formulas similar to (3) for each of the
“virtual” minimal cuts sets inMC j . For the virtual cut with the lowest order, the PFD
is
PFD(1)MC j ≈
(∏k (I )j
i=1λ
(I )
j ,i ·
∏r j
ν=1β j ,ν ·λmin,νDU, j
)
τ
k (I )j +r j
k(I )j + r j +1
(10)
where λmin,νDU, j is the lowest DU failure rate in CG j ,ν in minimal cut MC j .
For the virtual cut with the lowest order in Fig. 1, {1,2,C1,C2}, the PFD becomes
(the index j has been omitted)
PFD(1)MC ≈
(
λ(I )1 λ
(I )
2 β1β2λ
min,1
DU λ
min,2
DU
)
τ4
5
(11)
The PFD of the other virtual cuts can be found in a similar way. Consider the
virtual minimal cut {1,2,3,4,C2} in Fig. 1. Here, the PFD becomes
PFD(2)MC ≈
(
λ(I )DU,1 ·λ(I )DU,2(1−β1)2λDU,1,1λDU,1,2β2λmin,2DU
)
τ5
6
(12)
9
For the virtual cut {1,2,C1,5,6}, the PFD is
PFD(3)MC ≈
(
λ(I )DU,1 ·λ(I )DU,2(1−β2)2λDU,2,1λDU,2,2β1λmin,1DU
)
τ5
6
(13)
Consider the virtual minimal cut of order 6, {1,2,3,4,5,6}. Here, the PFD be-
comes:
PFD(4)MC ≈
(
λ(I )DU,1 ·λ(I )DU,2(1−β1)2λDU,1,1λDU,1,2(1−β2)2λDU,2,1λDU,2,2
)
τ6
7
(14)
Since (12), (13), and (14) have a higher order than (11), their PFD will usually
be small compared to PFD(1)MC. In many applications, we can therefore omit these
virtual cuts.
The PFD j of aminimal cut j can be calculated by the “upper bound approxima-
tion” formula which is available in most software tools for FTA.
PFDMC j ≈ 1−
∏
All“virtual′′cuts k
(
1−PFD(k)MC j
)
(15)
This approximation formula is slightly conservative, and this may compensate for
omitting higher order virtual cuts.
Non-simultaneous testing The four alternatives assume that all components are
tested at the same time. This assumption is valid for most SIFs in the oil and gas
industry, and was valid for the case study. Components that are tested at different
times and with different test intervals will give more complex formulas. To calculate
the PFD, we can use the same approach as the one derived for staggered testing in
[26]. The approach is straightforward, but the calculation will, inmost cases, require
the use of a computer.
Step 8: Calculate system PFDSIF
The PFDSIF can now be found by using the “upper bound approximation” on the
minimal cuts MC1, MC2, . . . , MCm .
PFDSIF 1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−PFDMC j
)
(16)
Dependencybetweenminimal cuts So far, wehave not discussed dependency be-
tween minimal cuts. There are two main reasons why the minimal cuts may be de-
pendent. One reason is that the same component may be a member of more than
one minimal cut. The corresponding minimal cuts will therefore be (positively) de-
pendent even when all the components are independent. The other reason is that
different components that are members of different minimal cut sets may be ex-
posed to the same CCF. In both cases, the minimal cut sets will have a positive de-
pendency that can be described by so-called associated variables. This type of de-
pendency is thoroughly discussed in [26], where it is also shown that the approxi-
mation in (16) is conservative also in this case.
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Figure 2: Simplified functional block diagram of the isolation function
4 Application of the approach
This section describes how the suggested approach was applied to the SIF that is
performed by the workover system. We assume that all components are periodi-
cally tested and that the functional tests are perfect in the sense that all failures are
revealed by the test. All failure rates are assumed to be constant and demands for
the SIF are assumed to occur so seldom that we can consider the system to be a low
demand system [13].
Description of the SIF
During a workover intervention, a workover riser is connected to the subsea well-
head. The lower riser package that is attached to the lower end of the riser includes
a number of valves that are operated by the workover control system.
The SIF analyzed in the case study was “to shut in the well flow by the lower riser
package upon a demand during intervention mode”.
The shear ram and at least one of the riser annulus valve and the riser cross over
valve in the lower riser package must close to achieve successful shut in of well.
When the shear ram is operated, it will also cut any wires that are in the produc-
tion tubing.
Step 1: System familiarization
The simplified functional block diagram in Fig. 2 was developed based on a detailed
review of drawings and documentation of the workover system.
The following components are used to implement the function (Notation used
in Fig. 2 is shown in parentheses):
• A shear ram (S-RAM) used to cut the wireline string and isolate the well.
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• Equipment used to activate the shear ram including a shuttle valve (CV8), sub-
sea mounted hydraulic accumulators (Acc), and a subsea mounted control
valve (CV9).
• A riser annulus valve (RAV) and a riser crossover valve (RXOV) that are in-
stalled in the annulus bore lines.
• Umbilical lines, two lines for operating the shear ram (Umb1 and Umb2) and
one line for each of the two valves RXOV (Umb3) and RAV (Umb4).
• A hydraulic power unit.
• An electrical power supply (Power). The electric power is supplied from the oil
and gas installation or rig. In addition, there is a dedicated un-interruptible
power supply.
• Air supply from the rig or platform (Purge) that is used to supply control pres-
sure andmaintain overpressure in theworkover container and theprogrammable
logic controller (PLC) cabinet.
• Equipment for electrical activation of emergency function, including:
– Two push-buttons for electrical activation (ElPb1 and ElPb2)
– One PLC
– Four pulse operated hydraulic control valves, two of which operate the
shear ram (CV4 andCV5), one that operates the RXOV (CV6) and one that
operates the RAV (CV7).
• Equipment for pneumatic activation of emergency function, including:
– Two push-buttons for pneumatic activation (PnPb1 and PnPb2)
– Two pneumatic operated hydraulic control valves (CV1 and CV3)
– One pneumatically operated pneumatic control valve (CV2)
The isolation at the lower riser package is successful when: (1) the shear ram
closes and (2) one of the two valves RAV or RXOV closes. The RAV and RXOV are kept
in open position as long as their actuators are pressurized, and will automatically
close when their actuators are depressurized. The shear ram starts to close when
the subsea mounted control valve (CV9) is depressurized. The shuttle valve (CV8)
merges the two umbilical lines to a single line to the control valve. When the control
valve (CV9) is depressurized, it switches over and allows the hydraulic accumulators
to pressurize the shear ram actuators that operates the two knives. The shear ram
including knives and knife actuators are referred to as one unit (S-RAM).
Unrestricted return of hydraulic fluids from the S-RAM, the RAV, and the RXOV
and back to the rig or platform is important. As the same umbilical lines are used
for supply and return of hydraulics, it is important to avoid any sharp bends on the
umbilicals. The RAV and RXOV are operated by separate umbilicals, while the shear-
ram has two umbilicals available.
The electrical push-buttons (ElPb1 and ElPb2) as well as the pneumatic push-
buttons (PnPb1 and PnPb2) are voted 1-out-of-2:G, which means that the emer-
gency function is initiated (electrically or pneumatically) upon pressing one of the
two push-buttons. The PLC reads the electrical push-button signals and sends a
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pulse signal to the pulse operated valves (CV4, CV5, CV6, CV7). These valves are
split into two parts in Fig. 2, the solenoid (sol) part and the hydraulic (hydr) valve
part. The reason is that the valve part is a common component for pneumatic as
well as electrical initiation of workover isolation, since the hydraulic return in both
cases must pass through this valve. To operate the shear-ram, it is necessary that ei-
ther CV4 or CV5 functions. The pulse operated valves are not able to switch and start
depressurizing the hydraulic lines upon loss of communication with the PLC. This
means that they are not fail-safe. Loss of electric power to the PLC may therefore
prevent electric activation of the emergency function.
Upon pressing one of the two pneumatic push-buttons, the pilot lines to the
pneumatic operated valves CV1 and CV2 are depressurized. Upon loss of pilot sig-
nal, the pneumatic operated valve CV1 starts to depressurize hydraulic supply to the
shear-ramand theRXOV. Thehydraulic returnmust pass through thepulse operated
valves (CV4, CV5, and CV6), and a restriction through these valves may prevent suc-
cessful depressurization upon electric as well as pneumatic activation. The second
pneumatic operated valve, CV2, depressurizes the pilot line to the pneumatic oper-
ated valve CV3. Upon loss of pilot signal, CV3 starts to depressurize the hydraulic
supply to the RAV. Also in this case, the hydraulic return must pass through CV7. A
restriction in the valve part of CV7 may therefore prevent successful depressuriza-
tion upon electrical as well as pneumatic activation.
The PLC is installed in an environment thatmay contain hydrocarbon gases. The
PLC panel and the container unit are therefore protected by overpressure. Upon loss
of overpressure in the PLC cabinet, the PLC shuts down. Loss of overpressure may
therefore lead to unsuccessful electrical activation of the emergency function.
Step 2: Definition of TOP event
Based on system familiarization, the following TOP event for the fault tree was for-
mulated: “Fail to shut in the well flow by the lower riser package upon a demand
during intervention mode”.
Step 3: Fault tree construction
The top structure of the fault tree in Fig. 3 was established and shows how failures
of the main elements, the shear ram, the RXOV, and/or the RAV, may lead to the TOP
event.
The next level of the fault tree, i.e., the fault trees associated with the shear ram
failure, the RXOV failure, and the RAV failure are shown in Figs. 4, 5, and 6, respec-
tively. The fault trees were all constructed in close cooperation with a design en-
gineer, and also verified with operators in field to check that the documentation
corresponded to the physical installation.
The basic events of the fault trees are named according to the physical compo-
nents, but they only represent the dangerous failure modes of the components.
Step 4: Identification ofminimal cut sets
The minimal cut sets that are listed in Table 1 were generated using CARA FaultTree
[32]. Many FTA software tools have a default cut off criterion for listing minimal cut
sets – based on the order of the cut set. When components may be dependent, it is
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Figure 3: Top structure of fault tree for the workover isolation function
Table 1: Minimal cut sets (MCS)
No Components No Components No Components
1 S-RAM 25 CV5-sol,PnPb1,PnPb2 49 RXOV,CV7-sol,CV3
2 Acc 26 PLC,PnPb1,PnPb2 50 PLC,RXOV,CV2
3 CV9 27 Purge,PnPb1,PnPb2 51 PLC,RXOV,CV3
4 CV8 28 Power,PnPb1,PnPb2 52 Purge,RXOV,CV2
5 Umb1,Umb2 29 Umb3,CV7-sol,CV2 53 Purge,RXOV,CV3
6 Umb1,CV5-hydr 30 Umb3,CV7-sol,CV3 54 Power,RXOV,CV2
7 CV4-hydr,Umb2 31 PLC,Umb3,CV2 55 Power,RXOV,CV3
8 CV4-hydr,CV5-hydr 32 PLC,Umb3,CV3 56 ElPB1,ElPb2,Umb3,CV2
9 CV4-sol,CV1 33 Purge,Umb3,CV2 57 {ElPB1,ElPb2},{PnPb1,PnPb2}
10 CV5-sol,CV1 34 Purge,Umb3,CV3 58 ElPB1,ElPb2,Umb3,CV3
11 PLC,CV1 35 Power,Umb3,CV2 59 PnPb1,PnPb2,Umb3,Cv7-sol
12 Purge,CV1 36 Power,Umb3,CV3 60 ElPB1,ElPb2,CV6-hydr,CV2
13 Power,CV1 37 CV6-hydr,CV7-sol,CV2 61 ElPB1,ElPb2,CV6-hydr,CV3
14 Umb3,Umb4 38 CV6-hydr,CV7-sol,CV3 62 PnPb1,PnPb2,CV6-hydr,Cv7-sol
15 Umb3,CV7-hydr 39 PLC,CV6-hydr,CV2 63 PnPb1,PnPb2,CV6-sol,Umb4
16 Umb3,RAV 40 PLC,CV6-hydr, CV3 64 PnPb1,PnPb2,CV6-sol,CV7-hydr
17 CV6-hydr,Umb4 41 Purge,CV6-hydr, CV2 65 {PnPb1,PnPb2},{Cv6-sol,Cv7-sol}
18 CV6-hydr,CV7-hydr 42 Purge,CV6-hydr, CV3 66 PnPb1,PnPb2,CV6-sol,RAV
19 CV6-hydr,RAV 43 Power,CV6-hydr, CV2 67 CV1,CV6-sol,CV7-sol,CV2
20 RXOV,Umb4 44 Power,CV6-hydr, CV3 68 CV1,CV6-sol,CV7-sol,CV3
21 RXOV,CV7-hydr 45 CV1, CV6-sol,Umb4 69 ElPB1,ElPb2,RXOV,CV2
22 RXOV,RAV 46 CV1,CV6-sol,CV7-hydr 70 ElPB1,ElPb2,RXOV,CV3
23 ElPB1,ElPb2,CV1 47 CV1,CV6-sol,RAV 71 PnPb1,PnPb2,RXOV,CV7-sol
24 CV4-sol,PnPb1,PnPb2 48 RXOV,CV7-sol,CV2
important to review all minimal cut sets, as a CCF reduces the order of the minimal
cut set.
The minimal cut sets were reviewed together with the design engineer and op-
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erators to verify that the failure combinations of the fault tree corresponded to their
understanding of how the systemmay fail.
Step 5: Identification of CommonCause Component Groups
The minimal cut sets were reviewed to identify components that may fail due to a
common cause. In the analysis, we mainly focused on the coupling factor “similar
or same design”. Components that share the same (potential) cause of failure were
included in the same common cause component group.
The identified common cause component groups are shown in bold in Table 1.
Where two common cause component groups are present within the same mini-
mal cut set, they are put within separate brackets. For example, minimal cut set 57
has two common cause component groups; CG57,1 = {ElPb1, ElPb2} and CG57,2 =
{PnPb1, PnPb2}.
Step 6: Determination of β j ,ν
We used OLF070 [21] as basis for selecting β j ,ν values. For many field devices, a β of
5% is suggested. This value was therefore used if no other information was available
that would indicate a higher or lower β.
One exception was for the pulse-operated valves, where β was set equal to 10%.
A careful review of reported failures for these components indicated some poten-
tial design weaknesses, and we therefore assumed that these valves might be more
vulnerable to CCF than indicated by the generic data.
Usingminimal cut set 65 as illustration, this means thatβ65,1 was set equal to 5%
and and β65,2 equal to 10%.
Step 7: Calculate PFD j
For each minimal cut set j we calculated PFDMC j . In the following, some of the
resulting equations are illustrated, using minimal cut sets 1, 5, 16, 27, and 57 as ex-
amples.
Equation forminimal cut 1:
Minimal cut 1, {S-RAM}, has only one component. By using (3), with mj = 1, and
λDU,1 =λDU,S−RAM, the PFDMC1 is
PFDMC1 ≈
λDU,S−RAM ·τ
2
(17)
Equation forminimal cut 5:
Minimal cut 5, {Umb1, Umb2}, has two components involving two umbilicals of the
same type with the same failure rate, λDU,Umb. Both components are therefore in-
cluded in the same common cause component group, CG5: {Umb1, Umb2} with β5
and k(C )5 = 2. By using (7), the PFDMC5 is
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PFDMC5 ≈
[
(1−β5)λDU,Umb ·τ
]2
3
(18)
+ β5λDU,Umb ·τ
2
Equation forminimal cut 16:
Minimal cut 16, {Umb3, RAV}, has two different components, umbilical 3 and RAV
with different failure rates, λDU,Umb and λDU,RAV, and we assume that they will not
fail due to CCF. By using (3), the PFDMC16 is
PFDMC16 ≈
λDU,UmbλDU,RAV ·τ2
3
(19)
Equations forminimal cut 27:
Minimal cut 27, {Purge,PnPb1,PnPb2}, has three components involving two pneu-
matic push buttons and the purge system. We assume that the push buttons may
fail due to CCF, such that CG27 become {PnPb1,PnPb2} with β27, and that the purge
system is independent of PnPb1 and PnPb2.
By using (10) – (14)with k(I )27 = 1, r27 = 1,λDU,27 =λDU,Purge andλ(C )DU,27,1 =λ(C )DU,27,2 =
λDU,PnPb, the PFD of the virtual cuts is
PFD1MC27 ≈
λDU,Purge ·β27λDU,PnPb ·τ2
3
(20)
PFD2MC27 ≈
λDU,Purge(1−β27)2λ2DU,PnPb ·τ3
4
(21)
PFDMC27 is found by inserting (20) and (21) into (15).
Equations forminimal cut 57:
Minimal cut 57, {ElPb1, ElPb2, PnPb1, PnPb2}, has four components involving two
electrical and two pneumatic push buttons. The components are dependent, but
assigned to two different common cause component groups, CG57,1: {ElPB1, ElPb2}
with β57,1 and CG57,2: {PnPb1, PnPb2} with β57,2 since electrical push buttons and
pneumatic push buttons are based on different design principles.
By using (10) – (14)with k(I )57 = 0, k(C )57,1 = 2, k(C )57,2 = 2, r57 = 2,λDU,57,1,1 =λDU,57,1,2 =
λDU,ElPb, and λDU,57,2,1 =λDU,57,2,2 =λDU,PnPb, the PFD of the virtual cuts is
PFD1MC57 ≈
β57,1λDU,ElPbβ57,2λDU,PnPb ·τ2
3
(22)
PFD2aMC57 ≈
(1−β57,1)2λ2DU,ElPbβ57,2λDU,PnPb ·τ3
4
(23)
PFD2bMC57 ≈
β57,1λDU,ElPb(1−β57,2)2λ2DU,PnPb ·τ3
4
(24)
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PFD3MC57 ≈
(1−β57,1)2λ2DU,ElPb(1−β57,2)2λ2DU,PnPb ·τ4
5
(25)
PFDMC57 is found by inserting (22) – (25) into (15).
In this case study, we have not found situations where it is likely to have CCFs
among different components and (8) was therefore not used.
Step 8: Calculate PFDSIF
The calculations for all minimal cuts were done in Excel. The result indicated that
the PFDSIF was greater than 1 ·10−2, and therefore not in accordance with the SIL 2
requirement. The main contributor to PFDSIF was the shear ram, and its associated
components (control valve and accumulator). Based on this information, improve-
ments have been suggested to the current design of these components. While this
workover system has only one shear ram, newer systems often include more than
one cutting facility.
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have presented a practical approach for reliability assessment of a complex SIS,
and demonstrated its application on the SIF “Shut in the well flow by the lower riser
package uponademandduring interventionmode” that is implemented for a subsea
well workover system.
The assessment is done according to IEC61508 and IEC61511 and is based on
fault tree analysis where CCFs are included by post-processing the minimal cut sets.
Fault tree analysis is preferred because of twomain reasons: (i) The failure-oriented
approach of FTA will lead to a more complete identification of failure causes, and
(ii) the fault tree construction process and the resulting fault tree are easy to com-
prehend by practitioners who have not been trained in reliability engineering, but
whose knowledge is important for verifying the reliability model.
To verify that the PFD of a SIF meets a SIL requirement, it is essential to use con-
servative approximations when such approximations are required. Many software
tools for FTA use non-conservative approximations for systems that are subject to
periodic testing. Our approach applies (slightly) conservative approximation for-
mulas to provide estimates of the PFD.
Wehave introduced anewapproach for treatingCCFs amongnon-identical com-
ponents. Instead of defining β as a fraction of the geometric mean, which in some
cases may lead to a rate of CCFs that is unrealistically high, we suggest that β is de-
termined as a fraction of the lowest failure rate of the components in the minimal
cut.
The approach does not include all aspects that are necessary to demonstrate
compliance to the SIL 2 requirements. Additional measures would be to verify the
SIF against the requirements for architectural constraints and the requirements for
control and avoidance of systematic failures and software failures [13, 16, 17].
The main disadvantage of the suggested approach is the manual effort that is
needed once the minimal cut sets have been identified. However, some of these
efforts may be automated by implementing the steps into a suitable software tool.
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6 Further work
In the suggested approach, we assume that all components are tested simultane-
ously and with the same functional test interval. This may not always be the case for
SIS components, and an area of further work may be to extend the approach with
new equations for components that are tested at different times. The approach is
straightforward, but the calculation may be rather complex and will require the use
of a computer.
A second area of furtherwork is to consider “outer” dependencies [28]. An “outer”
dependency is a dependency that may exist among two or more CCFs [28]. We have
disregarded the possibility of having dependencies between two or more common
cause component groups within the same minimal cut set, but the approach would
benefit from being further developed with this as an option.
In our approach, we consider the minimal cuts one by one. Each minimal cut
is a 1-out-of-n:G structure. For the case study, this approach is sufficient, but it
will not be satisfactory for systems with k-out-of-n:G structures where k ≥ 2. The
main challenge is to include CCFs in a proper way. According to the beta-factor
model, we should add theCCFas a single virtual component in serieswith the k-out-
of-n:G structure [13, 26, 28]. When generating minimal cut sets for a k-out-of-n:G
with k ≥ 2, we obtain ( nn−k+1)minimal cut sets. With the approach described in this
article, we add the virtual CCF-component to each of these
( n
n−k+1
)
cut sets, andwill,
for this reason, obtain a result that is more conservative than the result obtained by
the beta-factormodel. One potential way to solve this problem is tomodel k-out-of-
n:G with k ≥ 2 as one component, and use the equations developed for k-out-of-n:G
configurations [13, 28]. Another alternative is to identify, for example by a search
algorithm, those minimal cut sets that represent configurations that are voted k-
out-of-n:G with k ≥ 2, and then add the contribution from CCFs only once for these
minimal cut sets.
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Abstract
This article outlines a new approach to reliability, availability, maintainability, and
safety (RAMS) engineering and management. The new approach covers all phases
of the new product development process and is aimed at producers of complex prod-
ucts like safety instrumented systems (SIS). The article discusses main RAMS require-
ments to a SIS and presents these requirements in a holistic perspective. The approach
is based on a new life cycle model for product development and integrates this model
into the safety life cycle of IEC 61508. A high integrity pressure protection system
(HIPPS) for a deep-water oil and gas application is used to illustrate the approach.
Key words: Reliability, Product development, Safety instrumented systems, RAMS
management, System life cycle, IEC 61508
1. Introduction
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used in many industry sectors to reduce the
risk to human lives, environment, and material assets. A SIS is installed to detect
and respond to the onset of hazardous events by the use of electrical, electronic, or
programmable electronic (E/E/PE) technology. In cars, the airbag systems and the
anti-lock braking systems (ABS) are two examples of SIS applications. When a sensor
detects that the car collides, the airbag is activated. The ABS prevents the wheels from
locking during heavy braking, so that the driver can maintain control of the car. In
the process industry, SIS are used to stop flow and isolate electrical equipment upon
detected high pressures, high temperatures, fires, and gas leakages. One such SIS
application is the high integrity pressure protection system (HIPPS) which is used to
prevent over-pressure in vessels and pipelines.
We may split a SIS into three main sub-systems; input elements (e.g., sensors,
transmitters, push buttons), logic solvers (e.g., programmable logic controllers, relay
based logic), and final elements (e.g., safety valves, circuit breakers). To be defined as
a SIS, at least one element must be based on E/E/PE technology.
Producers of SIS components and complete SIS applications must comply with a
number of requirements, such as customer requirements, corporate requirements, reg-
ulatory requirements, and technical requirements [11, 38]. Regulatory requirements
give overall requirements for what the SIS shall do and how well it shall perform for
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a particular industry application. In addition, regulatory requirements may address
product safety, that is how the product must be designed to avoid risk to those oper-
ating or maintaining the product. Customer requirements may reflect many aspects
of the regulatory requirements as it is in the interest of the customer to develop safe
and reliable products. However, customers may add requirements for operation avail-
ability, maintainability, and maintenance support. Corporate requirements reflect the
producer’s own objectives, policy, and business goals. Technical requirements may be
addressed in all the previous categories of requirements, or identified during the de-
tailing of SIS design and development. Many of these requirements are related to the
reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) aspects of the SIS.
For design and operation of SIS, many national authorities make reference to the
IEC 61508 [20], or its sector specific implementations as recommended practise. It is
therefore important that the SIS producers adapt key requirements from these standards
for their product development. Examples of sector specific standards that build on
the IEC 61508 are the IEC 61511[21] (process industry), IEC 62061[23] (machinery
control systems), IEC 61513 [22] (nuclear power plants), and IEC 60601[19] (medical
equipment). An IEC standard is also being developed for the car industry.
IEC 61508 and some of the related standards use the safety life cycle approach
as framework for structuring SIS requirements. The safety life cycle splits SIS spec-
ification, design, construction, and operation into 16 phases, starting with the initial
concept evaluation and ending up with decommissioning and disposal. In IEC 61508,
SIS design and construction are mainly addressed in phase 9 of the safety life cycle.
For SIS producers, it may be advantageous to use this framework as basis for their
product development. Unfortunately, phase 9 is not very detailed on the product de-
velopment phases as seen from the producer’s perspective. In addition, producers must
have a holistic approach to the specification and adoption of RAMS requirements, so
that also customer requirements, corporate requirements, and technical requirements
are suﬃciently accounted for.
Many authors address product development models and product development chal-
lenges [42, 4, 37, 28, 8, 14, 15, 38]. Product development is viewed from diﬀerent
angles; producer perspective, consumer perspective, or a combination of the two. Un-
fortunately, none of the models seem to take a holistic approach to the specification and
adoption of RAMS requirements, which is an important aspect of SIS development. Pa-
padopoulos & McDermid [42] compare three safety standards, including IEC 61508,
and specify a new safety process for system development which fit into the framework
of the standards. However, maintainability, availability (in terms of operability) and
product safety are not discussed. The product development model proposed by Jack-
son et al. [28], addresses reliability, availability, and maintainability, but has limited
focus on safety related requirements. Murthy et al. [38] suggest a life cycle framework
for decision making regarding product reliability, and indicate that the model may be
suited for a large range of applications, including SIS development.
The main incentive for writing this article is that product development in IEC 61508
(primarily phase 9) can benefit from being structured according to the model by Murthy
et al. [38]. The article presents and discusses the new model from the perspective of
a SIS producer, and suggests how producers may account for RAMS in their product
development. To illustrate the application of the new model, we describe the design
and development of a HIPPS.
The HIPPS is an example of a custom-built product. Custom-built products are
products manufactured to a specific request from a customer, and include specialized
defense and industrial products [38]. Another category is standard products. Standard
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products are manufactured in anticipation of a subsequent demand. Standard products
include all non-durable (short life) products and durable (long life) products and most
commercial and industrial products. This may be a new version of a programmable
logic controller or a new type of pressure transmitter. Standard products and custom-
built products may be produced in small as well as large quantities. However, a HIPPS
is usually tailored made for one particular target application, for example an oﬀshore
oil and gas installation.
The first part of the article discusses important concepts regarding RAMS engineer-
ing and management and SIS, before presenting the safety life cycle of the IEC 61508.
The main part of the article describes the model of Murthy et al. [38] and important
RAMS activities when developing SIS. The article concludes that the development pro-
cess of SIS can benefit from implementing the model of Murthy et al. [38], because it
represents a holistic and structured approach focussing on RAMS performance rather
than safety alone as in the IEC 61508.
2. RAMS Requirements
Good product quality influences business success through satisfied customers, im-
proved market share, and higher productivity [5]. For producers of SIS or SIS com-
ponents, the most important dimensions of product quality are; reliability, availability,
safety, and maintainability. A producer must therefore identify and ensure proper adop-
tion of all relevant RAMS requirements.
We may split RAMS requirements into the following main categories, as illustrated
in Fig. 1:
• Functional safety and safety integrity requirements
• Product safety requirements
• Operation availability requirements
• Maintainability and maintenance support requirements
The producer must develop a RAMS specification where all the relevant require-
ments are included. This specification may be an extension of the SIS safety require-
ment specification (SRS) that is defined in IEC 61508. In the following sub sections,
we briefly discuss some main aspects of the four categories.
2.1. Functional Safety and Safety Integrity
Functional safety and safety integrity are key concepts in IEC 61508 for describing
the desired performance of a SIS. Functional safety concerns the overall safety of a
plant or a system, but may be detailed down to the required functionality of the SIS.
The required SIS functions are deduced from a hazard and risk analysis of the plant or
system, that is called equipment under control (EUC) by [20]. Safety integrity is used
to describe how well the SIS must perform and is therefore a measure of SIS reliability.
Safety integrity is defined as the probability that the SIS is able to perform the required
safety functions under all the stated conditions and within a stated period of time [20].
IEC 61508 distinguishes between four safety integrity levels (SIL), where SIL 1
is the lowest level and SIL 4 is the highest. To comply with a SIL, it is necessary to
demonstrate that each safety instrumented function (SIF) that is implemented by the
SIS, is within the specified reliability range, and that a number of measures have been
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implemented to avoid, reveal, and control random hardware failures, software failures,
and systematic failures. A systematic failure is a failure related in a deterministic way
to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or
of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant
factors [20].
Safety 
instrumented system
IEC 61508 + sector spec.
Customer requirements 
Functional safety
and system integrity
Product safety 
Laws and regulations
Product liability
Operation availability
Customer requirement
Competitive argument
Maintainability
Customer requirement
Competitive argument
Figure 1: RAMS aspects of a SIS
For custom-built products, the customer usually specifies the SIFs and their as-
sociated SIL. For standard products, the producer must themselves identify these re-
quirements. In some cases, the producer may use similar products on the market as
reference. In other cases, they must start with the EUC and from that point identify the
required functionality and reliability.
IEC 61508 classifies SIS as either operating on demand or in high demand mode.
Demand is here a request that requires response by the SIS. On demand systems (also
called low demand systems) are passive during normal operation, and typically experi-
ence less than one demand per year. Here, a separate system is used for plant or system
control during normal operation. As the SIS is normally passive, a SIS failure may not
have an immediate eﬀect. Dangerous failures of a low demand SIS are only manifested
when a demand occurs. This is, for example, the case for an airbag system with a “fail
to activate” failure mode.
A high demand SIS experiences demands frequently, typically several times per
year. In some cases, the high demand systems are operated almost continuously. Most
control functions of a high demand SIS have direct eﬀect on safety, and a failure may
lead to an immediate hazardous event. The ABS in a car or in an airplane is an exam-
ple of a SIS that operates in a high demand mode, since heavy braking occurs rather
frequently. If the ABS fails to operate, this may lead to immediate harm.
Separate reliability measures and ranges are required for on demand and high de-
mand systems. For on demand systems, IEC 61508 uses the (average) probability of
failure on demand (PFD) as a measure of reliability, whereas the probability of a dan-
gerous failure per hour (PFH) is used for high demand systems. The reliability or
availability may be calculated based on a reliability model, for example a reliability
block diagram, a fault tree, a Markov transition diagram, or a Petri net [43]. Some reli-
ability models are more suitable for including maintenance and testing strategies than
others [43, 25, 45].
IEC 61508 recognizes that all failures are not safety-critical. The standard distin-
guishes between:
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• Dangerous failures: i.e., failures that may prevent execution of a safety function,
and where the safety function will be unavailable until the failure is detected and
corrected.
• Safe failures: i.e., failures that do not prevent the execution of the safety func-
tion, or otherwise do not cause a hazardous situation. A spurious (non-intended)
activation of a safety function is sometimes defined as a safe failure. A safe fail-
ure does usually not aﬀect the availability of the safety function, but the EUC
may be unavailable for some time.
The failure classification is important to consider when calculating the PFH or the
PFD. In addition, the failure classification is important for calculating the safe failure
fraction (SFF) [31, 30, 35]. This parameter is used to determine the architectural con-
straints for the hardware configuration. The architectural constraints define minimum
hardware fault tolerance of a configuration, or the number of dangerous failures to be
tolerated before the SIS is unable to perform a SIF. To determine if a failure is safe
or dangerous, it is necessary to assess the application specific conditions. A spurious
activation is, for example, not always safe, such as an airbag on the driver’s side that is
activated while driving a car.
The SIS reliability is also influenced by the (potential) presence of common cause
failures (CCF) [20, 43, 47, 46, 16]. A CCF is a failure that aﬀects two or more com-
ponents (close to) simultaneously due to a shared cause [20, 21], and may reduce the
eﬀect of hardware fault tolerance [33]. IEC 61508 and related standards require that
measures are taken to avoid CCF during all phases of SIS development. All measures
that concern avoidance of systematic and software failures have a positive eﬀect on
avoidance of CCF [32].
Most SIS in the process industry are operating on demand. The diagnostic cover-
age of dangerous failure, is along with the length of the functional test intervals, the
factors that highly influence the PFD. The diagnostic coverage is defined as the fraction
of dangerous failures detected by online diagnostic systems to the total number of dan-
gerous failures [20, 31]. Some components have comprehensive diagnostic features,
like smart transmitters and PE logic solvers, while other components, like shutdown
valves, have just a few of these features.
2.2. Product Safety Requirements
Producers must take reasonable care regarding the safety performance of their prod-
ucts, related to all types of intended use and foreseeable misuse of the product. Product
safety requirements are mainly given in laws, regulations, and standards, or stated by
customers of specialized products.
For custom-built products, safety requirements are often included in the overall
requirements from the customer. Obligations to fulfill safety requirements in laws,
regulations, and standards are often explicitly stated in the requirement documents.
For standard products, the producer has to identify all relevant safety requirements
and integrate these into the development process.
For products developed for the European market, the producer must document com-
pliance to the product safety directives, for example GPSD [13]. One example is equip-
ment used in areas with explosive atmospheres, that must comply to ATEX 94/9/EC [2]
or similar standards. Another example is electrical systems, for example power distri-
bution systems and electrical apparatus. They must be designed in accordance with
directives on electromagnetic compatibility.
5
Product hazards may arise from failures (e.g., spurious activation of an airbag)
or from design features of the product (e.g., sharp edges, toxic materials). Product
hazard and risk analyses have to be integrated into the product development process to
minimize the risk related to such hazards [27].
2.3. Operation Availability
Operation availability may be defined as the fraction of time a system is able to
perform the intended functions [43].
Unintended operation of the SIS may lead to reduced operation availability. A
spurious closure of a HIPPS valve may lead to shutdown of the plant or at least a
process section. Testing and maintenance are other activities that may aﬀect operation
availability. If the ABS system in a car indicates a failure, the driver has to take the car
to the workshop. If a HIPPS valve has an external leakage, it may be necessary to shut
down the EUC to perform necessary repair.
When the product is custom-built, the customer may provide operation availabil-
ity targets for the SIS. For standard products, operation availability may be specified
based on competitive arguments. Lack of adequate availability may lead to product
recall, lawsuits, or loss of market share and reputation. It is therefore important for
the producer to analyze the product and demonstrate its ability to meet the specified
operation availability targets.
NORSOK Z-016 [39] is a Norwegian standard for the oil and gas industry on pro-
duction availability. The standard suggests a framework for determination and follow-
up of production availability. This standard is currently being used as a basis for devel-
opment of an ISO standard on the same topic.
2.4. Maintainability and Maintenance Support
Maintainability and maintenance support are features of the SIS that become ev-
ident once the product is put into operation. Maintainability is a design feature that
describes the ease by which an item can be maintained or repaired [18]. Testability is
a similar concept that describes the ease and speed by which an item can be tested. A
subsea HIPPS valve is sometimes welded to the pipeline, and to repair such a valve
is a complicated and time-consuming operation. The maintainability of the valve is
therefore rather low. The testability is also low, as the EUC must be shut down while
performing a full stroke operation of the HIPPS valves.
Maintenance support is the ability of a maintenance organization, under given con-
ditions, to provide upon demand, the resources required to maintain an item, under a
given maintenance policy [18]. Dedicated test and maintenance tools are often devel-
oped as part of the total product delivery. For subsea systems, the test and maintenance
tools may sometimes be more complex and more expensive than the products they are
associated to.
The producer must consider maintainability when selecting hardware and software
design, and prepare for maintenance support. In some cases, the producer may be
responsible for product maintenance, for example overhaul, and must establish the
necessary resources and facilities for maintenance support.
3. RAMS Performance and Management
Successful products perform very close to its desired performance. In our context,
performance is related to the RAMS properties of a product, and measured relatively
to the RAMS specification.
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We may distinguish between the desired RAMS performance, the predicted RAMS
performance, and the actual RAMS performance. Usually, the desired RAMS perfor-
mance emanates from RAMS requirements that were discussed in Section 2. A suc-
cessful product has a very narrow gap between the desired performance and the actual
RAMS performance. The actual RAMS performance is demonstrated when the SIS or
the SIS component is released to market and installed at the particular target applica-
tion. The actual performance is not linked to the product properties alone, but is also
influenced by its development process, operation and maintenance; important elements
of the product life cycle.
Moving from customer needs and a desired RAMS performance to a satisfactory
actual RAMS performance, involves a design process ensuring that all relevant product
requirements are specified and evaluated. During the design and construction process,
we may estimate the product’s performance by analysis, simulation, testing, and so on.
This estimate may be referred to as the predicted RAMS performance, and may be split
into four categories of analyses corresponding to the requirements illustrated in Fig. 1.
To ensure proper employment of RAMS requirements during product development,
the producer must establish a RAMS management system. RAMS management may
be defined as a process which supports [24]:
• Definition of RAMS requirements
• Assessment and control of threats to RAMS
• Planning and implementation of RAMS tasks
• Achievement of compliance to RAMS requirements
• On-going monitoring, during the life cycle, of compliance.
An important part of the RAMS management system is the management of func-
tional safety. Management of functional safety is used in IEC 61508 to describe man-
agement and technical activities which are necessary to achieve the specified func-
tional safety. From the producer perspective, management of functional safety should
describe all activities required to design and construct a SIS according to the speci-
fied functional safety and safety integrity requirements. Such activities may be design
reviews, probabilistic reliability analysis, failure modes and eﬀects analysis (FMEA),
various types of testing of software and hardware, and assessment of procedures, work
practises and tools with respect to IEC 61508 or related requirements.
To the list of management of functional safety activities, it is necessary to add oper-
ation availability analysis, maintainability analysis, and maintenance support analysis.
4. Product Development
IEC 61508 and related standards use the safety life cycle as a framework to structure
requirements. The safety life cycle is a sequence of phases, each containing a number
of tasks, covering the total life of a system. For producers, it may be important to align
their product development with the relevant phases of the safety life cycle model. In
this Section, we first introduce the main phases of the safety life cycle, and then suggest
how the safety life cycle may be merged with the model of Murthy et al. [38].
7
1 Concept
2 Overall scopedefinition
3 Hazard and riskanalysis
4 Overall safety requirements
5 Safety requirementsallocation
6 Overall
operation and
maintenance
planning
7 Overall
safety
validation
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commissioning
planning
Overall planning 9 Safety related systems:
E/E/PES
Realisation
(see E/E/PES
safety lifecycle)
10 Safety related systems:
other technology
Realisation
11 External riskreduction
facilities
Realisation
12 Overall installationand commissioning
13 Overall safetyvalidation
14 Overall operation, maintenance and repair
16 Decommissioningor disposal
15 Overall modificationand retrofit
Back to appropriate
overall safety lifecycle
phase
Figure 2: The safety life cycle of IEC 61508 [20]
4.1. The Safety Life Cycle in IEC 61508
IEC 61508 splits the safety life cycle into 16 phases as shown in Fig. 2.
The safety life cycle starts with the definition of the EUC, and continues with the
identification of the EUC related hazards and risk. The hazard and risk analysis is used
to specify safety functions. Based on tools and methods provided by the standard, the
necessary risk reduction that is to be provided by the safety functions are defined. The
safety functions may be realized by SIS (E/E/PE technology), other technology or other
risk reduction facilities. The realization of the two latter categories of safety systems is
not covered by the standard.
Parallel to the realization of the SIS, the standard requires planning and preparation
for the subsequent phases of overall installation, commissioning, validation, operation,
and maintenance. In this context, overall means that all safety systems are considered.
In the operation and maintenance phase, IEC 61508 focuses on how to operate and
maintain the SIS in accordance with the functional safety and safety integrity require-
ments. This includes failure recording and analysis.
The SIS modification phase addresses necessary analyses of minor and major mod-
ifications of the SIS. IEC 61508 requires that all modifications are carefully analyzed
with respect to their impact on the EUC, the EUC risk, the SIS hardware and soft-
ware, and the operation and maintenance procedures, tools, and practises. The impact
analysis should suggest the return to an appropriate safety life cycle phase for imple-
mentation.
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Phase 4
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Figure 3: Product life cycle model, from the perspective of a producer [38]
The safety life cycle embraces SIS design and construction as well as SIS opera-
tion. This means that all phases may not be relevant from the producer’s perspective.
The producer’s responsibility is often restricted to SIS realization (phase 9), but in
some cases, the producer may be involved in the overall system integration, installa-
tion, commissioning, and safety validation. Some producers may also be involved in
product follow-up and modifications. In fact, within some industry sectors it is a trend
that product performance is purchased instead of being inherent in products. This
means that the producer is responsible for the product use (or operation), and must also
ensure adequate maintenance and repair.
For custom-built products, the customer may wish to be more involved in the prod-
uct development phase. The customer may want to participate in design reviews and
witness product testing. Development of standard products may be without any exter-
nal involvement at all, or the producer may decide to involve intended users at certain
stages during the product development.
4.2. New Life Cycle Model for Product Development
Murthy et al. [38] have recently developed a new model to assist producers in
accomplishing the desired product performance. The model consists of three stages
(pre-development, development, and post-development), three levels (business, prod-
uct, and component), and eight phases, shown in Fig. 3.
The three stages and levels are:
• Stage I (Pre-development): This stage is concerned with a non-physical (or ab-
stract) conceptualization of the product with increasing level of detail.
• Stage II (Development): This stage deals with the physical embodiment of the
product through research and development and prototyping.
• Stage III (Post-development): This stage is concerned with the remainder of the
product life cycle (e.g., production, sale, use) subsequent to the new product
development.
• Level I (Business level): This level is concerned with linking the business objec-
tives for a new product to desired product attributes.
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• Level II (Product level): This level links product attributes to product charac-
teristics (the distinction between attributes and characteristics are described in
[38]). The product is treated as a black-box.
• Level III (Component level): This level is concerned with linking product char-
acteristics to lower level product characteristics, at an increasing level of detail.
Based on these stages and levels, the model outlines eight phases of product de-
velopment. The model portrays its phases as being sequential, but the necessity of
iteration is illustrated by the arrows between phases.
The main advantage of this product development model is the split between prod-
uct specification, pre-qualification, final construction, product use, and overall product
evaluation. The model describes the process of linking business objectives for a new
product to desired product attributes and components. A successful design process,
from gathering of user needs to the transformation of requirements into an optimal
product design solution, is based on eﬀective decision making in an overall business
perspective. Hence, the model of Murthy et al. [38] represent a more holistic approach
to development of SIS.
In the next section, we describe the content of the eight phases of the new model,
and how RAMS performance can be suﬃciently catered for in the development process
of a new SIS.
5. RAMS Management in the Product Life Cycle
The previous parts of the article have discussed general challenges when developing
a SIS. In the following, we will demonstrate how the product development model by
Murthy et al. [38] may be used for development of a SIS, taking into account RAMS
aspects and the main requirements for product development in IEC 61508. To illustrate
this implementation, we use a the development of a HIPPS as an example. A HIPPS
may be implemented in several ways, see for example [3, 34, 50].
A HIPPS is a custom-built product, where the main functionality is specified by
the customer. A HIPPS is used to protect against overpressure in pipelines or vessels
that are not designed for the maximum pressure that may arise from e.g., well shut-ins
(i.e., the maximum wellhead pressure) and sudden downstream blockage (e.g., spurious
closure of a downstream valve). The HIPPS monitors the pressure in the oil or gas
pipeline, and if the pressure exceeds a pre-determined level, dedicated valves are closed
to avoid further pressure build-up that may cause pipeline rupture.
A HIPPS comprises pressure transmitters, logic solver(s), solenoid-operated hy-
draulic control valves, and fast-closing shutdown valves. The main components are
illustrated in Fig. 4. For illustration, we have included a single logic solver, a sin-
gle shutdown valve, and two pressure transmitters voted 1-out-of-2, meaning that one
transmitter must detect a high pressure to initiate valve closure [43]. In a real situa-
tion, there may be more than two pressure transmitters to detect high pressures and
more than two shutdown valves available to stop flow. However, for this case study, the
focus is on the development process and not to present an actual HIPPS configuration.
Regarding the development of the HIPPS, we assume that the customer is an oil
company. We further assume that the HIPPS producer does not develop hardware and
software themselves, but are responsible for the integration of HIPPS hardware and
software that are supplied by subcontractors. The initial phases of the safety life cy-
cle of IEC 61508 are performed by the customer, including concept evaluation, overall
10
SIS
logic solver
PT PTPressure transmitters
To process
control system
Actuator
Solenoid
Pilot valve
Tank
Pump
Shutdown valve
Pipeline
Figure 4: Simplified illustration of the HIPPS
scope definition, hazard and risk analysis, and requirements specification and alloca-
tion. Based on this analysis, the customer orders the HIPPS from the producer, who
then becomes involved in the realization part (phase 9, Fig. 2) of the safety life cycle.
In this case study, we assume that a SIL 3 target has been set for the HIPPS.
The remainder of this section discusses the HIPPS development process for the
producer in line with the models of Murthy et al. [38] and IEC 61508, but with focus
on the RAMS-related activities in the various phases.
Phase 1. involves identifying the need for a new product or the need for modifica-
tions of an existing product in accordance with business objectives and strategies of the
company and the customer needs for the product. A key aspect of phase 1 for standard
products is the product definition. The product must fulfil business objectives as well
as customer requirements. Customer requirements may not be given explicitly, and
market and competitive analysis may be required to capture the customer expectations
of product performance [38].
The need for the HIPPS and several RAMS requirements are already pre-determined
when the development process starts. The risk analysis performed by the customer has
lead to a SIL requirement for the HIPPS, which puts constraints to the solution space
for the producer. Thus, phase 1 of the model implies a process at two levels for the
producer; (1) their overall business strategy regarding which type of products and ser-
vices they will develop, and (2) the development of this particular HIPPS. The main
activities in phase 1 consist of sorting out and making agreements with the customer
about the delivery, which in this case is the HIPPS.
The HIPPS is subject to several RAMS requirements, and during phase 1 it is im-
portant to establish and enforce overall strategies and frameworks for the management
of RAMS during product development. One task is to develop a RAMS policy, which
states the management commitments to RAMS principles, and outlines the main strat-
egy for achieving RAMS policy. The overall RAMS policy should be rooted at the
business level, constituting an umbrella for all development activities. Regarding the
HIPPS, the specific RAMS activities emanate from the overall policy, but the extent
and content of the activities may vary from one project to another. With reference to
the discussions in Section 3, RAMS management reflect the main principles of man-
agement of functional safety in IEC 61508.
The RAMS management activities should be listed in a RAMS management plan,
containing overall product development guidelines, verification, and validation activi-
ties, being adjusted depending on the product to be developed. In short, a RAMS man-
agement plan describes all RAMS related activities in each product life cycle phase, it
11
identifies persons, departments, and organizations responsible for the diﬀerent phases
and tasks of product development. Further, the plan identifies competence require-
ments and training of personnel involved in product development, and makes reference
to company procedures, tools, and methods for product development. References to
other governing documents, for example standards, such as the IEC 61508 [20], direc-
tives, such as the GPSD [13], regulations, and guidelines, should also be included, as
well as requirements to documentation in each phase of the product life cycle.
To take advantage of previous product development processes and experiences, a
critical items and hazard list should be established, in which failures and hazards re-
lated to similar products are recorded and evaluated. This list can be used as a starting
point to identify and evaluate potential hazards in the design of the HIPPS, and should
also be part of the RAMS management plan. Verification and validation are important
activities in all phases of the project development process, and these activities should
be planned for and rooted in the RAMS management plan.
Verification and validation have slightly diﬀerent meaning [14, 15, 48]. Verification
may be understood as an activity in which the deliverables from any stage (e.g., product
life cycle phase) are compared to the specifications developed in the previous stages
[48]. Verification activities may for example be design and documentation reviews,
FMECA, HAZOP, and testing. For software verification, the V-model may apply [20].
Validation may be defined as the confirmation that a product meets the specification and
that it is appropriate for the intended use. In an initial phase, validation is performed
prior to detailed design to gain confidence in that the product concept will satisfy the
desired performance [14]. Later in the development process, at the stage where the
product has been constructed and is ready for start-up or release to market, validation
is conducted to prove that the HIPPS works as intended [48].
Validation activities may be included in what IEC 61508 refers to as functional
safety assessments (FSA). However, the scope of an FSA goes beyond validation. An
FSA should also examine to what extent procedures, tools, methods, and design prin-
ciples meet the requirements of IEC 61508, or its sector or application specific imple-
mentations. If these product development tools and procedures have previously been
approved according to IEC 61508 (or similar), an FSA may verify if they are followed.
Establishment of RAMS controlling documents is necessary if not already available.
Controlling documents should include procedures, work processes, tools, and methods
that address RAMS aspects and the requirements for functional safety according to
IEC 61508 or its related standards if they apply. For the HIPPS development, the pro-
cedures, tools, and methods must be aligned with the requirements for SIL 3. Some
work process requirements prevail regardless of the specified SIL, whereas other re-
quirements are “SIL-dependent”. IEC 61508 includes a number of tables that concern
identification, avoidance, and control of random hardware failures, software failures,
and systematic failures, where each requirement is defined as mandatory, highly rec-
ommended, recommended, or not recommended depending on the SIL. The documen-
tation should address the handling of ; (1) non-conformities, deviations, and recom-
mendations from verification, validation, and testing activities, and (2) management of
change, including authorities for approving and follow-up of product modifications.
The RAMS policy, the RAMS management plan, and controlling documents are
the overall framework for the HIPPS development. More specific documents tailor-
made for each project, is the RAMS specification of desired product performance for
reliability/availability, maintainability and safety. For custom-built products, such as
the HIPPS, the RAMS specification may be deduced from the customer safety require-
ment specification (SRS). The SRS is used by IEC 61508 as the overall specification of
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functional safety and safety integrity requirements. For standard products, the RAMS
specification is developed by the producer. The RAMS specification should have a dual
focus on performance requirements and design constraints, and ensure that they reflect
the intended use, support, testing and maintenance. Regarding the HIPPS, the producer
will have to negotiate and come to terms with the customer about RAMS requirements.
Phase 2. is, along with phase 3, the most important phases from a producer’s per-
spective. Based on the overall RAMS requirements determined in phase 1, the product
characteristics are decided in phase 2. The objectives of phase 2 are to transform the
desired performance from phase 1 into a physical product, with sub-systems and com-
ponents, and to develop a preliminary product design which may be used as basis for
comparing the predicted performance with desired RAMS performance. The charac-
teristics are technical in nature, and should consider the desired performance as well as
the possible misuse of the product.
The SIL requirement influences how phases 3 and 4 are executed. First, the required
SIL aﬀects the work processes, which should be reflected in the controlling documents.
Second, the required SIL influences the selection of software language, programming
tools, and programming methods. Third, the required SIL influences the selection of
hardware architecture and hardware components. Here, reliability analysis must be
performed to verify if the proposed product design is able to meet the specified SIL.
The main RAMS activities in phase 2 are to:
• Detail the RAMS requirements into product characteristics. For the HIPPS, it is
important to review of IEC 61508, or its sector/application specific implemen-
tations, to identify additional requirements that concern hardware and software
characteristics (architecture, diagnostic features, behavior upon fault conditions).
• Develop a preliminary product description, of the system, its sub-systems, and
components.
• Communicate and enforce work procedures that ensure product design in accor-
dance with IEC 61508 or its sector specific implementation.
• Conduct design reviews, one or several depending on the complexity of the prod-
uct, should be carried out to assess how well the design at a given point in time
reflects the desired product performance. In general, the results from the design
review document justify design decisions [6, 17].
• Perform reliability analyses, for example:
– Establish top-level functional model and carry out functional analysis.
– List all assumptions made for the reliability assessment.
– Perform top-down FMEA [43], of the product and its foreseeable misuse
– Establish preliminary reliability model (e.g., by reliability block diagram,
fault tree, or Markov model) [43] and make a preliminary reliability predic-
tion. For the HIPPS, this means to calculate the PFD based on an initially
selected testing strategy and component failure rates.
– Allocate reliability targets to sub-systems (e.g., reliability apportionment
of PFD requirements, for example 35% to input elements, 15% to logic
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solvers, and 50% to final elements). This allocation is important as reli-
ability of components and subsystems must be specified in contracts with
subcontractors.
– Verify the hardware architecture against the architectural constraints [33]
– Propose modifications and follow-up based on the results from the reliabil-
ity assessment and the FMEA.
– Perform human reliability analysis [12, 29], if human errors may have a
major impact on the product reliability. In case of the HIPPS, the system
is installed subsea and rarely subject to direct human activities. However,
maintenance operations performed by remotely operated vehicles (ROV)
are controlled by humans, and such activities may be considered for analy-
sis.
• Perform operability analysis. For the HIPPS, this means to predict how the
HIPPS related spurious activations, testing activities, and maintenance activities
aﬀect operability due.
• Perform maintainability analysis. In case of the HIPPS, this means to analyze if
the product has suﬃcient inherent features that facilitate maintenance and testing
according to the specified requirements.
• Perform product safety analysis. Since the HIPPS is a system that is installed
subsea, it has limited potential to cause damage to humans. However, the HIPPS
may aﬀect the environment if the valves or piping leak, and the causes and eﬀects
of such events should be analyzed.
• Assess if there are new conflicts arisen between the functional safety and safety
integrity, product safety, operability, and maintainability, and decide how to han-
dle them. In case of the HIPPS, a SIL requirement may imply that two shutdown
valves have to be installed. Having two valves, may reduce the operability due
to more (potential) spurious activations, testing, and maintenance. One means to
compensate for the reduced operability may be to introduce partial stroke testing
[32, 35, 49].
• Update the RAMS specification based on the description of product characteris-
tics and the results from the reliability, operability, product safety, and maintain-
ability analyses.
• Initiate planning for product testing, product installation and commissioning (al-
ternatively, market release).
• Update the critical items and hazard list, based on findings from the reliability,
operability, product safety, and maintainability analysis.
• Perform an FSA with focus on the RAMS specification and its completeness
according to the identified product requirements, the RAMS management plan
and the RAMS policy.
• Update the product RAMS specification as a requirement for the next phase.
• Decide whether or not the RAMS performance is adequate to proceed to the next
phase.
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Phase 3. involves detail design of product, placement of orders for components to be
purchased, and preparation of initial product construction and testing. All functions
identified in phase 2 are transformed into a (product) design specification describing
the individual components and their relevant properties [38]. The design specification
is used as basis for the specification of components to be purchased. This is the start
of product development for subcontractors, and may involve new technology develop-
ment.
In case of the HIPPS, we may assume that all components are available on the
market, but that some additional challenges may be expected due to high temperature
and high pressure conditions.
RAMS activities in phase 3 are to:
• Develop product design specifications for components (including new develop-
ments) to be purchased from subcontractors. It is important that the specifica-
tions address desired features for diagnostics and component behavior upon fault
conditions. In case of the HIPPS, the producer needs to purchase pressure trans-
mitters, logic solvers, valves, and piping/cables. In addition, the producer must
specify and prepare for interfaces with other systems, for example the process
control system and other SIS, for status presentation and alarm notifications.
• Follow-up of subcontractors, and verify that the components achieve the desired
RAMS performance.
• Follow-up and control product safety design features (e.g., sharp edges, gaps)
of components and assemblies and assure that these do not cause unnecessary
hazards. For the HIPPS, the focus of product safety may be on the avoidance of
environmental hazards.
• Update the reliability analysis, operability and maintainability analyses from
phase 2, with new information on component failure rates and characteristics.
• Maintain and update the critical items and hazard list.
• Perform design review at intermediate stages of the detailed design. In the case
of the HIPPS, the producer may perform internal design reviews as well as par-
ticipating in design reviews performed by subcontractors. Design reviews should
focus on the intended use as well as foreseeable misuse.
• Develop plans for assembling of components that need pre-quantification before
the final product is constructed. In case of the HIPPS, one may want to build a
test facility to test the shutdown valves, to verify that the valves are able to close
within the specified time and with the specified pressure drop.
• Update the product design specification as a requirement for the next phase.
• Develop initial versions of operation (user) and maintenance manuals and in-
structions.
• Perform safety analyses of scheduled activities in phases 4 and 5 that may expose
humans or environment to risk, for example activities related to construction,
installation, and testing.
• Start preparing for maintenance support, that is the development of testing aids,
support services and so on.
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• Assess hazards related to product disposal. Some products may contain materials
and substances hazardous to human health and environment, and thus, disposal,
dismantling and recycling should be planned for during the development process
[51].
• Decide whether or not the RAMS performance is adequate to proceed to the next
phase.
Phases 4, 5, and 6 will be diﬀerent for products that are developed in high numbers
than for a one of a kind product.
Phase 4. and phase 5 constitute the first stage of product qualification. The main ob-
jectives of phase 4 are to build one or more prototypes and test them in a controlled
environment against the desired performance. For products to be produced in high
numbers, the prototype may be a complete product. For a one of a kind product, the
prototype may be the construction of some selected subsystems that require further test-
ing before the final construction of the product is started. When the prototype involves
new technology, it is important to adhere to procedures and guidelines on qualification
of new technology, for example as in [10].
The process of prototype development starts at the component level, before con-
tinuing with all subsystem levels until the product as a whole is finally reached [38].
In case of the HIPPS, phase 4 may include construction, integration, and testing of
logic solver hardware and software, including input/output cards, drivers, and commu-
nication. Or as mentioned in phase 3, to install and test the shutdown valves in a test
facility.
The main RAMS activities in phase 4 are to:
• Verify that the specified procedures, work practises, and tools are adhered to so
that systematic failures are avoided, revealed and followed up.
• Perform function testing of prototype components, taking into account reliability,
maintainability and operability requirements. The function testing should also
address behavior upon fault conditions and foreseeable misuse.
• Update the product safety analysis to find out if new hazards have been intro-
duced.
• Perform various type of reliability testing, for example stress testing or acceler-
ated testing to reveal if the product can lead to problems in over-stress situations.
• Document the qualification of new technology according to relevant guidelines
and procedures, for example as in [10].
• Update and follow up of the critical items and hazard list.
• Update product documentation and product description
• Review and update the reliability and operability analyses with new information
and data.
• Prepare operational testing, including establishment of system for customer feed-
back on product performance.
• Decide whether or not the RAMS performance is adequate to proceed to the next
phase.
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The testing done in phase 4 is limited, because it is most often carried out in con-
trolled conditions, such as in a laboratory. Thus, the RAMS performance is reflected
through the predicted performance of the product. When developing custom built prod-
ucts, produced in very few numbers, the costs for complete product tests may be un-
reasonable. Then the RAMS characteristics or procedures are tested, for example, by
use of engineering analyses, analogy, laboratory test, functional mockups, or model
simulation [51]. In such cases, phase 4 is the last phase before the production starts in
phase 6 [38].
For standard products, often a prototype of the product is released to a limited num-
ber of potential customers. This occurs in phase 5.
Phase 5. consists of operational testing, which means in some cases that selected cus-
tomers keep a log of the relevant information about how the product works. This in-
formation is used to assess field safety performance and to make design changes, if
necessary. Influence from factors like the usage intensity and the operating environ-
ment may reveal additional hazards, contributing to a more complete picture of the
actual product field performance. For some products, like cars, the products are tested
in in a wide span of environments to reveal hazards and operational problems.
The main RAMS-related activities in phase 5 are to:
• Perform operational testing under various operational and environmental condi-
tions.
• Record and classify all non-conformities, and allocate responsibilities for their
follow-up.
• Analyze customer feedback on product performance.
• Update and follow up critical items and hazard list.
• Decide whether or not the RAMS performance is adequate to start producing the
product.
Since there will be no temporary HIPPS installed subsea, it is not relevant to talk
about operational testing of a prototype in its true environment. However, some oper-
ational testing may still be performed under similar operational conditions. If compo-
nents are to keep tight under exposure of high temperatures and high pressures, they
may be tested under such conditions while submerged in a basin/pool.
The final qualification of the product may be a factory acceptance test (FAT). When
the product is custom-built, the customer may witness the test and make the formal ap-
proval of the prototype based on test results.
Phase 6. covers the physical production of the product. This may imply large scale
production which is often the case for standard products, or the final construction of a
single product at the target application, which is often the case for a custom-built prod-
uct. The production process has to be adapted so that the product achieves the desired
performance. This means that the production process must not introduce new failures
or have any other negative impact on reliability, safety, operability, or maintainability
characteristics of the product. When the production process is fine tuned, the full scale
production of the product can start [38].
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To ensure that the actual performance of the product matches the desired perfor-
mance, quality assurance is important. An eﬀective quality control system is consid-
ered from the early design phases, and covers all parts of the production process [44].
Product batches are tested to eliminate defects, assembly errors, and early failures. If,
during testing, a significant number of items are found not to conform with the de-
sired safety standards, the root causes should be found. Root causes may be related to
component quality or to the production process, and corrective action should be taken
[1].
Acceptance testing is used to test raw materials, parts and components when re-
ceived from suppliers to decide if the items are acceptable or not with respect to prod-
uct performance requirements [6]. Specialized and complex products may be subject
to a series of tests before they are delivered to the customer [38].
RAMS-related tasks in this phase are:
• Ensure quality control or product samples and production process. In the case of
the HIPPS, quality control should focus on verification of construction, instal-
lation, and commissioning. Focus should also be directed to the avoidance of
construction, installation and commissioning errors.
• For large scale production; Do conformance checking of product samples to
weed out non-conforming items.
• Perform safety analyses of scheduled activities in phase 7 that may expose hu-
mans or environment to risk, for example activities related to operation, cleaning,
testing, maintenance, and disposal.
• Update and finalize operator (user) and maintenance instruction manuals.
• Update and finalize maintenance support preparation.
In case of the HIPPS, this phase concerns the final construction, installation, and
commissioning of the system at site. The phase concludes with the site acceptance test
(SAT), which is witnessed by the customer.
Phase 7. marks the start of the product life cycle for the customer, because this is when
the product is put into operation. The phase can be divided into several sub-phases,
which according to ISO 12100 [26] consists of:
• Transport, assembly, and installation (at site or at the final destination)
• Commissioning
• Use of the product, including:
– Setting, teaching/programming or process changeover
– Operation
– Cleaning
– Fault finding
– Maintenance
– Repair/overhaul
– Testing
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• De-commissioning, dismantling, and related to safety; disposal.
Phase 7 is when the product’s RAMS performance, that should be integrated from
early on in the product development process, is challenged and tested in the field. A
safe and reliable product reflects a development process in which RAMS requirements
have been taken seriously. In this phase, the RAMS activities for the producer of the
HIPPS include:
• Data collection and evaluation of the product performance (data from customers
and possibly distributors).
• Regular inspection, function testing and maintenance.
• Making decisions regarding “adequate” RAMS performance (and possible ac-
tions if adjustments and improvements are required).
• Updating critical items list, the hazard list and RAMS controlling documents.
• Sharing information with users and possibly distributors regarding unrevealed
failures.
Customer feedback is necessary to attain input data for customer satisfaction mea-
surements and product improvements [36]. Brombacher [7] points out that actual field
reliability performance should be considered in product development processes, to im-
prove the quality of reliability predictions. Still, it may be diﬃcult to get systematic
feedback from customers. Regarding the HIPPS, where performance monitoring is re-
quired by the IEC 61508 and regulatory authorities, the customer may see the benefit of
cooperating so that suﬃcient statistical significance may be obtained for the data. In the
oil and gas industry, reliability data are collected and published through the Oﬀshore
reliability data (OREDA) handbooks [40, 41].
Phase 8. concludes the product development. Here, the producer assesses the HIPPS
delivery from an overall business perspective. Costs, such as warranty expenses, profits
from sale, and business consequences like product recalls, bad reputation, and liabili-
ties due to inadequate RAMS performance, should be evaluated [38]. These analyses
are enabled by assessing the collected data about RAMS performance and the expenses
regarding reported failures and customer complaints. The main outcome of phase 8
should be to gain organizational learning and insights that are valuable for the devel-
opment of the next product generation [9].
Phase 7 and 8 occur more or less parallel in time, but at diﬀerent levels. Phase 7
encompasses the activities carried out by the responsible engineering and development
team. The business level involves strategic marketing and management decisions based
on results from phase 7.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this article we have integrated RAMS aspects into the model of Murthy et
al. [38], and argued that the approach fits into the framework of safety life cycle of
IEC 61508 [20]. The safety life cycle covers the development of a SIS, including all
phases from “cradle to grave”. The approach has similarities to other system develop-
ment processes, such as the systems engineering process in which a need is identified
and analyzed, before designing, solving the problem, verifying and testing the chosen
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solution [6, 52]. For each phase in the safety life cycle, activities and recommendations
for achieving functional safety are described, addressing not only a single system, but
several that may be included in the EUC.
A SIS, such as the HIPPS, is not only subject to functional safety requirements,
as is the focus of IEC 61508. The technological progress leads to systems performing
an increasing number of tasks, and as a consequence, our activities are getting more
dependent on the ability of the systems to deliver the expected services. This means
that, like any other product, a successful SIS has to possess suﬃcient quality features,
related to reliability, availability, and maintainability performance, along with safety.
By using the model of Murthy et al. [38], we achieve a more holistic development pro-
cess of a SIS, focussing not only on safety performance, but placing equal importance
on RAM requirements, as well. Besides the RAMS performance, there may be other
attributes subject to trade-oﬀs in the requirement specification process, for example,
costs, usability, and aesthetics, depending on type of product or system. In the HIPPS
example, these do not play a prominent part of the development process. For consumer
products, such as cars, these attributes have to be addressed more explicitly.
7. Further work
The focus in this article is mostly on custom-built products, like the HIPPS, but it
would be useful to describe how the model could be applied in a development process
of a standard consumer product. Originally, the model was developed to help produc-
ers’ specify reliability performance of a product. However, whether the model may be
suitable for improving the RAMS performance from a customer’s perspective, should
be further exploited.
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Abstract 
 
Safety instrumented systems are installed to detect hazards and mitigate their 
consequences. Several international standards give requirements and guidance on 
how to design, operate and maintain such systems. Two relevant standards for safety 
instrumented systems in the process industry are the IEC 61508 and the IEC 61511. 
The two standards propose requirements related to how hardware architecture may 
be configured, also referred to as architectural constraints. The main objectives in 
this paper are to clarify the application of these requirements, discuss some of the 
related ambiguities, and propose ways to improve the requirements. 
 
 
Keywords: IEC 61508, IEC 61511, hardware safety integrity, architectural 
constraints, safe failure fraction (SFF) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used in many industrial processes to reduce the 
consequences of process demands on humans, the environment and material assets. 
Process demands may be hazardous events like, e.g., overpressure and gas leakage, 
requiring a response by the SIS. One important aspect of SIS is the ability to perform 
its intended safety functions upon demand. Measures are therefore required to obtain 
reliable design and implementation of SIS hardware and software. 
 
International standards have been developed to ensure that the SIS is designed, 
implemented and operated according to the specified needs. The focus in this paper is 
on SIS applications in the process industry, and here the IEC 61508 [1] and the IEC 
61511 [2] have been widely accepted. Both standards give lifecycle requirements for 
the SIS. IEC 61508 is a generic standard, and is often used by vendors when 
developing new products. IEC 61511 is a sector specific standard for the process 
industry based on the same concepts as IEC 61508, and focusing on the integration of 
certified or proven-in-use hardware and software components. Both standards use the 
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term safety integrity as an expression for the ability of the SIS to perform its intended 
safety functions. 
 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 split the safety integrity into two parts; hardware safety 
integrity and systematic safety integrity. Both parts are important to ensure reliable 
design and implementation of hardware and software. Hardware safety integrity is 
related to random hardware failures, while systematic safety integrity is related to 
systematic failures. The safety integrity is split into four discrete safety integrity 
levels (SIL), SIL1 to SIL4. SIL4 is the level with the most stringent requirements. To 
fulfill a specified SIL, the SIL requirements related to hardware safety integrity as 
well as systematic safety integrity must be met. 
 
The hardware safety integrity requirements comprise two different aspects of SIS 
reliability; 1) the quantified evidence that the safety function is able to meet the 
reliability target and 2) the necessary constraints on the system architecture that 
ensure sufficient fault tolerance. The latter is often referred to as architectural 
constraints. In this context, constraints are a set of requirements that limits the 
designers’ freedom on how the hardware may be configured. 
 
Several papers discuss the application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 [3-12], but few 
papers cover the architectural constraints in a broad perspective. Several guidelines 
and reports on the application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 are available on the 
Internet. One such example is the OLF-070 guideline developed by the Norwegian 
Oil Industry Association [13]. The papers and guidelines address various aspects of 
how the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 requirements should be adopted. The standards 
are not prescriptive, which gives room for different interpretations, and hence opens 
up for new methods, approaches and technology. If inadequate methods and 
technology are selected, they may produce solutions that are not sufficiently safe. 
Rouvroye and van den Blick [14] and Rouvroye and Brombacher [15] compare 
different qualitative and quantitative safety analysis techniques and show that they 
may lead to different results. They conclude that more research is required to assess 
which technique is most suited in different situations. Van Beurden and Van 
Beurden-Amkreutz [16] compare the IEC 61508 and the IEC 61511 requirements on 
architectural constraints, and discuss that, e.g., the standards have different definitions 
of proven-in-use components. Goble [17, 18] discusses several aspects of 
architectural constraints, e.g., the rationale of relating safe failure fraction (SFF) to 
architectural constraints and how different assumptions and estimation techniques 
may lead to different estimates of failure rates.  
 
This paper focuses on the requirements related to architectural constraints. The 
objectives are to clarify the application of these requirements, discuss some of the 
related ambiguities, and propose improvements and areas of further research.  
 
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 discusses basic concepts related to 
hardware safety integrity. Section 3 gives a brief description of the quantitative part 
of hardware safety integrity, and a more detailed presentation of the requirements 
related to the architectural constraints. A four-step procedure is proposed to clarify 
the necessary analytical steps that determine the required hardware architecture. 
Section 4 discusses the ambiguities related to architectural constraints, and section 5 
Proceedings of the 30th ESReDA Seminar, Trondheim, Norway, June 07-08, 2006 
 3
proposes some related improvements. Section 6 gives some final remarks, proposed 
improvements and conclusions. 
 
2. Basic Concepts 
 
In this section the basic concepts related to architectural constraints are discussed and 
clarified. 
 
2.1 Safety instrumented function versus safety instrumented system 
 
A safety instrumented function (SIF) is used to describe the safety functions 
implemented by instrumented technology. The SIS is the physical system 
implementing one or more SIFs. The SIF may be considered as a barrier function, 
while the SIS may be considered as a barrier system [19]. The SIF usually performs 
the following actions or subfunctions; detect process demands, decide what to do and 
act in order to bring the process back to a safe state. The configurations of physical 
components used to implement the subfunctions may be referred to as subsystems. 
The subsystems may comprise input elements like sensors, push buttons and 
switches, logic solvers like programmable electronic solvers (PLC) or hardwired 
logic solvers, and final elements like valves, solenoids and circuit breakers. The 
relationship between a SIF and a SIS is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. SIS versus SIF 
 
The SIL requirements are allocated to a specific SIF. To assess the hardware safety 
integrity, it is therefore necessary to analyze the configurations of the hardware 
architecture that realizes the SIF.  
 
2.2 Failure classification 
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Failures may be classified in many different ways [20, 21]. They may be classified 
according to their causes or according to their effects. IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 use 
both approaches. Failures classified according to their causes may be referred to as 
either random hardware failures or systematic failures. Failures classified according 
to their effects may be referred to as safe or dangerous failures. The four types of 
failures are in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 described as follows: 
 
• Random hardware failures: Failures occurring in random time resulting from a 
variety of degradation mechanisms in the hardware. Usually, only degradation 
mechanisms arising from conditions within the design envelope (natural 
conditions) are considered as random hardware failures. A constant rate of 
occurrence of such failures (ROCOF) is usually assumed. 
• Systematic failures: Failures related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, 
which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design, manufacturing 
process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors. Design 
faults and maintenance procedure deficiencies are examples of causes that may 
lead to systematic failures. 
• Safe failures: Failures that do not prevent the SIS from performing its intended 
safety functions. The immediate consequences of safe failures are typically 
spurious trips or false alarms. However, restoration of a safe failure may in some 
situations be hazardous. 
• Dangerous failures: Failures that prevent the SIS from performing its intended 
function upon a demand. 
 
Safe and dangerous failures may be split into two subcategories, detected and 
undetected. According to IEC 61508 and IEC 61511, detected failures are failures 
that are revealed by online (self) diagnostics. Undetected failures are only revealed 
during periodic proofs tests (often referred to as functional tests). 
 
2.3 Safe failure fraction and hardware fault tolerance 
 
The safe failure fraction (SFF) and the hardware fault tolerance are two important 
parameters related to architectural constraint. The SFF is a parameter that gives the 
fraction of failure rates considered as “safe” versus the total failure rates. In this 
context, “safe” failures comprise safe failures and dangerous failures detected by 
diagnostics. The dangerous detected failures are considered “safe” as it is assumed 
immediate follow-up and repair. It is also assumed that compensating measures are 
implemented to ensure that the level of safety integrity is maintained during this 
period. A compensating measure may be degraded operation of the SIS, which means 
that the SIS changes the voting of redundant channels to reflect that one component is 
not operational. The SIS may for example degrade a configuration voted 2oo3 to a 
1oo2 upon a dangerous detected failure. Here, a KooN configuration is a 
configuration where K out of N channels (or redundant components) must function in 
order to perform the safety function. 
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Another interpretation of SFF is that it gives the fraction of failures not leading to a 
dangerous failure of the safety function [22]. The SFF is calculated from the 
following equation: 
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where ∑λS is the sum of safe failure rates (detected as well as undetected), ∑λDD is 
the sum of dangerous detected failure rates, ∑λDU is the sum of dangerous undetected 
failure rates, , and the ∑λTot is the sum of all failure rates. The application of the SFF 
is further discussed in sections 3.2 and 4. 
 
Fault tolerance is according to IEC 61508 defined as the “ability of a functional unit 
to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors”. The 
hardware fault tolerance measures the number of faults tolerated before the safety 
function is affected. To model the architecture, a reliability block diagram may be 
used. A 1oo2 and a 2oo3 system have a hardware fault tolerance equal to 1 while a 
1oo3 system has a hardware fault tolerance of 2.  
 
3. Hardware Safety Integrity 
 
Some main quantitative and qualitative requirements to hardware safety integrity are 
listed in Table 1. The requirements are found in part 2 of IEC 61508 [23]. A brief 
summary of the requirements is also given by Smith and Simpson [24]. The 
requirements are used to determine or verify the hardware safety integrity level of the 
hardware architecture. The hardware safety integrity level corresponds to the lowest 
SIL obtained from using the qualitative and quantitative requirements. 
 
 
Table 1: Hardware safety integrity requirements [23] 
Quantitative 
requirements 
The probability of failure of safety functions due to random hardware failures shall be 
estimated so that: 
 
The probability of failure of each safety function shall be equal or less than the target 
value 
• The estimation should take into account the following: 
- Hardware architecture (configuration) 
- Dangerous detected and undetected failures 
- Susceptibility with respect to common cause failures utilizing plant specific 
beta-factor 
- Diagnostic coverage of the diagnostic test intervals 
- Repair times for detected failures 
- Proof test intervals (periodic functional tests) 
- The probability of undetected failure of any data communication process 
 
Qualitative 
requirements 
Architectural constraints shall be identified. The architectural constraints limit the 
achievable SIL based on hardware fault tolerance and safe failure fraction (SFF) of 
the subsystem.  
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In the following sections, the applications of these requirements are elaborated in 
more detail.  
 
3.1 Quantitative requirements 
 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 distinguish between a SIS operating in a low demand 
mode and in a high demand (continuous) mode. A demand is a process deviation that 
must be handled by the SIS. Low demand mode means that the SIS experiences a low 
frequency of demands, typically less than once per year. If more frequent demands 
are expected, typically several times a year, the SIS is operating in a high or 
continuous mode.  The probability of SIF failure due to random hardware failures in 
the low demand mode is often quantified as the probability of failure on demand 
(PFD). It is often the average PFD within a proof test interval, and not the time 
dependant PFD that is being used. In the high demand mode, any dangerous 
undetected failure is likely to cause SIF failure. Hence, for SIS operating in the high 
or continuous mode it is often the frequency of dangerous failures to perform the SIF 
(per hour) that is calculated. 
 
A range of PFD values is allocated to each SIL. However, it is the calculated 
probability of a SIF failure that should be compared to the initial risk reduction target, 
and not any other PFD value within the range of the corresponding SIL. This issue is 
also emphasized by Smith and Simpson [24]. 
 
The reliability calculations must consider all requirements addressed in Table 1. IEC 
61508 proposes to use the standard β-factor model for modeling common cause 
failures (CCFs), while IEC 61511 lists a number of alternative approaches. The β-
factor model is discussed, e.g., in Rausand and Høyland [20]. A CCF is a multiple 
failure affecting several or all of the redundant channels, potentially leading to failure 
of the safety function. A channel means here a single component or a group of 
components that independently perform a subfunction. In redundant systems, the 
contribution from CCFs is often the dominant part compared to the contribution from 
single failures. 
 
The petroleum industry in Norway often apply an extended version of the standard β-
factor model, referred to as the PDS method [13, 25]. The PDS method calculates the 
effect of CCFs between 2 or more redundant channels in KooN configurations [26, 
27], and incorporates the effect on PFD from degraded operation and potential 
failures introduced during testing. The PDS method also describes how the 
contribution from systematic failures may be added. In the PDS method handbook it 
is argued that random hardware failures only represent a limited fraction of the actual 
experienced failures, and that systematic failures should be included to better predict 
the real performance of the SIS. 
 
IEC 61508 states that the mean time to restoration for a given component should be 
calculated by adding the diagnostic test interval and the (mean) repair time of 
detectable failures. The diagnostic test interval may be omitted if the diagnostic tests 
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are run close to continuously. If the diagnostic tests are run less frequently, it is 
important to also assess the effect of the diagnostic test interval. 
 
3.2 Qualitative requirements 
 
The qualitative requirements comprise measures necessary to determine the 
architectural constraints. There are two approaches to how these requirements are 
applied; they may be applied to specify the required architecture or applied to verify 
if a given architecture corresponds to a specified SIL. 
 
The rationale for introducing architectural constraints is to “achieve a sufficiently 
robust architecture, taking into account the level of subsystem complexity” (IEC 
61508 and IEC 61511). The statement may imply a low confidence in how 
complexity is captured in reliability calculations, since the requirements related to 
architectural constraints limit the achievable SIL regardless of the quantified result. 
There are several reasons why the quantified reliability may be uncertain: 
 
• Only random hardware failures are included in the calculations 
• Failure modes may have been omitted due to misinterpretations  
• Only the average PFD within the proof test interval is usually calculated 
• The failure data used for quantification are uncertain 
• The contribution from software failures is usually not considered 
 
Some of these limitations may be overcome by using more exact reliability 
calculation models, but it is not possible to remove all uncertainty like i.e. uncertainty 
in failure rates. It may therefore seem reasonable to have some qualitative measures 
that may ensure sufficient fault tolerance. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Four-step procedure to determine the architectural constraints 
 
To determine the architectural constraints of a SIF, it is necessary to carry out the 
following analytical steps: 
 
1) Assess and classify the subsystem components 
2) Calculate the SFF for each component 
3) Determine the achievable SIL of the subsystem 
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4) Determine the achievable SIL of the SIF 
 
The four steps, referred to as the four-step procedure, are illustrated in Figure 2.  The 
first three steps determine the architectural constraints for each subsystem. The forth 
step comprises a set of merging rules used to obtain the overall architectural 
constraints of the SIS components used to implement the SIF. 
 
In the following, a more detailed description of the necessary steps is given. 
 
Step 1: Assess and classify the subsystem components 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 require that the subsystem components are assessed and 
classified. The objective is to assess the complexity of the component and thereby the 
uncertainty associated with the components’ behavior. IEC 61508 uses a rather 
generic classification where components are classified as type A or type B. Type A 
components are characterized by well defined failure modes, completely determined 
behavior and sufficiently documented performance by field experience data. 
Sufficiently documented performance means to fulfill the IEC 61508 requirements for 
proven-in-use. Valves and solenoids are often considered as type A components. 
Type B components do not meet one or more of these requirements. Components 
having application software are often considered as type B. 
 
IEC 61511 uses a more industry specific and straightforward classification, and 
defines programmable electronic logic solvers as one class and sensors, final elements 
and non-programmable electronic logic solvers as another class. The latter group is 
considered to have less complexity. The IEC 61511 classification may be used if the 
components are considered as proven-in-use by this standard. To be considered 
proven-in-use by IEC 61511, it is required to document evidence of prior 
performance in safety or non-safety applications. The proven-in-use requirements are 
further discussed by Van Beurden and Van Beurden-Amkreutz [16], who highlight 
the fact that IEC 61508 has straighter requirements to proven-in-use than IEC 61511. 
 
Step 2: Calculate the SFF 
The SFF must be determined for the components of the subsystem using equation (1). 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 assume similar components in redundant configurations; 
hence each subsystem is associated with one SFF value. In case the redundant 
components are dissimilar, it may be necessary to treat the components as 
independent subsystems. 
 
One important issue when calculating the SFF is how the failures are classified. The 
distinction between dangerous detected and undetected failure rates seems to be 
ambiguous, an issue which is further discussed in section 4. At present, it is possible 
to increase the SFF by increasing the safe failure rates.  However, this approach is 
probably not intended by the standards, and may not imply a good engineering 
practice. 
 
The OLF-070 guideline lists generic SFF values for typical components used in the 
petroleum industry. The data have been derived from the PDS data handbook [28] 
that contains generic failure data mainly based on the offshore reliability database 
OREDA [29, 30]. Vendors may also provide failure rates for their components. 
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Regardless of data source selected, it is important to ensure that the data are valid and 
suitable for the application. 
 
Step 3: Determine the achievable SIL of the subsystem 
To determine the achievable SIL of a subsystem, it is first necessary to determine the 
hardware fault tolerance. The hardware fault tolerance is found by assessing the 
voting of the hardware architecture, as explained in section 2.3. Step 3 is repeated 
until all subsystems implementing the SIF have been covered. 
 
The relationship between the achievable SIL, the hardware fault tolerance of a 
subsystem and the SFF is given by the hardware fault tolerance tables in IEC 61508 
and IEC 61511. There are two tables in each standard, one table for each class of 
components, see Table 2. The two tables in IEC 61511 have been transformed so that 
they have a similar setup as the tables in IEC 61508. Note that the table uses the 
following abbreviations: Hardware fault tolerance (HFT), sensor (S), final element 
(FE) and programmable electronic logic solver (PE LS). 
 
 
Table 2:  Hardware fault tolerance tables in IEC61508 and IEC 61511 
IEC61508 IEC 61511 
Type A Type B S, FE, non-PE LS PE LS SFF 
/HFT 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
<60% SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 - SIL1 SIL2 Not relevant - SIL1 SIL2 
60-
90% 
SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 
90-
99% 
SIL3 SIL4 SIL4 SIL2 SIL3 SIL4 Not relevant SIL2 SIL3 Note1 
>99% SIL3 SIL4 SIL4 SIL3 SIL4 SIL4 Not relevant SIL2 SIL3 Note1 
 
 
As seen from Table 2, there are differences between how IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 
relate the hardware fault tolerance to SFF and SIL. This issue is also discussed by 
Van Beurden and Van Beurden-Amkreutz [16]: 
• IEC 61511 does not treat SIL 4 systems 
• IEC 61511 does not give extra credit for SFF above 99%  
• In IEC 61511, the class of sensors, final elements and non-programmable 
electronic solvers is independent of SFF. The hardware fault tolerance versus 
SIL corresponds to a SFF of 60-90%. 
• The IEC 61511 allows a reduction in the hardware fault tolerance by 1 for IE, 
FE and non-PE LS if certain conditions are met. Without this rule, the IEC 
61511 would in most cases require more hardware fault tolerance than if using 
the IEC 61508 classification. 
 
Step 4: Determine the achievable SIL of the SIF 
Once the achievable SIL has been obtained for each subsystem, the next step is to 
develop the achievable SIL of the SIF.  
 
                                                 
1 IEC 61511 does not relate hardware fault tolerance and SFF to SIL4 systems. For SIL4 systems it is 
necessary to comply with the requirements in IEC 61508. 
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IEC 61508 proposes a set of merging rules to be used to determine the achievable SIL 
of the SIF. The merging rules are rather simple; the achievable SIL for subsystems in 
series is restricted by the subsystem having the lowest SIL, while the achievable SIL 
for subsystems in parallel is equal to the subsystem having the highest SIL plus one 
level. The assessment of the subsystems is repeated until the overall achievable SIL 
by architecture is obtained. The merging rules demonstrate that lower SIL 
components may be used to satisfy the needs for a higher SIL function. 
 
4. Ambiguity and uncertainty of architectural constraints 
 
As previously discussed, the architectural constraints have been introduced to ensure 
a sufficiently robust architecture. A fundamental question to ask is why these 
requirements are needed. Another question is whether the requirements may be 
interpreted differently in a way that may lead to different results. 
 
Quantitative risk and reliability assessments are based on the belief that reliability 
may be estimated and that the result has some valuable meaning for decision makers. 
However, such assessments are always based on various assumptions. The gap 
between a reliability model with its assumptions and the real world determines the 
uncertainty of the quantified result. Some potential sources of uncertainty are 
discussed in section 3.2. When the complexity of the system increases, one may 
expect that the uncertainty in the quantified result also increases. The principle of 
introducing architectural constraints may be seen as a precautionary principle [31]; if 
we have insufficient evidence that the safety is good enough, additional measures 
should be introduced. However, it is not evident if the requirements related to 
architectural constraints are able to capture complexity in a better way than existing 
quantitative approaches. 
 
A closer look at the requirements related to architectural constraints, indicate that 
they open up for different interpretation that may lead to different architecture. The 
parameter that seems to be the most ambiguous is the SFF. The uncertainty related to 
classification of components seems to be associated how to comply with the IEC 
61508 requirements for proven-in-use. The definition of hardware fault tolerance is 
rather straight forward, and the uncertainty seems to be related to how well the real 
SIS configurations have been captured in the architecture model (reliability block 
diagram). 
 
There are at least three factors that may lead to different results when calculating the 
SFF. The first factor is the vague distinction between diagnostic testing and proof 
testing. The main uncertainty seems to be related to whether the length of the test 
interval should influence if the test is classified as a diagnostic test or a proof test. 
Today, the standards refer to diagnostic testing as online testing as well as automated 
tests performed continuously or periodically. It seems not clear if “automated or not” 
or “online or not” is the key issue? Ali and Goble [32] have proposed partial stroke 
testing as a means to increase the SFF, without discussing any requirements to the 
diagnostic test interval. Would a partial stroke testing every week versus every two 
months influence how we classify the test? IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 require that the 
diagnostic test interval shall be taken into account through the mean time to 
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restoration when calculating the PFD, but it is not clear from the paper by Ali and 
Goble that this has been done.  
 
A second factor is that the SFF may be increased by increasing the number of safe 
failures. At present, there is no restriction in the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 on what to 
consider as safe failures as long as they are not dangerous. This means that non-
essential features having no meaning for the safety function may be added as a means 
to increase the SFF. This is probably not the intention, and the PDS method has 
therefore proposed an alternative SFF where non-essential (non-critical) failure rates 
are excluded from the safe failure rates. 
 
A third factor is that vendors may calculate failure rates using different assumptions. 
This means that failure rates stated by different vendors may not be comparable, an 
issue that has been discussed by Goble [33]. SFF may therefore not be a parameter 
which is suitable for comparison between different components. 
 
5. Potential improvement of SFF 
 
From the discussions on the ambiguity and uncertainty of architectural constraints, it 
seems clear that the SFF is the main parameter to question. The first question is 
whether or not the parameter is important at all. One perspective is to consider 
hardware fault tolerance as a configuration issue only, where frequency of how often 
the component fail or do not fail is irrelevant. In this case the SFF would be 
superfluous. Another perspective is to consider the diagnostics as important, and 
credit configurations of components with high diagnostic capabilities more than those 
with poor diagnostics. This approach seems to be in line with current intention in the 
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. At present, more research is required to decide which 
alternative that is the best.  
 
To clarify the application of SFF, the standards should define more precisely the 
requirements related to diagnostic test intervals, and give some guidance to when a 
test should be classified as a diagnostic test and when to classify it as a proof test. It 
should also be emphasized that only safe failures affecting the SIF (such as spurious 
trips or alarms) should be included in the calculation of the SFF. The latter proposal is 
in line with the PDS method. 
 
An alternative approach is to replace the SFF by a new parameter. The new 
parameter, called diagnostic failure fraction (DFF), is really a modification of the SFF 
that gives some new features. The DFF is defined as: 
 
 
∑∑∑
∑
∑
∑
++== DUDDS
DD
Tot
DDDFF λλλ
λ
λ
λ
    (2) 
 
 
From equation (2), it is evident that the DFF only credits improvement of the 
components’ diagnostics (increasing the DFF), while any increase in safe or 
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dangerous undetected failures is punished (decreasing the DFF). An increase in the 
dangerous detected failure rate often means a corresponding decrease in the 
dangerous undetected failure rates. It may be desirable to disfavor safe failures since 
spurious trips or false alarms may have negative long term effects due to wear, 
hazardous situations during restoration and reduced confidence in alarms. It should be 
noted that the range of the DFF is different than the present range of SFF, and the 
hardware fault tolerance tables would need to be recalibrated. 
 
6. Discussions and Conclusions 
 
The HSI requirements have been discussed, and various aspects of the requirements 
related to the architectural constraints have been elaborated. A procedure that clarifies 
necessary analytical steps to determine architectural constraints has been proposed. 
 
The discussion on the fundamental question “are the requirements related to 
architectural constraints really needed?” has not been solved, and requires further 
research and discussions. One approach could be to assess some typical 
implementations of SIFs, and evaluate in more detail how the various complexity 
issues are captured by the quantitative and qualitative methods. 
 
It has been shown that SFF is a parameter that may need further clarification. It has 
also been discussed if the SFF should be replaced by a new parameter, DFF. Further 
research is required to determine if such a modification would be advantageous.  
 
It is not always evident how requirements should be clarified or improved. 
Stephenson and McDermid [34] demonstrate an analytical approach for how  
requirements may be rewritten in a way that removes unwanted ambiguities. First, the 
various uncertainty elements of the existing requirements are identified, then the 
various interpretation of the requirements are tested adding necessary assumptions, 
and last the insight obtained is used to rewrite the requirements. Such a process may 
demonstrate necessary guidance and clarifications for future updates of the IEC 
61508 and IEC 61511. 
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Part III
Supplementary information

4Safety instrumented systems
This chapter briefly explains some frequently used concepts and terms that are
used with safety instrumented systems (SISs). The main focus is SIS applications
in the oil and gas industry.
4.1 Key concepts
SISs are used in the oil and gas industry to detect the onset of hazardous events
and/or to mitigate their consequences to humans, material assets, and the envi-
ronment. A SIS belongs to the category of safety systems that uses at least some
electrical, electronic, and/or programmable electronic components.
A SIS is often split into three main subsystems as illustrated in Fig. 4.1; input
elements, logic solvers, and final elements. The input elements are used to detect
the onsets of hazardous events, the logic solver for deciding what to do, and the
final elements to perform according to the decision.
The SIS may perform one or more safety instrumented function (SIF). The
distinction between a SIS and a SIF may be illustrated as in Fig. 4.1. Here, we
assume that the SIS comprises two level transmitters (LT), two pressure trans-
mitters (PT), one programmable logic controller (PLC), two shutdown valves,
and one circuit breaker. A single SIF may use some of these components, as in-
dicated in the figure. It should be noted that the logic solver is often a shared
component for all SIFs that are implemented by the same SIS.
SIS is a term that has been widely accepted in the process industries, includ-
ing the oil and gas industry, and is used by many standards and guidelines on
SIS design, construction, and operation in this industry sector [39, 100]. Still,
some other terms with similar meaning may be found in literature, such as in-
strumented protective system (IPS) and instrumented safety systems (ISS) [13].
IEC 61508, a generic standard on SIS design, construction, and operation, has
adopted the term safety-related E/E/PE systems. For machinery, it is more com-
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Fig. 4.1. The main subsystems of a SIS
mon to talk about safety-related electrical control system (SRECS) [41, 74],
since control and safety functions are often combined in the same system.
A plant or an equipment to be protected may have more than one SIS. In
this case, they are often given names according to their main functions. On oil
and gas installations, we may, for example, find emergency shutdown systems
(ESD), process shutdown systems (PSD), high integrity pressure protection sys-
tems (HIPPS), and fire and gas (F&G) detection system [100].
4.2 SIS technologies
Several authors give thorough descriptions of SIS technologies, see for example
Smith and Simpson [116], Goble and Cheddie [24], MacDonald [73, 74], Gruhn
[27], CCPS [13].
Input elements may be pneumatic or electrical push buttons, pneumatic or
electrical switches, and electrical, electronic, or PE based sensors. The switches
may isolate electrical circuits or depressurize hydraulic or pneumatic lines. Sen-
sors may be used to measure current, pressure, temperature, level, concentration
(e.g., of smoke and hydrocarbon gases), and radiation (e.g., from a fire). Sensors
that are based on PE technology are sometimes referred to as smart sensors or
smart transmitters.
The logic solvers are the SIS’ “brain” and may be constructed using electri-
cal relays, electronic components (e.g., printed circuit boards), or programmable
logic controllers (PLC).
Relay based logic solvers are sometimes referred to as direct wired logic,
since the input elements interact directly with the final elements via electrical
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relays. Printed circuit boards are sometimes called solid state logic, and have a
fixed (printed) arrangement of electronic components such as resistors, capaci-
tors, transistors, diodes, and so on.
A PLC comprises input cards, one or more central processing units (CPU),
output cards, and associated cables for communication. The logic is mainly im-
plemented by software that is downloaded to the CPU. The use of software re-
duces hardware costs and eases the process of doing modifications, but leads at
the same time to more complex systems with the added features that come with
the software.
The decision taken by the logic solver on how to act on the input signals is
determined by how the signals are voted. If the input signals are voted k-out-of-
n, the SIF is performed when k-out-of-n components raise an alarm. The voting
may be implemented by software, hardware, or a combination of both depending
on the technology being used.
The SIS may use more than one logic solver to perform the safety functions.
This approach is sometimes used in railway signaling systems, where two logic
solvers have to agree on setting a green (go) signal, while it is sufficient that one
out of the two logic solvers agrees on setting a red (stop) signal.
Final elements may be valves, relays, and circuit breakers capable of stopping
flow and isolating electrical equipment. To improve safety and reliability, it is
sometimes used more than one final element to perform the same function. In
this case, the physical installation determines how the final elements are voted.
If two valves are installed in the same pipeline, it is sufficient that 1-out-of-2
valves closes to stop flow.
4.3 SIS example
We may briefly illustrate the implementation of a SIS by using a high integrity
pressure protection system (HIPPS) as an example. A HIPPS is used to detect
if the pipeline pressure exceeds a specified set pressure, and to close dedicated
valves to avoid further pressure build-up that may cause pipeline rupture. Pres-
sure build-up may arise from well shut-in pressure (i.e., the maximum wellhead
pressure), or from a sudden pipeline blockage, for example a spurious closure of
a downstream valve.
A HIPPS typically comprises PTs, logic solver(s), and valves. The main com-
ponents of a HIPPS are illustrated in Fig. 4.2.
In this example, the logic solver continuously reads and compares the two PT
signals with a value that corresponds to the high pressure set point. We assume
that the logic solver is configured so that the shutdown valve closes when one
out of the two PTs detects a high pressure.
The shutdown valve has two parts, the actuator and the valve. As indicated in
Fig. 4.2, we assume that this is a gate valve, since this type is often used when
208 4 Safety instrumented systems
Flow
From hydraulic
supply (pump)
To hydraulic
tank (return)
PT
Logic solver
Comparison
& voting
PTPressuretransmitters
Shutdown 
valve
Solenoid
Solenoid
operated
DCV
Pilot 
operated
DCV
Solid state
switches
Power supply
Fig. 4.2. SIS example
rapid closure is required. The actuator includes a spring package that forces the
valve to close upon loss of hydraulic pressure. Without this spring package, the
shutdown valve would be left in the last (open) position.
The shutdown valve is not operated directly by the logic solver, but via two
smaller valves, a solenoid operated hydraulic directional control valve (DCV)
and a pilot operated DCV, illustrated in Fig. 4.2. As for the shutdown valve, the
two smaller valves have springs that force the valves to a specified position upon
loss of signal.
The logic solver initiates the valve closure by isolating the power to the
solenoid operated DCV. Upon loss of power, this DCV switches and depressur-
izes the signal line to the pilot operated DCV. It is the pilot operated DCV that
controls the hydraulic flow to and from the shutdown valve. Upon loss of pilot
signal, the DCV switches so that the shutdown valve actuator is depressurized.
It should be noted that a HIPPS often uses two shutdown valves instead of
one and sometimes more than two PTs to achieve the desired level of safety and
reliability.
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4.4 Other related concepts
A SIS design starts with the analysis of the equipment under control (EUC).
IEC 61508 [38] uses EUC as a collective term to describe an equipment, ma-
chinery, apparatus, or plant that needs some type of protection from the unwanted
consequences of hazardous events. At oil and gas installations, the EUC may be
a process section that contains hydrocarbon gases under high pressures and high
temperatures.
The EUC is usually equipped with an EUC control system that operates the
EUC in a desired manner during normal operation, start-up, and planned shut-
downs [38]. In the process industries, the EUC control system is sometimes re-
ferred to as the (basic) process control system (BPCS) [39]. The EUC control
system monitors EUC states, reads commands from operators, and actuates final
elements so that the desired state of the EUC is achieved or maintained.
Equipment under control (EUC)
EUC control system
Safety instrumented  system (SIS)
Safety systems based on other technology
Other risk reduction facilities
Fig. 4.3. EUC, EUC control system, and safety barriers
EUC control systems and SISs use similar types of technologies and have
the same main subsystems, but they do not face the same safety and reliability
requirements. The EUC control system does not need to comply to the IEC 61508
or related standards, unless safety and control are combined in the same system.
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SISs are not the only means to protect of EUC from unwanted consequences.
Protection may be provided by non-instrumented components and systems (e.g.,
pressure relief valves, rupture disks) and other risk reduction measures (e.g., fire
walls, drain systems, administrative procedures) [38, 39, 115]. Some means are
also inherent properties of the EUC, for example as pressure tolerances of vessels
and pipelines.
The protection means that are added to the EUC and the EUC control system
are sometimes referred to as protection layers [39] or safety barriers [115]. One
way of illustrating the relationship between various protection layers is shown in
Fig. 4.3.
When several protection means (or layer) are used, it is important to ensure
that they are independent. This means that a failure on one means (or layer) does
not lead to a failure of the other. Standards related to safety systems suggest
various means to achieve independence, for example through technical design,
physical installation, and work practises and procedures.
EUC
risk
Tolerable
risk
Necessary risk reduction
SIS
Non-
instrumented
system
Other risk
reduction
facilities
Fig. 4.4. EUC risk, tolerable risk, and risk reduction
For on demand safety systems, the reliability of the protection layers is de-
termined from the necessary risk reduction. The necessary risk reduction is the
difference between the EUC risk and the tolerable risk level, as illustrated in Fig.
4.4. The EUC risk is the risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the
EUC control system [38], and may be expressed as the expected number of a
specified hazardous event (e.g., overpressure) per year. The tolerable risk is the
risk which is accepted in a given context (for example on an oil and gas installa-
tion on the Norwegian continental shelf) based on the current values of society
[39]. The tolerable risk level may be determined by authorities, guidelines, or the
plant owner.
The necessary risk reduction may be allocated to one or more protection lay-
ers, as illustrated in Fig. 4.4. The risk reduction that is allocated to a SIS will be
the reliability target of the associated SIF.
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4.5 Design principles
Three important and frequently mentioned properties of SIS design are fail-safe
operation, fault tolerance, and independence [116, 73, 24, 13].
A SIS that is designed for fail safe operation will, upon specified failures
such as loss of power supply, operate in a way where the safe state of the EUC
is maintained or achieved. On oil and gas installations, the safe state may be to
stop shut down a process section or the whole plant. In this case, the SIS may
use de-energize-to-trip components and fail-to-close (position) valves.
A fault tolerant system is able to function even in the presence of one (and
sometimes several) failures, and may be achieved by having more than one com-
ponent to perform the same function. Fault tolerance may be implemented with
hardware, software, or a combination of both. The level of fault tolerance is de-
termined by how the (software or hardware) components are voted. A k-out-of-n
voted configuration has a fault tolerance of n−k. This means for example that a
2-out-of-3 system can tolerate one failure before the system is unable to perform
its functions, whereas a 1-out-of-3 system tolerates two failures.
Raising the level of fault tolerance improves the reliability, at least when we
assume that the components or systems operate and fail independently of each
other. In practise, the components or systems may not be independent and the
fault tolerance adds more complexity and more maintenance and testing. The
level of hardware fault tolerance should therefore be balanced with the need to
have systems that are easy to comprehend for designers and end users and that
are not too prone to design failures, installation, failures, and maintenance and
testing failures. This issue is further discussed in [71].
To design for independence means, at least in the context of a SIS, that the
system is designed for robustness against common cause failures (CCFs). A CCF
is a failure of more than one device, function, or system due to the same cause
[13]. IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 focus on two types of CCFs: CCFs of redundant
components in a SIS subsystem and CCFs of SISs (or other technology systems)
that are redundant in the sense that they shall provide protection against the same
hazardous event.
In practise, it is difficult to avoid that some common causes of failure are
present, through common design principles, technologies, physical location, and
operational and environmental exposure. But we may reduce the vulnerability
through functional diversity (i.e. use of totally different approaches to achieve
the same result), diverse technologies (i.e. use of different types of equipment
to achieve the same results), separation in physical installation, separation in
common services or support systems, and separation in maintenance and testing
activities (e.g., staggered testing, using different procedures) [104, 126, 67].
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4.6 Failure classification
During SIS design, construction, and operation, it is important to avoid intro-
ducing failures, to reveal failures, and to correct failures. Failure classification
systems are useful means to get more insight into why components fail and what
the consequences are. In the following, we briefly discuss some of the main ap-
proaches for classifying failure causes and effects.
Failure classification in OREDA
OREDA handbooks [101, 60] include reliability data collected from oil and
gas installations. Here, failure causes are classified as either design-related,
fabrication/installation-related, operation/maintenance related, or miscellaneous
(not identified or covered by the other categories).
Failure effects are split into critical, degraded, and incipient. A critical failure
is defined as a failure of an equipment unit which causes an immediate cessation
of the ability to perform a required function. In this context, the term “required
function ” comprises two elements: The ability to activate on demand and the
ability to maintain production when safe (no demands) [114]. This failure cate-
gory therefore includes failures that may prevent the execution of a SIF as well
as unintended (spurious) activation failures.
Degraded failures and incipient failures are partial failures. For degraded fail-
ures, this means that some of the functions have failed, but without ceasing the
fundamental functions. A hydraulic leakage in an actuator for a fail-safe (close)
valve may, for example, lead to spurious closure of the valve, but will not, while
in open position, prevent the valve from closing on demand.
An incipient failure is the onset of a degraded failure, and will, if no correc-
tive action is taken, develop into a degraded failure.
Failure classification in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511
IEC 61508 [38] and IEC 61511 [39] distinguish between random hardware fail-
ures or systematic failures for failure causes and safe and dangerous failures for
the failure effects. The relationship between all failure categories used by the
IEC standards is illustrated in Fig. 4.5.
Random hardware failures are failures that are due to normal degradation, and
which for this reason, may be predicted based on a failure distribution function.
For safety and reliability assessments of SIS, we often assume exponentially
distributed time to failure, which means that we use a constant rate of occurrence
of failures (“failure rate”).
Systematic failures are failures that are introduced due to design errors, im-
plementation errors, installation errors, or operation and maintenance errors. Un-
like random hardware failures, their occurrence cannot be predicted. Instead, the
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Fig. 4.5. Classification of failures
IEC standards suggest a number of methods and requirements for avoidance and
control with systematic failures. In practise, systematic failures as well as ran-
dom failures are recorded by the oil companies, and we may assume (even if it is
not mathematically correct) that failure rates to some extent reflect both failure
categories.
A failure type that does not fit entirely into the classification system of sys-
tematic or random hardware failures, is the CCFs. Per definition, these failures
are dependent failures [108] and cannot be classified as random random hard-
ware failure. For this reason, they should belong to the class of systematic fail-
ures. A systematic failure is, however, used to classify individual failures, while
a CCF includes the failure of more than one component. Still, the causes of sys-
tematic failures and CCFs are similar, and defense measures against systematic
failures may therefore also be efficient means to defend against CCFs.
When including CCFs in reliability calculations, we extract a fraction (e.g.,
β) of the random hardware failure rate and classify it as the CCF rate. This means
that we indirectly give CCFs some of the same properties as the random failures,
for example a constant failure rate. This is a somewhat contradicting approach,
but still widely used in the industry.
IEC 61508 [38] and IEC 61511 [39] distinguish between safe and dangerous
failure effects. A dangerous failure is a failure which has the potential to put the
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safety instrumented system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state [39], whereas
a safe failure does not have this potential. A failure that prevents the valve from
closing on demand is defined as a dangerous failures, while a spurious valve
closure is defined as a safe failure. This may indicate that the IEC standards
consider spurious activation as less safety-critical than OREDA.
Safe and dangerous failures may be further split into detected and undetected
failures. A detected failure is a failure that is revealed by online diagnostics [39],
and, in some cases, by operators during normal operation [114] and which is
corrected or acted upon shortly after its occurrence.
Undetected failures are failures that are only revealed by a function test or
upon a demand. The dangerous undetected failures are therefore of vital impor-
tance when calculating the SIS reliability as they are a main contributor to SIS
unavailability.
Other classification systems
The PDS method [114] also distinguishes between random hardware failures
and systematic failures. Here, the aging (normal degradation) failures are related
to random hardware failures, while environmental stresses, design failures, and
(human) interaction failures are considered to be causes of systematic failures.
In practise, it is often difficult to discriminate between an aging failure or a stress
failure [114]. As illustrated with the dotted line in Fig. 4.5, the class of random
hardware failures may sometimes include both environmental stress related fail-
ures and aging failures.
The PDS method has adopted the concept of safe and dangerous failures
for classifying failure effects. In addition, they use the concept of critical and
non-critical failures. The main intention with this amendment is to distinguish
between the more “severe” safe failures (i.e. spurious activations) and the less
severe ones (e.g., small drift in signal).
The approach taken by the PDS method has some practical benefits, partic-
ulary when calculating the safe failure fraction (SFF). The SFF is used in the
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 to determine the required level of hardware fault tol-
erance, and is the fraction of safe and dangerous detected failures among all fail-
ures. The use of the SFF as a design parameter has been criticized, as it may be
manipulated by adding superfluous equipment with high safe failure rates [71].
By extracting the non-critical failures from the safe failure category, the ability
to manipulate the SFF is reduced.
5SIS related standards and guidelines
This chapter gives an overview of some frequently used standards and guidelines
for SIS design, construction, and operation. The main focus is the oil and gas
industry, but some other industry sectors are also briefly discussed.
5.1 Industry practises
International standards and guidelines on SIS design and follow-up have evolved
over a number of years [73, 24]. The first initiatives were taken in the 1970s as
a response to a number of industry related accidents, like the explosion at the
Flixborough plant in 1974 and the large chemical release from the Seveco plant
in 1976. For the offshore oil and gas industry, the large accident at the Piper
Alpha installation in 1988 influenced the design of safety systems onboard oil
and gas installations. Results from the accident investigations led to new legisla-
tions and directives like e.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Adminstration
(OSHA) Process safety management (PSM) legislation (USA), the Seveso II leg-
islation on prevention of chemical accidents, and the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE) safety case regulations.
In addition to the lessons learnt from accidents, the industry recognized that
the use of new technology in SIS designs could lead to new type of SIS failures
[24]. Programmable electronic controllers (PLCs) had started to replace tradi-
tional relay logics, and safety functions were implemented by software instead
of by physical devices. The use of software allowed for more flexibility and re-
duced hardware acquisition costs.
The globalization of the process industry during the 1980s and 1990s re-
sulted in a demand for international practises rather than national practises and
guidelines [13]. The IEC 61508 titled functional safety of electrical/electronic/
programmable electronic safety-related systems was developed for this pur-
pose. The standard was based on a number of recognized national standards
[29, 16, 17, 102, 7, 31], and developed further to fit the purpose of being a generic
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standard for development of safety systems where electrical, electronic or pro-
grammable electronic devices are key elements. A key element of the IEC 61508
is to approach SIS development using a life cycle perspective. The process sector
specific standard, IEC 61511, has been developed with IEC 61508 as basis, but
adjusted to the concepts and technology used in the process industries.
IEC 61508 and related standards are not automatically mandatory unless
they are referenced by national authority regulations. Such a reference is given
in the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). HSE also recognizes
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 as good engineering practise, while OSHA refers
to ANSI/ISA 84.00.01 [8], the US version of IEC 61511. The Norwegian Rail-
way Inspectorate refers to sector specific standards that build on the IEC 61508
[20, 21, 22].
5.1.1 Oil and gas industry
The overall requirements for equipment and systems are provided by the national
authorities. In Norway, onshore and offshore oil and gas installations must adhere
to the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) regulations. The main requirements for
SIS are found in the PSA activity regulations, the management regulations, and
the facility regulations. For maritime systems onboard mobile rigs and floating
production storage and offloading (PFSO) vessels, the regulations provided by
the Norwegian Maritime Directive apply.
In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the authority for on-
shore and offshore oil and gas installations, while in the US, the authority is
split between Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), Minerals
Management Service (MMS), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).
Some of the standards that are referenced by the PSA and therefore apply to
the Norwegian oil and gas industry, are shown in Fig. 5.1. The standards have
the following title and scope:
• ISO 10418 [55] Petroleum and natural gas industries - Offshore production
installations - Basic surface process safety systems: This standard describes
protection means for process related equipment and systems. The standard
is a replacement for API RP 14C. For implementation of the safety instru-
mented functions, the standard makes reference to IEC 61511.
• ISO 13702 [56] Petroleum and natural gas industries - Control and mitiga-
tion of fires and explosions on offshore production installations - Require-
ments and guidelines: This standard concerns design of fire and gas detection
and mitigation systems.
• IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and OLF 070 [38, 39, 100]: These standards are cov-
ered in more detail in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
• ISO/FDIS 14224 [60] Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries -
Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment:
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Fig. 5.1. Some of the standards that apply to SIS used on oil and gas installations
This standard gives guidance on failure recording and classification and is
based on the approach in OREDA [101] and in NORSOK Z-008 [92].
• NORSOK S-001 [91] Technical safety: This standard provides the Norwegian
best practise principles and requirements for design of instrumented and non-
instrumented safety systems. For fire and gas detection systems, the standard
supplements the requirements in ISO 13702.
• NORSOK P-001 [90] Process design: This standard provides the Norwegian
best practise requirements for topside process piping and equipment design
in general, and propose means to handle process deviations. The standard
makes reference to the ISO 10418 [55].
• NORSOK I-001 [88] Field instrumentation: The standard provides the Nor-
wegian best practise requirements for the selection of field sensors, hook-up
details and documentation requirements.
• NORSOK I-002 [89] Safety and automation systems (SAS): This standard
covers the Norwegian best practise requirements for programmable elec-
tronic systems used for control and safety functions. The standard does not
specify which safety functions that are required, but focuses on technical de-
sign features such as human-machine interfaces, alarm and event handling,
wiring and termination, management of access rights, and so on.
• ATEX directives [3, 1]: These directives give requirements for design and
follow-up of equipment that has the potential to cause ignition in areas with
explosive atmospheres. Further information about the ATEX directives is
given in Section 5.2.1.
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The NORSOK standards have been developed by as a joint effort by oil com-
panies in Norway. The objective was to replace existing company specific stan-
dards with a common set of technical requirements, and in this way contribute
to improved safety, value creation and cost efficiency. Some of the NORSOK
standards have become internationally accepted and been developed further into
ISO standards. One such example is the ISO 14224 standard.
As illustrated in Fig. 5.1, the company may still have additional standards
and guidelines that can apply for SIS design, construction, and operation.
5.1.2 Nuclear industry
Numerous international guidelines and standards apply for SIS design, construc-
tion, and follow-up in the nuclear power industry, and many of them are listed in
IEC 61513 [40] Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control for systems
important to safety - General requirements for systems. Many of the referenced
standards are published by IEC and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). IEC 61513 [40] links these standards to IEC 61508 [116].
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation (NUREG) is the pub-
lisher of several reports that have got wide acceptance internationally. One guide-
line is NUREG/CR-6090 [97] on PLCs and their application in nuclear reac-
tor systems. NUREG/CR-5485 [96] describes different approaches for treating
CCFs in probabilistic risk assessments, while NUREG/CR-5460 [95] describes
a cause-defense methodology for CCFs. Recently, IEC has published a new stan-
dard IEC 62340 [44] that also addresses requirement related to CCFs.
CCFs are given extensive attention in the nuclear power industry, and the Nu-
clear Energy Agency (NEA) has initiated the International Common Cause Data
Exchange (ICDE) project to encourage collection and analysis of data related
to CCF events [86]. Several reports with CCF data have been published, see for
example in NEA [83, 84, 85].
5.1.3 Railway industry
Railway signalling systems installed in Europe have traditionally adhered to Eu-
ropean Norms (EN). After the introduction of IEC 61508, they have been updated
with references to this standard. EN 50126 is the overall approach to SIS spec-
ification design, construction, and operation, and describes the railway sector
version of the overall SIS life cycle requirements. As opposed to the IEC 61508,
the standard puts explicit emphasis on availability and maintainability require-
ments. The standard also encourages European industry inter-operability [116],
meaning to ease railway traffic between European countries. An international
standard IEC 62278 [42] has been developed that is based on EN 50126.
EN 50128 [21] and EN 50129 [22] give requirement for software and hard-
ware design and construction, and have similar scope as IEC 61508, part 3
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and IEC 61508, part 2. A frequently applied principle is to use redundant logic
solvers with diverse software. As with EN 50126, EN 50129 and EN 50128 are
now available as IEC standards, IEC 62425 [45] and IEC 62279 [43].
EN 50129 specifies a particular structure of the documentation of compliance
to the EN 50128 and EN 50129, the technical safety report. The technical safety
report is one section of the overall safety case that is required by EN 50126 and
which describes, in all respects, how the system complies with EN 50126 and its
references standards.
A railway signalling system is usually considered as a high demand (continu-
ously operating) system, since each train passing or request for leaving a station,
which may be several times a day, represents a demand.
5.1.4 Automobile applications
The amount of programmable devices in cars is increasing. Components that
used to be pure mechanical (e.g., the gear systems, braking systems) can now be
replaced by software implemented functions. The systems experience a demand
each time they are activated by the driver, and control and safety functions are
highly integrated. Many of these functions are therefore operating in the contin-
uous mode.
Some differences between traditional SIS design and the safety related sys-
tems in cars, are for example [129]:
• Instead of hardware redundancy, the safety related systems in cars often use
software diversity to reduce space requirements and costs.
• While a SIS in many industry sectors is one of a kind, the safety related
systems for cars are reproduced in large volumes.
• While many SISs are operated by trained personnel, a car driver may have
little or no competence on the systems he or her are operating.
• While SISs in many industry sectors cannot be tested under real demand
conditions, it is possible to perform such testing for safety related systems in
cars.
Before the Motor Industry Reliability Research Association (MISRA) pub-
lished a development guideline for vehicle based software [79] in 1994, there
were no national or international guidelines that applied specially to in such ap-
plications [129].
The MISRA guideline distinguishes between five integrity levels (0 to 4)
[116], but does not assign quantitative reliability targets or ranges for these lev-
els. Instead, each integrity level corresponds to a risk level and a corresponding
(qualitative) acceptable failure rate.
IEC 61508 has not achieved acceptance within the automobile industry. They
feel that the standard has too little focus on real-time embedded systems, that
the current automotive development processes are not reflected, that too little
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guidance on the manufacturer/supplier relationship is provided, and that too little
focus is given on product development for the mass market [129].
A sector specific standard, ISO 26262 [58], is now under development and
is scheduled for publishing in 2008. The ISO 26262 will apply to SIS installed
in road vehicles of class M, N and O, which by 70/156/EEC [2] is defined as
cars used for the carriage of passengers, cars used for the carriage of goods, and
trailers.
The ISO 26262 adopts a customer risk-based approach for determination of
risk at the vehicle level and provides automotive-specific analysis methods to
identify SIL requirements and for developing hardware and software according
to these requirements.
Similar to the current MISRA guideline, the ISO 26262 does not assign a
probabilistic target value to each SIL. ISO 26262 has therefore introduced ASIL
to indicate a slightly different SIL concept than what is used in the IEC 61508.
The industry has also used another approach to integrity classification, where
the integrity is split into four levels A to D. The categories A to D corresponds
to ASIL 1 to ASIL 4, where C is defined in the middle range of what IEC 61508
define as SIL 2 and SIL 3. SIL 4 is not considered relevant since road vehicles do
not trigger catastrophic events that would require this amount of risk reduction.
The ISO 26262 recognizes that redundancy is not required to enhance reliability
and safety even for ASIL 3 systems.
5.1.5 Civil aviation
The national authorities, which in Norway is the Civil Aviation Authority, give
reference to international regulations, standards, and guidelines. For aircrafts and
air traffic management in Europe, these references include standards and guide-
lines developed by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the Joint
Aviation Authority (JAA).
Civil aviation require global collaboration as aircrafts travel from one coun-
try to another. The international Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a global
forum for civil aviation and works to achieve harmonized regulations, standards,
and guidelines.
5.2 Cross sector standards
5.2.1 ATEX directives
The potential presence of explosive atmospheres on plants affects the selection
of SIS components. Plants that handle combustible materials may occasionally
have small leakages from flanges, valves, and pipes. Explosive atmospheres are
created when combustible materials like gases, vapor, and dust are mixed with
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oxygen. On oil and gas installations, there may occasionally be hydrocarbon
gases in the wellhead and process areas, whereas explosive gases and dust may
be present from time to time at chemical plants.
To cause an explosion, it is necessary to have an ignition source. Ignition
sources may be high temperature surfaces, open fires, and electrical charges.
Electrical equipment may have high temperature surfaces and produce arcs and
sparks. When installed in areas where explosive atmospheres may be present,
all electrical equipment must be designed or located so that they are not able
to be ignition sources. Equipment that are designed to not cause ignition are
sometimes referred to as explosion (ex) proof equipment [3, 34].
Standards and regulations have been developed for design and selection of
ex-proof equipment. One standard is the IEC 60079 [34]. The standard comprises
a number of parts, each addressing one particular implementation of explosion
proof protection. Some alternative methods are:
• Oil-filled protection, where all electrical components are submerged in oil so
that the mixture is too rich to produce an explosive atmosphere.
• Sand-filled protection, where all electrical components are submerged in
sand, so that neither explosive gases and dust nor oxygen can get in contact
with the components.
• Explosion proof protection, where all electrical components are encapsulated
in a housing with flameproof joints. The housing is designed to withstand
an internal explosion, and the flame proof joints prevent the transmission of
explosion to the surroundings.
• Increased safety protection, where additional measures have been taken that
reduce the probability of having high temperature surfaces, arcs and sparks
during normal operation and specified abnormal conditions.
• Intrinsic protection, where all electrical components are designed with energy
limitations so that they do not cause ignition during normal operation and
some specified failure conditions.
• Overpressure protection, where one or more electrical components are encap-
sulated in a housing with supplied or mechanically generated overpressure.
Equipment for use in areas with explosive atmospheres and which are to be
sold and used within the European market must comply to the ATEX directives.
The ATEX directives are the product directive 94/9/EC [3] and the user directive
1999/92/EC [1]. The product directive addresses product design and is directed
towards the electrical component manufacturers. 94/9/EC [3] describes the over-
all approach to product design of equipment to be used in areas with explosive
gases, and is not restricted to only electrical equipment. For detailed design of
electrical equipment, further reference is made by 94/9/EC [3] to the European
Norms EN 50014 through EN 50028. As such, EN 50014 through EN 50028
have similar scope as IEC 60079.
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The user directive focuses on the safety of workers, and describes principles
for assessment of explosion risk, including classification of areas (or zones) ac-
cording to their explosion risks. The user directive also addresses the selection
of explosion proof design principles according to the area classification.
5.2.2 Machinery directive
Machinery produced for the European market must meet the requirements of
ISO 13849 [57]. This ISO standard replaces the previous European Norm EN
954-1:1996 on safety of machinery. The ISO 13849 provides life cycle require-
ments for specification, design, implementation, construction, operation, main-
tenance, and modifications of control and safety systems in rotating machinery.
Machinery systems have close integration of control and safety functions and
operate usually in the high demand (continues) mode.
A new international standard IEC 62061 [41] for machinery that builds on
the IEC 61508 has been developed. Here, the SIS is referred to as safety-related
electrical control system (SRECS) to reflect the close integration of safety and
control functions. The requirements in ISO 13849 are compatible with the re-
quirements provided by IEC 62061, but uses some slightly different concepts.
One example is the use of performance level instead of SIL.
5.3 IEC 61508
The international standard, IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/ electronic/
programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems is the overall or “um-
brella” standard for safety instrumented systems and covers multiple industries
and applications [24, 116, 12].
A primary objective of the IEC 61508 standard is to serve as a guideline
to help individual industries develop sector specific standards, tailored specifi-
cally for their industry but at the same time in accordance with the IEC 61508
requirements. A secondary objective is to enable the development of E/E/PE
safety-related systems where related sector standards do not already exist. The
IEC 61508 may also be used for to qualify new E/E/PE technology for use in
safety related applications. This is one reason for why the IEC 61508 is some-
times referred to as the ‘vendors standard’.
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IEC 61508 has seven parts:
Part 1: General requirements
Part 2: Requirements for E/E/PE safety-related systems
Part 3: Software requirements
Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations
Part 5: Examples of methods for the determination of safety integrity levels
Part 6: Guidelines on the application of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3
Part 7: Overview of techniques and measures
The first three parts are normative parts while the remaining four parts pro-
vide informative annexes to the standard.
IEC 61508 is often referred to as a performance-based standard. This means
that the standard intends to describe the required behaviour of systems and pro-
cesses, rather than giving prescriptive requirements on how the systems shall be
implemented. Taking into account the standards size, some users may still find
the standard rather prescriptive.
Part 1 defines the overall requirements associated with safety related systems
and introduces the safety life cycle to structure the requirements. Part 1 applies
safety systems in general, but regarding realization of safety systems the standard
is restricted to E/E/PE technologies. It describes the steps that are necessary to
identify the EUC hazards and risks, to allocate the necessary risk reduction to
different safety related systems, and the activities that are necessary to plan for
and execute overall system integration, validation, installation, commissioning,
operation, maintenance, modifications, and finally, decommissioning.
SIS design and realization are covered in part 2 and part 3. Part 2 provides
requirements for hardware design and the integration of hardware and software.
In addition, part 2 outlines the principles and methods for demonstrating that a
SIF fulfils the specified reliability targets defined in the preceding phases.
Part 3 gives requirements for the selection, implementation, and verification
of software tools, applications, and programming languages. A number of prin-
ciples and recommendations related to the selection of tools, language, and de-
velopment process are proposed to ensure adequate level of safety integrity.
A brief description of the remaining parts of the standard is that part 4 lists
definitions and abbreviations that are used elsewhere in the standard, part 5 sug-
gests ways to determine the SIL, part 6 is a guideline on the application of part 2
and 3, and part 7 gives specific recommendations associated with tools, methods,
and approaches.
Several international organizations have developed guidelines that suit the
needs of different industry sectors. Some examples are:
• IEC 61511 Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the process
industry. The Instrument Society of America (ISA) has independently de-
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veloped ANSI/ISA S84.01 Application of safety instrumented systems for the
process industries that is similar to IEC 61511.
• IEC 62061 Safety of machinery – Functional safety of electrical, electronic
and programmable electronic systems. This standard was initially developed
as a European standard to support the EU Machinery Directive.
• IEC 61513 Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control for systems
important to safety – General requirements for systems.
• EN 50126 Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of re-
liability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS).
• EN 50128 Railway applications – Software for railway control and protection
systems.1
• EN 50129 Railway applications – Safety related electronic systems for sig-
nalling.
• IEC 60601 Medical electrical equipment
Some of these standards have already been mentioned, while others will be
discussed later.
5.3.1 The safety life cycle
IEC 61508 uses the safety life cycle as a framework to structure its own require-
ment. The safety life cycle comprises 16 phases, as illustrated in Fig. 1.2 in
part I, section 1.1.3. The initial five phases (1-5) lead up to the functional safety
requirements, stating what the SIS is required to do, and the safety integrity re-
quirements, stating how well the SIS is require to perform. These requirements
may, together with the assumptions under which the requirements have been de-
veloped, be documented in a safety requirement specification (SRS). The SRS is
an important document for the subsequent phases of SIS safety life cycle.
Phase 9 is the realization phase of SIS and specifies the work processes and
design principles for hardware and software design and integration. Phase 9
should be performed separately for each SIS. The safety life cycle also indicates
that other means may be used for risk reduction, by using other technologies
(e.g., pure mechanical systems) or other risk reduction facilities (e.g., fire walls,
drain systems). However, the IEC 61508 does not include requirements for how
these systems should be designed and constructed.
Phases 12 and 13 outline the main activities and principles for the overall
installation, commissioning, and validation. Overall means here that all safety
systems that were specified in the SRS are to be considered. Validation refers to
the activities that are necessary to document compliance to the requirements and
assumptions in the SRS.
Parallel to the realization phase, the IEC 61508 specifies necessary planning
of overall installation, commissioning, validation, and operation and mainte-
nance. The main purpose is to ensure that adequate procedures, tools, and work
1 EN 50126 and EN 50128 were based on earlier drafts of IEC 61508.
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processes are in place to maintain the functional safety and safety integrity. Fail-
ure recording and analyses are two important activities for measuring the safety
integrity. If the SIS does not perform according to the specified functional safety
and safety integrity requirements, it is necessary to implement (e.g., design mod-
ifications, adjustments of functional test and inspection intervals) will have to be
implemented.
Phase 15 specifies the handling of modifications. Key aspects is to analyze the
impact of the proposed modifications, and determine the life cycle phase to return
to for proper implementation (phases 6 to 8). In some cases, operating conditions
or plant modifications may introduce new hazards and risks. In this case, it may
be necessary to return to the initial phases so that any new or modified functional
safety and safety integrity requirements are identified and catered for.
Phase 16 denotes the last phase of the SIS life, and covers the necessary
cautions that must be taken when the SIS is decommissioned and dismantled.
5.3.2 Safety integrity
Safety integrity is used as a measure of how well a safety function (e.g., a SIF)
shall perform. The IEC 61508 distinguishes between four safety integrity levels
(SIL), where SIL 1 is the lowest (least reliable) level and SIL 4 is the highest
(most reliable). For each SIL, it is specified a target range for the PFD. In addi-
tion, the SIL outlines the requirements for architectural constraints.
It is distinguished between three categories of safety integrity:
• Hardware safety integrity
• Software safety integrity
• Systematic safety integrity
Architectural
constraints
PFD
Software 
safety
integrity
Systematic
safety 
integrity
SIL 
requirement
Hardware safety integrity
Fig. 5.2. Illustration of safety integrity categories and SIL
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Hardware safety integrity is split into two parts: One part is associated with
the quantitative requirements and the other part concerns the architectural con-
straints. The quantitative requirements address how to calculate the probability
of failure on demand (PFD) for SIS that works on demand, or alternatively the
probability of a dangerous failure per hour (PFH) for continuously operating SIS.
The architectural constraints are used to achieve a sufficiently robust architecture
and not selecting hardware architecture based on calculations alone.
The systematic safety and software safety are handled by qualitative require-
ments. To achieve a specified SIL, it is necessary to select and demonstrate ade-
quate use of the corresponding methods that are proposed for this SIL.
IEC 61508 requires that all three safety integrity categories meet the specified
SIL before the SIL can be claimed for the SIF. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. If
one of the categories fails to meet SIL 2, for example for the software, the SIF is
not a SIL 2 function even if SIL 2 is supported by the reliability calculations.
5.4 IEC 61511
IEC 61511 is the process sector version of the IEC 61508. IEC 61511 is directed
at the system level designers, integrators, and end users rather than for vendors
developing new devices, and the standard is therefore sometimes referred to as
the ‘end user’ standard. It follows the requirements of IEC 61508, but modifies
them to suit the practical situation, concepts and terms in the process industry
[73]. The IEC 61511 refers to E/E/PE safety systems as safety instrumented sys-
tems (SIS).
The standard consists of three parts:
Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements
Part 2: Guidelines for the application of IEC 61511, part 1
Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels
Part 1 and 2 have similar scope as part 1 to 3 of IEC 61508, whereas part
3 of IEC 61511 corresponds to the content of part 5 of IEC 61508. The main
amendment to part 3 in IEC 61511 compared to part 5 in IEC 61508 is the layers
of protection analysis (LOPA), a method that is frequently used in the process
industry [123].
There are some situations where IEC 61511 directs the end users or system
integrators back to IEC 61508 [117]:
• The devices is new and does not have any documented evidence for being
compliant to IEC 61508 (proven-in-use).
• A device is being modified and/or used in a manner not intended by the ven-
dor.
• A SIL 4 is specified for the SIF.
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• A device is being programmed using full variability language.
A first rule of thumb is that IEC 61511 applies to SIS up to SIL 3 if the
SIS is based on proven-in-use components or components that are developed
and verified according to IEC 61508. In this context, proven in use means (i)
that there is appropriate documented evidence of previous use, and (2) that the
component is suitable for use in this particular application [39]. A second rule of
thumb is that the IEC 61511 requirements apply to safety functions up to SIL 2
when off-the-shelf PLCs are being used [116].
That components are to be developed and verified according to IEC 61508
does not necessarily imply that a certification is required. However, certified bod-
ies sometimes provide certificates after they have assessed a particular product.
The certificate may indicate that the component is suitable up to a certain SIL,
given some assumptions about application specific conditions such as functional
test intervals and fail safe operation.
Different national organizations have developed separate guidelines on the
application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 that take national regulations and prac-
tices into account. Some of these guidelines are:
Guide to the application of IEC 61511 to safety instrumented systems in the UK
process industries [19]:
Representatives of the Energy Industry Council (EIC), Engineering Equipment
Manufacturers and Users Association (EEMUA), United Kingdom Offshore Op-
erators Association (UKOOA), and HSE are currently developing a guide to the
application of IEC 61511 to SIS in the UK process industries. The guide dis-
cusses how the various IEC requirements should be interpreted in light of the
UK regulations and practices. The guideline does not suggest the same approach
as the OLF 070 with respect to minimum SIL requirements.
ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004, Functional safety: Safety instrumented systems for
the process industry sector (IEC 61511 mod)[8]:
This is the recommended practice for US process industries. The pre-runner of
this standard, the ANSI/ISA-84.01, Application of safety instrumented systems
for the process industries, was used as basis for development of IEC 61508 as
well as IEC 61508. Through the ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004, the US has adopted
the IEC 61511 requirements with some exceptions. Summers [122, 117, 124,
119] discuss some of the differences. An important distinction between ANSI/ISA-
84.01 / ANS/ISA-84.00.01 and IEC 61511 is the grandfather clause. The grand-
father clause is derived from the OSHA 1910.119 PSM regulation, and concerns
SIS installed prior to the issuance of the ANSI/ISA standards. The clause ask for
verification that the SIS is designed, maintained, and operated in a safe manner.
This means that the plant operator or owner should verify that the SIS not built
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according to the IEC 61508, IEC 61511 requirements, or ANSI/ISA standards is
built, operated, and maintained according to recognized and generally accepted
engineering practices [124, 119, 118].
UKOOA Guidelines for instrumented protective systems [127]:
This guideline represents an early interpretation of the IEC 61508 standard in
UK. The guideline has extended the use of risk graph to also consider require-
ments for environment and loss of production [116].
OLF 070 Guidelines for the application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the
Norwegian petroleum industries[100]:
The OLF 070 guideline has been developed by the Norwegian Oil Association.
The objective has been to simplify the implementation of the IEC standards.
The guideline does not take a full risk based approach like IEC 61508. As the
Norwegian PSA requires that any new approaches to SIS design should at least
be as good or better than current practices, the OLF 070 includes calculations
of PFD for typical SIFs and proposes the corresponding SILs as minimum SIL
requirements. The underlying assumption is that the SIFs are according to the
requirements in ISO 13702 [56] and ISO 10418 [55]. The reliability calculations
are preformed with the PDS method [114, 113].
Other IEC 61508/IEC 61511 related guidelines:
The instrumentation, systems, and automation society (ISA)2 has developed
guidelines on more specific issues related to SIS reliability assessments and SIS
design, implementation, operation and maintenance, as for example:
• ISA TR 84.00.04-1 [50]: Guidelines for the implementation of ANSI/ISA-
84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 mod).
• ISA TR 84.00.04-2 [51]: Example implementation of ANSI/ISA84.00.01-
2004 (IEC 61511 mod).
• ISA TR 84.00.02 [48]: Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) - Safety Integrity
Level (SIL) Evaluation Techniques. Parts 1-5.
• ISA TR 84.00.03 [49]: Guidance for testing of process sector safety instru-
mented functions (SIF) implemented as or within safety instrumented sys-
tems (SIS).
• ISA TR 96.05.01 (draft) [52]: Partial stroke tesing of automated block valves.
2 ISA has recently been given a new interpretation; The International Society of Automation.
AAcronyms and Abbreviations
AC Architectural constraints
ABS Anti-block breaking system
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASIL Automobile safety integrity level
ATEX ATmospheres EXplosibles (French)
BIP Brukerstyrte inovasjonsprosjekter (User controlled innovation projects)
BPCS Basic process control system
CCF Common cause failure
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CPU Central processing unit
DC Diagnostic coverage
DCV Directional control valve
DD Dangerous detected
DU Dangerous undetected
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EC European Commission
EEMUA Engineering Equipment Manufacturers and Users Association
E/E/PE Electrical, electronic, programmable electronic
E/E/PES Electrical, electronic, programmable electronic system
EIC Energy Industry Council
EN European Norm
ETA Event tree analysis
EUC Equipment under control
FDIS Final draft international standard
FMEA Failure modes and effects analysis
FMECA Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis
FMEDA Failure modes, effects, and detectability analysis
FPL Fixed programming language
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FSA Functional safety assessment
FTA Fault tree analysis
FVL Full variability language
HAZOP Hazard and operability study
HFT Hardware fault tolerance
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HW Hardware
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICDE International Common Cause Data Exchange
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IDEF Integrated definition language
IE Input element(s)
IEC International Electrotechnical Committee
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
I/O Input/Output
IPS Instrumented protective systems
ISA Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISS Instrumented safety system
JAA Joint Aviation Authority
LOPA Layers of protection analysis
LS Logic solver
MISRA Motor industry reliability research association
MTBF Mean time between failure
MTTR Mean time to repair
NEA Nuclear Energy Agency
NORSOK Norsk sokkels konkurranseposisjon (Eng: Competitive position for
the Norwegian continental shelf)
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
NUREG US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OLF Oljeindustriens landsforening (Eng: The Norwegian Oil Industry
Association)
OREDA Offshore Reliability Data
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PFH Probability of a dangerous failure per hour
PLC Programmable electronic controller
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (Norway)
PSM Process safety management (legislation, OSHA)
PST Partial stroke testing
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RBD Reliability block diagram
ROCOF Rate of occurrence of failures
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SAT Site acceptance test
SD Safe detected
SFF Safe failure fraction
SIF Safety instrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SINTEF Foundation of Science and Technology at the Norwegian Institute
of Technology
SIS Safety instrumented system
SO Spurious operation
SRCS Safety-related electrical control system
SRS Safety requirement specification (may also mean safety-related sys-
tem)
STR Spurious trip rate
SU Safe undetected
SW Software
UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
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Accident: An unintended event or sequence of events causing death, injury,
environmental, or material damage [14].
Note: In the context of event tree analysis, we may define the end events
involving death, injury, environmental, or material damage as accidents.
Accident scenario: An accident scenario includes an initiating event, a related
sequence of subsequent events, and a resulting undesired consequence [75].
Note: An undesired consequence corresponds to an end event involving
death, injury, environmental, or material damage.
Actual performance: The product performance that is experienced in field,
based on observations and feedback from customers and end users (deduced
from Murthy et al. [80]).
Note: In the context of SIS, the observations may for example include the
number and type of failures that are recorded.
Analysis (risk): Systematic use of available information to identify hazards
and to estimate the risk [54].
Architecture: Arrangement of hardware and/or software elements in a system,
for example a SIS [39].
Architectural constraints (AC): Used by IEC 61508 [38] and IEC 61511 [39]
to denote the requirements that restrict the freedom in selection of hardware
architecture.
Assessment (risk): The overall process comprising a risk analysis and a risk
evaluation [54].
Automatic testing: A test which consists of simulated process conditions to a
logic solver which cause the logic solver to take specified action and signal a
final control element to move to a specified position [49].
Note: The test may be trigged automatically, for example on specified calen-
der time, or by humans.
Availability: May be defined as either:
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• The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under
given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given time interval,
assuming that the required external resources are provided [33].
• A measure of reliability of repairable components or systems [108].
Safety barrier: Physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, con-
trol, or mitigate the undesired events or accidents [115].
Note: A SIS may be considered as a barrier system.
Basic event: The bottom or “leaf” events of a fault tree. The limit of resolution
of the fault tree [81]. Examples of basic events are component failures and
human errors.
Basic process control system (BPCS): See EUC control system.
Best estimate analysis: Used in the context of accident analysis, and defined
as analysis that [32]:
• Is free from deliberate pessimism regarding selected acceptance criteria;
• Uses a best estimate code;
• Includes uncertainty analysis.
Note: This definition can also be applied for safety and reliability assess-
ments.
Best estimate code: A code which [32]:
• Is free of deliberate pessimism regarding selected acceptance criteria;
• Contains a sufficiently detailed model to describe the relevant processes
required to be modeled.
Channel: Element or group of elements that independently performs a func-
tion[39].
Code: For accident analysis in the nuclear industry, see e.g., IAEA [32], the
term ‘code’ seems to include what we refer to as system models, input data,
and calculation approach.
Confidence level: We may relate confidence level to confidence intervals or
statistical tolerance limits [32]:
• Confidence intervals: Probability p that the confidence interval to be com-
puted from the sample will contain the true parameter value.
• Statistical tolerance limits: Probability p that the limits to be computed
will cover the specified proportion α of the population (probability con-
tent α). The confidence level is specified to account for a possible sam-
pling error due to the limited sample size, for example a limited number
of calculations, from which the statements are obtained.
Configuration: Used with the same meaning as architecture. May be used to
describe software as well as hardware.
Conservative analysis: Analysis leading to pessimistic results relative to a
specified acceptance criterion [32].
Note: In the context of SIS, a conservative analysis may be defined as an
analysis where conservative assumptions are made for the model, the data,
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and the calculation approach so that the calculated PFD most likely is higher
than what we may experience once the SIS is put into operation.
Common cause failure (CCF): CCF may be defined as either:
• Failure of more than one device, function, or system due to the same cause
[13].
• Failure, which is the result of one or more events, causing failures of two
or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system
failure [38].
• Failure (or unavailable state) of more than one component due to a shared
cause during the system mission [82]
• Multiple component faults that occur at the same time or that occur in a
relatively small time interval and that are due to a common cause [81].
Note: The four definitions indicate some of the differences in the interpreta-
tion of what a CCF is. Some restrict the concept of CCFs to events within
a single safety function, while others include CCFs between different func-
tions. Some restrict CCFs to events that occur within the same mission time
(e.g., same flight, same functional test interval), while others do not have this
restriction.
Complex interactions: Those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and un-
expected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensi-
ble [107].
Complexity: Not easy to understand; complicated (Oxford Dictionary).
Note: IEC 61508 [38] uses the classification of type A and B components
to distinguish low complex components from those that are more complex.
Here a type A component is characterized by (i) all failure modes are well
defined, (ii) the behavior of the component under fault conditions is well
known, and (iii) field data are dependable and able to confirm the failure
rates that are claimed, while a type B component does not meet one or more
of these criteria.
Component: One of the parts of a system, subsystem, or device performing a
specific function [39].
Note: In some situations, the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 use “element” and
“device” with the same meaning.
Coupling: Coupling may be used in two different contexts; for classifying
CCF causes and for classifying systems:
• In relationship with CCF causes: A coupling factor explains why several
components are affected by the same root cause (e.g., inadequate material
selection for several valves) [104, 105].
• In relationship with system classification: Perrow [107] uses coupling to
express the degree of dependencies between system components:
– Tight coupling means that there is no slack or buffer between two
items, and what happens in one item will directly affect what happens
in the other.
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– Loose coupling means that there is such slack or buffer, and the items
may operate independently of each other.
(Cumulative) distribution function: Consider a random variable X . The (cu-
mulative) distribution function of X is [108]:
FX(x) = Pr(X ≤ x)
Construction: Construction is sometimes used with quite different meaning,
for example as:
• A process that consists of the building or assembling of infrastructure
(Wikpidia).
• The analysis, design, manufacture, fabrication, placement, erection, in-
stallation, modification, inspection, or testing of a facility or activity
which is subject to the regulations in this part and consulting services
related to the facility or activity that are safety related (U.S. Nuclear reg-
ulatory commission regulations, title 10, Code of Federal Regulations,
part 21, Reporting of defects and noncompliance).
Note: In the context of SIS, construction may be used to describe the assem-
bling of hardware, the development of application software, and the integra-
tion of hardware and software.
Continuous mode: The mode of operation for a SIS where a dangerous failure
may lead to an immediate hazardous event [39].
Note: IEC 61508 uses high demand/continuous mode in the same meaning as
IEC 61511 uses continuous mode. A SIS that experiences more than one de-
mand per year or more than one demands during a period of two subsequent
functional test interval, shall be considered as working in the continuous
mode [38]
Critical failure: Failure of an equipment unit which causes an immediate ces-
sation of the ability to perform a required function [60].
Dangerous failure: Failure which has the potential to put the safety instru-
mented system in a hazardous or fail-to function state [39].
Data: A representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized man-
ner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or
by automatic means [13].
Note: In reliability modeling and calculation, we distinguish between input
and output data. Input data are the values that we assign to the model pa-
rameters, for example the failure rates. Output data are the values that we
obtain from the calculations, for example the average PFD.
The terms generic data, predicted data, experience data, historical data,
plant specific data, and field data are sometimes used. These terms may be
given the following meaning:
• Generic data: Data that represent a property, for example the failure rate,
for a group of similar components, for example pressure transmitters.
Generic data may be based on experience data or predicted data.
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• Predicted data: Data that are based on the aggregation of failure rate
models for subcomponents like integrated circuits, transistors, diodes,
resistors, capacitors, relays, switches, and connectors. Such failure rate
models are provided by e.g., MIL-HDBK-217F [77].
• Experience data: Data that is based on historical performance. OREDA
[101] publishes data handbooks with failure rates that are based on
recorded failures in the oil and gas industry. Historical data is often used
with the same meaning as experience data.
• Plant specific data: Experience data that are based on information col-
lected for a specific plant. Field data is used with the same meaning as
plant specific data.
Degraded failure: Failure that does not cease the fundamental function(s), but
compromises one or several functions [60].
Demand mode: Where a specified action (for example, closing of a valve) is
taken in response to undesired process conditions or other demands. In the
event of a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented function a potential
hazard only occurs in the event of a failure in the process or the BPCS [39].
Note: IEC 61508 uses low demand mode in the same meaning as IEC 61511
uses demand mode. A rule of thumb in IEC 61508 is that that a SIS operates
in the (low) demand mode if it experiences one or less demands per year or,
alternatively, one or less demands during a period of two subsequent func-
tional test interval.
Dependability: Collective term used to describe the availability performance
and its influencing factors: reliability performance, maintainability perfor-
mance and maintenance support performance [33, 35].
Dependent failure: Failure whose probability cannot be expressed as the sim-
ple product of the unconditional probabilities of the individual events which
caused it [38, 39].
Note: CCFs is a category of dependent failures.
Desired performance: What the consumers or end user expect from a product
[80].
Note: In the context of a SIS, the desired performance is stated through the
functional safety (what to perform) and safety integrity requirements (how
well to perform) [38, 39]. In addition, we may add other reliability, avail-
ability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) requirements.
Detected: In relation to hardware and software faults, detected by the diagnos-
tic tests or through normal operation [39].
Note: IEC 61508 also includes failures that detected by proof tests (e.g., func-
tional tests) into the category of detected failures, but this approach has not
adopted by the process industry.
Deterministic method: A deterministic method has the following features in
common with probabilistic methods (deduced from [32]):
• Code and transients are identified
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• Uncertainties are identified
Deterministic methods does not use probability distributions for model pa-
rameters. Instead, reasonable uncertainty ranges or bounding values are spec-
ified that encompass, for example, available relevant experimental data. The
statements of the uncertainty code results are deterministic, not probabilistic.
Device: See component.
Diagnostic coverage (DC): Ratio of the detected failure rate to the total failure
rate of the component or subsystem as detected by diagnostic tests [39].
Note: Diagnostic coverage does not include any faults detected by proof tests.
Diagnostic test interval: The interval between on-line tests to detect faults in
a safety-related system that has a specified diagnostic coverage [38].
Note: The contribution from diagnostic tests is often negligible when calcu-
lating the PFD, provided that the diagnostic test interval is short. Currently,
IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 provide little guidance on what is meant by “
short”.
Diversity: Existence of different means performing a required function[39].
Note: Diversity is not the same as redundancy, as redundancy may be
achieved by having similar/or same means performing the required function.
E/E/PE (safety-related) system: System for control, protection or monitor-
ing based on one or more programmable electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic (E/E/PE) devices, including all elements of the system such as
power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other
communication paths, and actuators and other output devices [38].
Note: E/E/PE system corresponds to SIS in IEC 61511.
Electrical (logic solver): Sometimes referred to as relay based or direct wired
logic. The input elements and the final elements are connected in a common
electrical circuit, so that the state of the input elements directly determines
the state of the final elements.
Element: See component.
End event: A description an outcome of an accident scenario in an event tree
analysis.
Equipment: See component.
Equipment under control (EUC): A collective term used to describe equip-
ment, machinery, apparatus, or plant to be analyzed.
Error: Discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or con-
dition and the true, specified or theoretical correct value or condition [33].
Estimated performance: An estimate of an objects performance, based on ob-
servations and feedback from customers (deduced from [80]).
Note: The estimated performance is based on observations and is therefore
our best measure of an object’s actual performance. In the context of a SIS,
the estimated performance may be calculated based on for example:
• The number of dangerous detected and undetected dangerous failures;
• The functional test intervals;
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• The number of spurious activations;
• The average repair times for detected and undetected failures.
EUC control system: System which responds to input signals from the pro-
cess and/or operator and generates output signals causing the EUC to operate
in the desired manner [38].
Note: On an oil and gas installation and in the process industry in general,
the EUC control system is the same as what is sometimes described as pro-
cess control systems. Therefore, IEC 61511 uses the term basic process con-
trol system (BPCS) instead of EUC control system.
EUC risk: Risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the EUC control
system [38].
Evaluation (risk): Procedure based on the risk analysis to determine whether
the tolerable risk has been achieved [54].
Event tree: A logic tree diagram that starts from a basic initiating event and
provides a systematic coverage of the time sequence of events propagating to
its potential outcomes or consequences [108].
Event tree analysis: Identification and analysis of potential outcomes and con-
sequences of an initiating event.
External risk reduction facilities: Measures to reduce or mitigate the risks,
which are separate and distinct from the SIS [39].
Note: Such measures may be drain systems and fire walls.
Factory acceptance test (FAT): The following definitions indicate when and
what a FAT is about:
• The test performed for an equipment or system at the construction site
(factory) before it is is moved to its final destination.
• A test conducted to determine and document equipment hardware and
software operates according to its specification, covering functional, fault
management, communication, support systems, and interface require-
ments [13].
Fail safe: Denotes an equipment or a system that, upon specified failures such
as loss of utilities, will operate in a way such that the safe state of the EUC
is achieved or maintained.
Failure: The termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a re-
quired function [33].
Failure cause: The circumstances during design, manufacture or use that have
led to a failure [33].
Failure mode: The effect by which a failure is observed on a failed item [108],
that is in which way an item is no longer able to fulfill a required function.
Note: For a shutdown valve, a failure mode may be ‘Not able to close on
demand’. Failure modes should not be mixed with failure causes. For a valve
it is not relevant to talk about ‘corrosion’ as a failure mode.
Failure rate: The formal definition of the rate at which failures occur as a func-
tion of time and is the life distribution of a single component. If T denotes
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the time to failure of an time, the failure rate z(t) is defined as [108]:
z(t) = lim
Δt→∞
Pr(t < T ≤ t+Δt | T > t)
Δt
Note: The failure rate may be understood as the “proneness to failure” and
is for this reason sometimes called “force of mortality (FOM)” [108].
Fault: The state of an item characterized by inability to perform a required
function [108].
Fault tree: A logic diagram that displays the interrelationships between a po-
tential critical event in a system and the causes for this event [108].
Note: Analogue terms for critical events are initiating events and hazardous
events.
Fault tree analysis: Two useful definitions are:
• Identification and analysis of conditions and factors that cause or may
potentially cause or contribute to the occurrence of a defined top event
[37].
• An analytical technique, whereby an undesired state of the system is spec-
ified (usually a state that is critical from a safety or reliability standpoint),
and the system is then analyzed in the context of its environment and op-
eration to find all realistic ways in which the undesired event (top event)
can occur [81].
Fault tolerance: Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required
function in the presence of faults or errors [39].
Final element: A SIS element that implements the physical action necessary
to achieve a safe state. Builds on the definition of final element in IEC 61511
[39].
Functional safety: Part of the overall safety relating to the process and the ba-
sic process control system (BPCS) which depends on the correct functioning
of the SIS and other protection layers [39].
Functional safety assessment: Investigation, based on evidence, to judge the
functional safety achieved by one or more protection layers [39].
Functional (or function) test: Used the process industries in the same mean-
ing as proof test.
Hardware safety integrity: Part of the safety integrity of the safety instru-
mented function relating to random hardware failures in a dangerous mode
of failure [39].
Harm: Physical injury or damage to the health of people, either directly or
indirectly, as a result of damage to property or to the environment [54].
Hazard: Potential source of harm [54].
Note: Hazards may lead to hazardous events in combination with some trig-
gering event(s). Icy streets can represent a hazard, but a hazardous event
does not occur before the hazard is combined with a triggering event e.g., a
car starts to slide off the road.
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Hazardous event: Hazardous situation which may lead to harm.
Note: In practise, we may consider an hazardous event to be an initiating
event. But hazardous events may also be the undesired outcome of an event
in an event tree.
High demand mode: See continuous mode.
Human error: Human action or inaction that produces an unintended result
[39].
Note: Unintended result may be the same as an undesired event. Human er-
rors are sometimes also referred to as mistakes.
Initiating event: The first significant deviation from the normal situation that
may lead to a system failure or an accident [108].
Note: We may refer to an hazardous event as an initiating event.
Input element: An element used to monitor the process and its associated
equipment in order to provide input information for the logic solver. Builds
on the definition of input function in IEC 61511 [39].
Instrumented protective function (IPF): A protective function allocated to
an instrumented protective system that provides the risk reduction necessary
to reduce the risk in an identified hazardous event below the owner/operator
risk criteria [13].
Note: IPF has the same meaning as SIF.
Instrumented protection (protective) system (IPS): Composed of separate and
independent combination of sensors, logic solvers, final elements, and sup-
port systems that are designed and managed to achieve a specified risk reduc-
tion. An IPS may implement on or more instrumented protective functions
(IPF) [13].
Note: IPS has the same meaning as SIS.
k-out-of-n: A configuration of n redundant elements, where k elements must
perform the required safety functions in order to perform the SIF (Slightly
modified compared to the definition used in IEC 61511 [39]).
Note: This definition gives the conditions for successful performance of a
subsystem. In some cases, k-out-of-n is used to describe the conditions for
system failure. To distinguish between the two types of notations, we may
denote the first type as k-out-of-n:G (for good) and the latter as k-out-of-
n:F (for fail).
Linear interactions: Those in expected and familiar production or mainte-
nance sequences, and those that are quite visible even if unplanned [107].
Logic solver: That portion of either a BPCS or SIS that performs one or more
logic function(s) [39]. In practice, the logic solver reads signals from the
input elements, makes decisions on how to respond to these signals, and set
output signals accordingly.
Manual test: A test which consists of simulating process conditions using the
input device to a logic solver causing the logic solver to take specified action
and signal a final control element to move to a specified position [49].
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Note: To this definition, we may add that the simulation process is performed
by humans.
Minimal cut set: A smallest combination of basic events whose occurrence
results in the occurrence of the top event of a fault tree [81].
Mode of operation: Way in which a safety instrumented function operates
[39].
Note: See also (low) demand mode and continuous/high demand mode.
Necessary risk reduction: The risk reduction required to ensure that the risk
is reduced to a tolerable level [39].
Non-critical failure: Failure of an equipment unit which does not cause an
immediate cessation of the ability to perform its required function [60].
Note: Degraded failures are often considered as non-critical failures.
Off-line testing: Testing performed while the process or equipment being pro-
tected is not being operated to carry out its designated function [49]
On-line testing: Testing performed while the process or equipment being pro-
tected is operating performing its designated function [49].
Partial stroke testing (PST): The following two definitins may apply:
• Confirmed movement of a block valve from the normal operating state
towards the designated safe state [7].
• A test that partially closes a valve, and then returns it to the initial position
[69].
Partial testing: Method of proof testing that checks a portion of the failures
of a device, e.g., partial stroke testing of valves and simulation of input or
output signals [13].
PST coverage: The fraction of DU failures that are detected by the PST [69]
PST reliability: A measure of the PST hardware and software ability to pro-
vide reliable and useful test results, within the scope of the test [69].
Predicted performance: An estimate of an object’s performance, obtained
through analysis, simulation, testing, and so on [80].
Note: In the context of a SIS, the use predicted performance to characterize
the future intended performance of the SIS. As such, the predicted perfor-
mance of a SIS may be documented through:
• Safety analysis reports
• Results from FAT and SAT
Prior use: See proven-in-use.
Probabilistic method: A probabilistic method has the following features (de-
duced from IAEA [32]):
• Code and transients are identified.
• Sources of uncertainties are identified.
• The input parameters to be studied, and their associated probability dis-
tribution functions, are selected.
• The statements of the uncertainty code results are probabilistic.
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Probability density function: Consider a random variable X . The probability
density function fx(x) of X is [108]:
fX(x) =
dFx(x)
dx
= lim
Δx→∞
Pr(x < X ≤ x+Δx)
Δx
Process deviation: A state where the plant has left its normal operating condi-
tions.
Process industry: The industries involving extraction of raw materials, their
transport and their transformation (conversion) into other products by means
of physical, mechanical and/or chemical processes using different technolo-
gies (Wikipedia).
Note: The process industry includes petroleum extraction, treatment, refin-
ing, petrochemical, chemical and pharmaceutical industries, pulp and paper
manufacturing, mining, etc. (Wikipedia).
Producer: Derivative of produce, which means to make, manufacture, or cre-
ate (Oxford Dictionary).
Note: Producer is often used with the same meaning as a manufacturer.
Proof test: Test performed to reveal undetected faults in a safety instrumented
system so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to its designed func-
tionality [39].
Note: Periodically performed proof tests are often referred to as functional
tests.
Protection layer: Any independent mechanism that reduces risk by control,
prevention, or mitigation [39].
Note: The term has a similar meaning as the term safety barrier.
Proven-in-use: A category of components with documented evidence, based
on the previous use of the component, that they are suitable for use in a safety
instrumented system (deduced from IEC 61511 [39]).
Note: Prior use is a term that has similar meaning as proven-in-use.
Quality: Degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfils requirements[59].
Note: ISO 9000 defines requirements as need or expectations that is stated,
generally implied or obligatory. In the context of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511,
we may consider requirements to be restricted to those that are stated.
Random hardware failure: Failure, occurring at a random time, which results
from a variety of degradation mechanisms in the hardware [39].
Redundancy: The use of multiple elements or systems to perform the same
function; redundancy can be implemented by identical elements (identical
redundancy) or by diverse elements (diverse redundancy) [39].
Note: Redundancy and fault tolerance are related terms. The fault tolerance
of a redundant components are determined by how the components are voted,
see the definition for k-out-of-n.
Risk: Risk is often defined as the combination of the frequency of occurrence
of harm and the severity of that harm [54].
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Note: Kaplan [63] suggests that risk comprises three elements; the scenario
(what can happen or go wrong?), the frequency (how likely is it?), and the
consequences (in terms of injury, death, environmental damages, or material
damages).
Risk acceptance criteria: Criteria that are used to express a risk level that is
considered tolerable for the activity in question [93].
Risk analysis: See analysis.
Risk assessment: See assessment.
Risk evaluation: See evaluation.
Root cause: A basic cause of a component failure [104, 105].
Safe failure: Failure which does not have the potential to put the safety instru-
mented system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state [39].
Note: Spurious activations are usually considered as safe failures, as the
EUC is taken to a safe state. The concept of safe failure should not be mixed
with what OREDA[101, 60] defines as non-critical failures. In OREDA [101,
60], spurious activation failures are defined as critical failures as they lead
to unavailability of the function or equipment.
Safe failure fraction (SFF): The SFF is a property of a component or com-
ponent group. The IEC standards [38, 39] define SFF as the proportion of
“safe” failures among all component failures
SFF =
λS + λDD
λS + λDD + λDU
where λS is the rate of safe failures, λDD is the rate of dangerous detected
(DD) failures, and λDU is the rate of dangerous undetected (DU) failures of
a component.
An alternative interpretation is that the SFF is a conditional probability [71]:
SFF = Pr(The failure is “safe” | A component failure occurs)
Hence, we may interpret SFF as a measure of the inherent safeness of a com-
ponent, that is, to what extent the component responds in a safe way when a
failure occurs.
Safe state: State of the EUC (process) when safety is achieved [38, 39].
Safety: Freedom from unacceptable risk [53, 54].
Safety analysis report (SAR): SAR is a term introduced by OLF-070 [100]
and denotes the document that describes how an equipment or a system meets
the requirements of the safety requirement specification that has been allo-
cated to the equipment or system.
Note: The SAR should include evidence of compliance of the equipment’s or
system’s contribution to hardware safety integrity, software safety integrity,
and systematic safety integrity.
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Safety and reliability analysis: Systematic use of available information to
identify safety and reliability influencing factors and to predict or estimate
their impact on safety and reliability (deduced from ISO-IEC Guide 51 [54].
Safety and reliability assessment: The overall process comprising safety and
reliability analysis and safety and reliability evaluation (based on the ISO-
IEC Guide 51 [54] definition of assessment).
Safety and reliability evaluation: The process using the results from the safety
and reliability analysis to determine if the desired performance has been
achieved.
Safety function: Function to be implemented by a E/E/PE safety-related sys-
tem, other technology safety-related systems or external risk reduction facil-
ities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state of the EUC, in
respect of a specific hazardous event [38].
Safety instrumented control function: Safety instrumented function with a
specified SIL operating in continuous mode which is necessary to prevent
a hazardous condition from arising and/or to mitigate its consequence [39].
Note: This term is analogue to the term Safety-related electrical control sys-
tem (SRCES) used in the Machinery directive IEC 62061 [41].
Safety instrumented function (SIF): Safety function with a specified safety
integrity level which is necessary to achieve functional safety and which can
be either a safety instrumented protection function or a safety instrumented
control function [39].
Note: In literature, a more common definition of a SIF is that it is a safety
function that is implemented by a SIS.
Safety instrumented protection function: See instrumented protection func-
tion.
Safety instrumented system: Instrumented system used to implement one or
more safety instrumented functions. An SIS is composed of any combination
of sensor (s), logic solver (s), and final elements(s) [39].
Safety integrity: Average probability of a safety instrumented system satis-
factorily performing the required safety instrumented functions under all the
stated conditions within a stated period of time [39].
Safety integrity level (SIL): Discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the
safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions to be al-
located to the safety instrumented systems. Safety integrity level 4 has the
highest level of safety integrity; safety integrity level 1 has the lowest [39].
Safety life cycle: Specification that contains the safety integrity requirements
of the safety instrumented functions that have to be performed by the safety
instrumented system(s) [39].
Safety manual: Manual which defines how the device, subsystem or system
can be safely applied [39].
Safety margin: The difference in physical units, between a threshold that char-
acterizes an acceptance criterion and the result provided by either a best es-
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timate or a conservative calculation. In the case of best estimate calculation,
the uncertainty band must be used when defining the safety margin [32].
Safety-related electrical control system (SRCES): Electrical control system
of a machine whose failure can result in an immediate increase of the risk(s)
[41].
Safety-related system (SRS): Designated system that both [38]:
• Implements the required safety functions necessary to achieve or maintain
a safe state of the EUC; and
• Is intended to achieve, on its own or with other E/E/PE safety-related sys-
tems, other technology safety-related systems or external risk reduction
facilities, the necessary safety integrity for the required safety functions.
Safety requirement specification (SRS): Specification that contains all the
requirements of the safety instrumented functions that have to be performed
by the safety instrumented systems [39].
Scenario: We may define a scenario as:
• A description of what can go wrong [63].
• A single or sequence of events with the potential to cause harm.
Note: In risk analysis, we often use the term accident scenario. However, the
term does not seem to have a proper definition.
Sensitivity analysis: Two definitions may apply:
• Quantification of the degree of impact of the uncertainty from the indi-
vidual input parameters of the model on the overall model outcome (un-
certainty importance analysis) [32].
• Performed in a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to indicate analysis
inputs or elements whose value changes cause the greatest change in par-
tial or final risk results [82].
SIS designer: A SIS designer may be a person that develops concepts and de-
tails on how a SIS may be built and constructed.
Note: Builds on the following definitions: (i) A designer is a person who de-
signs something (Wikipedia), and (ii) design may be a plan (with more or less
detail) for the structure and functions of an artifact, building or system (Wik-
tionary). A SIS designer may sometimes be referred to as a system integrator.
SIS manufacturer: A SIS business engaged in manufacturing some product.
Note: This definition builds on the following definitions: (i) Manufacturer
is a business engaged in manufacturing some product (Princeton), and (ii)
manufacturing may be considered as fabrication, which is the act of making
something (a product) from raw material (Princeton).
Site acceptance test (SAT): A SAT may be defined as:
• A test performed for an equipment or system at its final destination (site)
prior to start-up.
• A test conducted to determine and document that a new or modified in-
strumented protective system meets the design basis, is installed in accor-
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dance with construction, installation, and software requirements, and is
ready to start up [13].
Software: Software in a safety instrumented system with application, embed-
ded or utility software functionality [39]. IEC 61511 distinguishes between
three types of software program types:
• Application software: Software specific to the user application. In gen-
eral, it contains logic sequences, permissives, limits and expressions that
control the appropriate input, output, calculations, decisions necessary to
meet the safety instrumented functional requirements. See fixed and lim-
ited variability language
• Embedded software: Software that is part of the system supplied by the
manufacturer and is not accessible for modification by the end-user. Em-
bedded software is also referred to as firmware or system software. See
3.2.81.1.3, full variability language
• Utility software: Software tools for the creation, modification, and docu-
mentation of application programs. These software tools are not required
for the operation of the SIS
Software language: IEC 61511 [39] distinguishes between the following three
languages:
• Fixed program language (FPL): In this type of language, the user is lim-
ited to adjustment of a few parameters (for example, range of the pressure
transmitter, alarm levels, network addresses).
• Limited variability language (LVL): This type of language is designed to
be comprehensible to process sector users, and provides the capability to
combine predefined, application specific, library functions to implement
the safety requirements specifications.
• Full variability language (FVL): This type of language is designed to be
comprehensible to computer programmers and provides the capability to
implement a wide variety of functions and applications
Software safety integrity: Measures that signifies the likelihood of software
in a programmable electronic system achieving its safety functions under all
stated conditions within a stated period of time [38].
Spurious activation: A collective term used to characterize an improper, false,
or non-genuine transaction from one state to another. We may distinguish
between the following categories of spurious activations [70]:
• Spurious operation: A spurious operation is an activation of a SIS element
without the presence of a specified process demand.
• Spurious trip: A spurious trip is activation of one or more SIS elements
such that the SIS performs a SIF without the presence of a specified pro-
cess demand.
• Spurious shutdown: A spurious shutdown is a partial or full process shut-
down without the presence of a specified process demand.
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Start-up: The state of putting the equipment or system into operation at the
final destination.
System: Set of elements, which interacts according to a design; an element of
a system can be another system, called a subsystem, which may be a control-
ling system or a controlled system and may include hardware, software and
human interaction [39].
Systematic failure: Failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause,
which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the man-
ufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant
factors [39].
Systematic safety integrity: That part of the safety integrity of safety instru-
mented function relating to systematic failures in a dangerous mode of failure
[39].
Tolerable risk: Risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current
values of society [39].
Top event: The initial event of a fault tree or success tree. Also called the un-
desired event in case of a fault tree [81].
Transient: In risk assessments in the nuclear industry, see e.g., IAEA [32],
transients seem to be a state where the plant has left its normal operating
conditions. A transient may therefore be interpreted as a process deviation.
Triggering (trigger) event: Two definitions may apply:
• An event that activates a failure, or initiates the transition to the failed
state, whether or not the failure is revealed at the time the trigger event
occurs [96].
• An event that in combination with one or more hazards may develop into
an hazardous event.
Uncertainty: Two definitions that may apply:
• Measure of the scatter in experimental data or calculated values. It is ex-
pressed by an interval around the true mean of a parameter resulting from
the inability to either measure or calculate the true value of that param-
eter (scatter). The uncertainty is often given as a (e.g., 95%) probability
(confidence) limit or probability interval [32].
• A measure of our degree of knowledge or confidence in the calculated
numerical risk results [82].
Note: In the context of safety and reliability assessment of SIS, we may define
uncertainty as the degree of doubt in our ability to capture the relevant factors
in model, the data, and/or the calculations.
Uncertainty analysis: Analysis performed to evaluate the degree of knowl-
edge or confidence in the calculated numerical risk results [82].
Uncertainty range or bound (deterministic or probabilistic: Depending on
the uncertainty method used, the state of knowledge about an uncertain pa-
rameter is given as a ‘bounding’ range, ‘reasonable’ uncertainty range or as
a probability distribution [32].
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Undesired event: Technical failures, human errors, external events, or a com-
bination of these occurrences that may realize potential hazards. We may
consider accidents, hazardous events, initiating events, and basic events as
undesired events.
Undetected: In relation to hardware and software faults not found by the diag-
nostic tests or during normal operation [39].
Note: This definition deviates from the one that is used in IEC 61508. How-
ever, it is the IEC 61511 version of the definition that is used in most safety
and reliability assessments.
Utility systems: A common term to describe pneumatic, hydraulic, and power
supply systems.
Note: An utility system may also be called a support system.
Validation: Confirmation through the provision of objective evidence that
specified requirements have been met [38].
Note: IEC 61508 uses the term in relation with the activities of demonstrating
that the deliveries from one safety life cycle phase meets the objectives and
requirements set for the specific phase.
Verification: Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evi-
dence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled
[38].
Note: IEC 61508 uses the term in relationship with the activities of demon-
strating that the SIS under consideration, before or after installation, meets
in all respect the safety requirement specification.
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